1In recent years, migration has become an increasingly pressing political issue in many countries, in Europe and beyond, played out notably through media coverage of the hardships faced by asylum seekers, and of anti-immigrant agendas of right-wing political movements. Journalistic and social discourse, in many languages, often distinguishes “migrants” (commonly perceived as having few economic resources) from “expats” (students or relatively wealthy professionals whose expatriation is generally temporary) (Calabrese & Veniard 2018). In the commercial struggle for audience, media discourse tends to privilege sensationalism, often presenting migration as a threat, and simplistic visions of “Us vs. Them”, including essentialising uses of the notion of culture (Dervin 2013). This is notably the case in the context of “deep mediatization”, characterised among other things by the fragmentation of media audiences and the associated polarisation of politicised discourse (Couldry & Hepp 2016; Hepp, Breiter, & Hasebrink 2018). Critical voices in intercultural communication (Dervin 2011b; Dervin & Machart 2015; Nakayama & Halualani 2010), have warned about the negative impact of simplistic visions of culture, which can be seen to lead to a vicious circle accrediting populist xenophobia and discourse presenting migration as a threat to social cohesion.

2France has a long history of migration, notably as a “land of immigration”, having absorbed migrants from different countries of origin at various points in the country’s history (Noiriel 1988). Yet in recent years, while immigration flows are not at a historically high level, nationalist and xenophobic discourse has been gaining ground in the public sphere (Noiriel 2010), a process mirrored by the historical rise and apparent de-radicalisation of the political extreme right. Social debate about migration in France is framed in the light of the “Republican Integration Model”, which puts the onus on migrants adapting their behaviour to dominant social norms in the French public sphere, rather than the opposite. Indeed, multiculturalist models which seek to take into account supposed cultural differences are often dismissed in French political discourse as “communitarian” approaches, commonly associated with North America and the English-speaking world, and seen to lead to situations which subversively legitimise (foreign or ethnic) identity claims (Schnapper 2007; Wieviorka 2008). However, the republican model has also been criticised for not taking into account previous or alternative models of socialisation to which the individual may have been exposed, and insisting instead on the importance of learning and conforming to what are presented as French practices and values (Hachimi Alaoui 2016; Wieviorka 2008 :226). Individuals arriving in the country are expected to assimilate what is expected of them, sometimes with short formal training in French republican values and institutions, and then left to find their own way in society, often with the help of associations, religious and diaspora groups. Faced with the pedagogical challenge of diversity, a combination of political, social and economic factors have led to the institutionalisation of an approach which seems to consist in disqualifying this diversity in the face of a normative French societal model, rather than helping migrants to deconstruct, reconfigure and build upon their existing individual representations. This paper argues that the objective of social cohesion motivating the integration policy can be more effectively promoted by paying attention to evolving individual representations in the ongoing process of socialisation.

3Scientific literature from communication science, and from the field of intercultural communication in particular, can be used to focus on this process. Studies on “acculturation” and “culture shock” have traditionally concentrated on businesspeople or students, notably when looking to improve “adaptation” to host societies via training or tools, leaving a partial gap in the literature as regards other categories of migrants, typically less affluent. Moreover, tools designed for all of these publics are often based on premises which tend to objectify national cultures (Dervin 2014). Although growing up in a given national setting may influence individuals’ views or behaviours in a general way, knowledge and representations are multiple and continue to evolve through the ongoing process of socialisation, which is especially pronounced during phases of contact with new social groups or a host society, as individuals seek to understand and adapt to new social configurations. Behaviours in any given setting are not conditioned by national cultures but linked to many different factors, not least of which are the identities attributed to those present (Frame 2013b). It follows that training to help people understand such phenomena should to take into account national cultures and identities not as deterministic ontologies, but rather as social constructs guiding expectations, which have an impact on the way people act towards one another.

4This paper thus focuses on the epistemology of intercultural communication in information and communication sciences, and the way that dominant theories and concepts of this “inter-discipline” have contributed to shape our thinking about migrants and migration. In reaction to critical voices in intercultural communication, it aims to show how emerging, liquid, negotiated definitions of culture can be used to rethink the questions of integration and social cohesion. By factoring in social discourse and identity dynamics when seeking to understand the cultural dimension of these processes, it argues, we are better able to address some of the most pressing issues in today’s societies, marked by growing populism and xenophobia. Finally, taking into account the French model and based on a research-action project currently in progress, it will make the case for an integration policy including measures to actively engage their target public in a reflexive, individualised way, and outline tools which could be used to achieve this.

An intercultural approach to migration in communication science: epistemological foundations

7Parallel to the comparative approaches, other studies tried to look beyond specific national cultures, to deal with intercultural competence in the context of (generally professional) expatriation (Wiseman & Koester 1993). They put the accent on the individual’s specific competencies helping them deal with international settings and work assignments, evaluated via tests and developed through various training and coaching methods (Humphrey 2007; Matsumoto & Hwang 2013; Spencer-Oatey & Stadler 2009). As with Earley and Ang’s work on cultural intelligence (CQ), the aim of such studies is generally to identify affective, behavioural and cognitive qualities (Earley & Ang 2003) which help individuals become more “effective” at communicating and managing internationally.

8Less directly inspired by the needs of multinational corporations, another important trend in IC concerned questions of face and politeness (Brown & Levinson 1987) in intercultural interactions (Spencer-Oatey 2000, 2007; Ting-Toomey 1994). Inspired by sociology and adopting an interpretivist stance, these studies question the existence of universal values associated with politeness and study the way people manage face in difference societies (macrosocial level) or through facework in interactions between individuals of different nationalities (microsocial level).

11On the epistemological level, positivist approaches to IC are often distinguished from interpretative ones (Friedman 2014; Ogay 2000; Romani 2008; Romani, Barmeyer, Primecz, & Pilhofer 2018). The former, which Victor Friedman associates with the period 1960s-1980s, include comparative approaches and work on (national) cultural adaptation. They reduce culture and communication to dependant variables, linked to the national culture or personality of individuals, rather than considering them as complex emergent social processes. This “cultural differences paradigm” suggests that communication problems come from differences in national cultures that need to be overcome. The ‘solution’ proposed is to learn to understand these differences and adapt to them, or have the other person adapt, in order to communicate “efficiently” (Dervin 2011a :39). This first paradigm, which often failed to differentiate macro- and microsocial approaches to cultures and communication, was then challenged by proponents of an interpretivist, performative, social constructionist or symbolic interactionist paradigm (Spencer-Oatey & Franklin 2009), focusing on intersubjective negotiations of meaning on the microsocial level, taking into account considerations of multiple identities, non-national and negotiated conceptions of cultures. As Ron Scollon and Suzanne Wong Scollon write :

Rather than seeking an explanation of how given identities and meanings are communicated or fail to be communicated, what is sought is an understanding of how identities and meanings are constituted in and through the interaction itself. The role of culture and other a priori categories in this model is as historical and cultural archives of tools through which social actions are taken by participants. (Scollon & Wong Scollon 2003 :543).

12From the early 2000s, calls were thus made for paradigmatic renewal, notably by cross-cultural management scholars (Søderberg & Holden, 2002), with an issue of the International Journal of Cross Cultural Management dealing specifically with this question in 2006 (Jackson & Aycan 2006). From this point onwards, we can note a widening gap between those academics who progressively adopted interactionist approaches to the cultural dynamics of communication, and many intercultural trainers whose clients are receptive to simplistic and stereotyped recipes based on national cultural differences, and who go on feeding into essentialising social discourse mirrored in the media and populist political stances.

13The growing realisation of this gap between social and academic discourse, as well as increasing frustration with perceived “misuses” of the culture concept (Hannerz 1999) led to a second paradigmatic challenge from critical scholars, based on a postmodern criticism of the legitimacy of any research (including positivist and some interpretative approaches) which is based on “solid” definitions of the concept of culture (Dervin 2011a, 2013; Jack 2009; Nakayama & Halualani 2010; Romani et al. 2018; Romani & Claes 2014; Sommier 2014; Wagener 2015). Particularly hostile to the comparative approaches which they consider largely responsible for essentialising representations and discourse, the scholars defending these new paradigms use methods such as critical discourse analysis and deconstruction to question the motivations of positions defended in particular instances of argumentation. This critical movement focuses on dimensions of power, ideology, oppression and emancipation channelled through discourse and thus links up with other critical approaches in cultural studies (Hammer & Kellner 2009; Maigret 2013; Mattelart & Neveu 2008), for example. This change of perspective is resumed by Mélodine Sommier: “The main aim of using a critical intercultural communication framework is not to uncover what culture really is but to uncover what representations of culture come to appear real, and through which processes.” (Sommier 2014 :8).

14Academic specialists currently dealing with questions of interculturality often favour social constructionist or hermeneutic approaches (Dahl 2006 :7–18; Dervin 2011b :30–32), relying on “liquid” conceptualisations of culture as a process (Bauman 2011; Ogay & Edelmann 2016). This trend contributes to take the emphasis away from the national level as the main focus of analysis, even if methodological nationalism (Beck 2007; Dervin 2014; Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002) continues to weaken certain studies. Liquid conceptualisations of culture consider it not as a variable to discover, but rather as a set of potential signifiers to be taken into account reflexively on the level of co-constructed meanings during social interactions. In Jeff Verschueren’s pragmatic approach to intercultural communication:

when we take into account ‘reflexivity’, culture does play a role in intercultural communication, but not as a describable, separable, bounded entity (rather as the complex of practices and concepts that, in actual discourse, reflexively connects interaction and cognition in an overall process of meaning generation); and not as a direct determinant which it cannot be if it does not have an ‘external’ existence (rather as a complex of ideas that is part of the metapragmatic awareness which indirectly determines the meaningfulness of the activities that are carried out or the events that take place). (Verschueren 2008 :31).

15The object of this type of approach is to understand the ways in which cultural dynamics affect sensemaking during interactions, including the participants’ representations of the cultures themselves. To echo Martine Abdallah-Pretceille in the passage quoted at the beginning of this section, this raises questions as to whether intercultural communication should indeed be seen as a field, or whether it should not more usefully be considered as a transversal dimension of all communication, as Eric Dacheux (1999 :2) and Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1994 :141) were already suggesting in the 1990s.

16The intercultural approach to migration outlined here thus raises questions not so much about supposed cultural differences linked to national identities, although these may constitute an important part of social discourse which should also be taken into account, rather it looks at the way that various identities are mobilised and co-constructed in the process of sense-making in everyday interactions (critical and interactionist dimensions). For reasons of space and scope, the paper does not focus specifically on the work carried out in communication science, in France and elsewhere, specifically centred on migration, socialisation, diasporas and ICT, and which is reflected in many of the other contributions to this journal issue. By adopting a specifically “intercultural” perspective on communication processes, the ambition of the paper is to cast new light on the migrant condition and identity, as illustrated in the following section through the discussion of the integration process.

The integration process revisited: rethinking migration and social cohesion from a critical intercultural standpoint

17It should be clear from the preceding discussion that there is a growing gap between more complex academic approaches to cultures and much of the social discourse surrounding migration which is relayed in the media or in some political discourse. When public figures point to “cultural barriers”, differences in “traditions” or “lifestyles” as obstacles for communication and integration, they often seem to accredit the notion that individuals are determined by country of birth or perceived heritage, so that they produce only certain forms of thought and behaviour, oblivious to the social context in which they may currently be living. Such “solid” approaches to culture are rejected by those academics who point to the way in which individuals, as they grow up and through various life experiences, become socialised in many groups (professional, religious, national…) and use their corresponding cultural repertoires (Swidler 1986) to find common ground and negotiate meaning with one another. In this sense, cultures are not what separate people, but indeed what make communication and mutual understanding possible.

18However, what do separate people are the intergroup identity dynamics associated with social tensions and “Us and them” type discourse. The social psychological processes which lead to intergroup rivalry, negative and stereotyped perceptions of outgroup members, and in some cases intergroup violence have been analysed extensively in Social Identity Theory (Abrams & Hogg 1990; Calhoun 1994; Smith & Bond 1998; Tajfel 1974, 1981; Tajfel & Turner 1986; Turner 1982). Perceived social tensions and competition for resources are catalysing factors in these categorisation processes, meaning that deterministic discourse about “cultural barriers”, mediated through social interactions, are likely to heighten consciousness of group belonging, aggravate intergroup rivalry and strengthen perceptions of supposed cultural differences. The work of Fredrik Barth on group boundary maintenance (Barth 1969) further suggests that a sense of group belonging and intergroup rivalry leads groups to cultivate distinctive identity traits. Through the mediation of interpersonal interactions, group cultures will, in given circumstances, evolve to increase intergroup differentiation, capitalising upon and attributing symbolic capital and affective value to traits which distinguish in-group members from outgroups. Despite having their roots in processes linked to identity dynamics and social distinctiveness, the espoused identity traits become socially-valued expressions of group culture, not because they are particularly traditional, although they may be perceived as such, but because they allow group members to adopt a central stance in the group, thus gaining social prestige as “one of us” when performing such traits. Many examples of this basic social process have been highlighted in cultural studies, sociology and sociolinguistics. It is apparent in various youth “subcultural styles” (Hebdige 1979) as groups seek to differentiate themselves both from mainstream adult society and from other “subcultures”. In the French context, many regions thus cultivate their specific patrimonial “authenticity” through accents, dress and gastronomic specialities (Rasse 2013). In urban spaces, styles of speech, use of vocabulary or ways of dressing can mark out individuals from different age groups and neighbourhoods. On a more political level, restrictions on religious dress or refusals to take into account dietary preferences in school canteens, in the name of Republican neutrality, can lead to religious or ethnic groups feeling targeted and stigmatised and thus defensively elevating the offending symbols to strongly-valued identity traits embodying resistance and social defiance. Following the municipal bans and ensuing social debates around the “burkini” in France in 2016, this particular garment has incontestably taken on a particular symbolic value for many French Muslim women, whether or not they decide to wear it, and for wider society. Although each person has their own motivations and the factors of choice are clearly multiple, someone choosing to wear the burkini is arguably making a symbolic statement related both to perceived long-standing religious traditions and to perceived anti-Muslim sentiment and a desire (paradoxical for some) to express a form of individual freedom in lifestyle choices. They key point is that the identity dynamics are inextricably linked to the cultural form chosen to express them. Identity-based tensions are what divide and threaten social cohesion, whereas the cultural forms, rather than being static, deterministic barriers, evolve to express these identities, depending on social contexts.

The French integration system for migrants

20The “integration” of migrants in France is one of the missions of the “French Office for Immigration and Integration” (OFII), at the Ministry of the Interior. The structure dating from 2009 is the latest in a line which has existed under different names since the National Immigration Office founded in 1945. The OFII is the first name to explicitly include the term “integration”, as the entity’s initial missions focused mainly on managing immigration flows. The notion of integration was put forward with the personalised “Reception and Integration Contract” (contrat d’accueil et d’intégration, CAI) introduced in 2003 and replaced in 2016 by the “Republican Integration Contract” (contrat d’intégration républicaine, CIR).

22A recent parliamentary report focusing on the state’s migrant integration policy, prepared by government MP Aurélien Taché in preparation for the 2018 law on Asylum, Immigration and Integration, criticised the effectiveness of existing measures aiming to favour integration and social cohesion in France (Taché 2018):

• 10 “Today, the only instrument specifically favouring integration of foreigners is the Republican Inte (...)

« Aujourd’hui, le seul dispositif en faveur spécifiquement de l’intégration des étrangers est le contrat d’intégration républicaine (CIR), conclu entre l’État et tout primo-arrivant souhaitant s’installer durablement en France. Ce CIR comprend au mieux 200 heures de français et douze heures de formation civique. Dans ces conditions, comment espérer construire un « parcours personnalisé d’intégration républicaine », pourtant prévu par les textes, alors même que les défis s’accumulent ? »10.

26When analysed in the light of critical intercultural theory (supra), the power relations implicit in the model thus described, as well as the insistence on a value-based approach to (national) culture can both be seen to potentially hamper the espoused objective of social cohesion. Models based on cultural values tend to both oversimplify social reality and have only a very tenuous link to micro-level manifestations of behaviour. An example is given in an article by Myriam Hachimi Alaoui, where the author relates an incident during civic training. After spending a morning talking about liberty, equality and fraternity, observes the author, the group went to lunch, where the trainees were imposed a set menu, while the trainer had a free choice of meal. The irony of the situation did not escape the notice of the trainees (Hachimi Alaoui 2016 :91), even if it is an everyday illustration of the non-correspondence between espoused (macro-level) values and (micro-level) practices, in reality governed by a multitude of other factors (Desjeux 2002).

Rethinking integration tools from a critical intercultural perspective

28In order to go beyond the limits of such value-based models and essentialist visions of national cultures, a “liquid”, socio-constructionist approach to culture (Bauman 2011) can be adopted. This underlines the way in which individuals, in order to communicate, build on multiple cultures and identities, co-constructing emergent cultural forms through their interactions (Frame 2013a). It focuses on microsocial level interactions, implying both sense-making processes (Weick 1995) and interpersonal and intergroup identity phenomena which effect the migrant experience and can act to help or hinder the integration process through their daily occurrences.

29Moving beyond abstract principles relating to the way we think about and discuss cultures and communication, it is important to consider how these can be applied in concrete terms to integration tools as they have been outlined here. A first evolution, in line with recommendations in the Taché report, would be to shift focus in the civic training module from abstract considerations of declarative values to pragmatic advice, rooted in the migrants’ own experiences and daily lives, aiming to develop their reflexivity regarding interpersonal communication processes, moving beyond essentialist representations of cultures. In concrete terms, this could be done by having participants share and discuss the “cultural differences” they have observed in France, with an experienced facilitator helping to “decode” unfamiliar behaviour and compare it to foreign cultural settings, both in terms of differences and similarities or parallels, as well as giving advice as to what is generally expected in various social contexts in France.

30A wider civic training programme could be partly modelled on the type of (inter)cultural competence training which is generally reserved for businesspeople preparing for expatriation (Berninghausen & Hecht-El Minshawi 2014; Jack, 2009; Matsumoto & Hwang 2013; Spencer-Oatey & Franklin 2009; Wiseman & Koester 1993). On top of sharing practical advice aimed to help newcomers get by in their everyday lives, training to foster a more global understanding of cultural differences and their impact on interpersonal communication could help them develop more critical distance towards misunderstandings and enable them to better explain them to themselves or others. The aim of this training should thus be to develop understanding and reflexivity when faced with differences in codes, practices and beliefs, and not simply to assimilate a series of unexplained and abstract injunctions which newcomers are instructed to respect in order to hope to one day be accepted. Dialogue and exchanges can lead people to adopt the dominant French cultural codes more willingly, in order to fit in more easily to society, provided that differences in cultural practices and logics can be discussed without stigmatisation or value judgements. When differences are identified and understood, the foreigner seeking to conform to social expectations to make him/herself more predictable in his/her interactions will be able to do so all the more easily and willingly if the the cultural logics underlying these practices have been rationalised and made explicit.

31In adopting a “liquid” approach to cultures, such training would also aim to challenge the idea that national cultures constitute symbolically insurmountable barriers. Recognising the various social identities and rich cultural baggage of each individual can help to avoid reductively imprisoning them in their national identities and enable and encourage them to reach out more easily to find common ground with others in their interactions (Abdallah-Pretceille 2006; Cloet & Pierre 2018). The training would thus constitute a source of empowerment : rather than being confined to an identity imposed from the outside the individual can learn to relate differently to others, while being able to implicitly question reductive or essentialising discourse with which (s)he is confronted.

33This paper has been written as part of a research-action project working with social workers and volunteers in associations helping economically fragile migrants to settle and find work in France. Going beyond the civic training programme of OFII, it aims to work with the rich associative sector which is involved in the migrant integration process (Frame 2019), in order to develop “workshops” targeting both newly-arrived migrants settling in France and staff or volunteers in the associations working with them. These workshops will be designed to challenge essentialising discourse about migrants and national groups, to help newcomers to France to deconstruct their own experience and think reflexively about differences they encounter, while at the same time addressing questions of identities and dominant perceptions in social discourse. The optimised workshops will then be outlined and commented in detail, in the form of a trainer’s guide, containing both a conceptual discussion and a facilitator’s kit with training materials, which will be freely distributed online (open access), and sent to key associations in the sector, throughout France.

Conclusion

34This paper underlines the potential for a renewal of the intercultural paradigm used to conceptualise migration and integration in France, thanks to recent critical approaches to intercultural communication. With their focus on power, identities, and performative intersubjective dynamics in interactions, these are closer to critical cultural studies than to traditional positivist or comparative approaches to national cultures. However, this evolution has become necessary not simply as a result of emerging trends in academia. It also reflects the global shift towards identity politics in the globalised, postmodern world, characterised by “visible otherness” (Wolton 2003), new forms of sociability and diasporic socialisation and imaginaries, involving “connected presence” (Licoppe 2004) within and across technoscapes and ethnoscapes (Appadurai 2001).

35In this context, the Republican model of integration is under growing pressure as social tensions increase between different groups in search of recognition. In order to facilitate policies in favour of social cohesion, not only is it important for us as scholars to understand how these social processes are manifested in modern-day society, we should also aim to reengage with social discourse and contribute to public debate around these questions, in order to combat divisively solid definitions of culture. Politically, the question remains sensitive, which may go some way to explain the apparent lack of tools and means currently deployed in support of the integration policy, as governments may not want to be seen to overly favour what may seem to be, in the light of (mediated) “public opinion”, a stigmatised segment of the population.

36Similarly, although the idea of “Republican values” has strong political support in France, arguably it should not be the central focus of an integration policy because of its tendency to underline imagined social group boundaries. Despite the conceptual limits of integrationist models which think cultures separately, the Republican integration model, with its objective of a standardised public sphere and guaranteed cultural plurality in the private sphere, appears compatible with non-essentialist thinking, notably if the emphasis is placed on individuals as multi-faceted, and the way they use their personal cultural repertoires for sense-making in different contexts. The future of the integration model could thus be to embrace difference neither by idealising nor by stigmatising non-majority group identities, but by promoting the idea that individuals are rich with various experiences, and helping them to reflect on and continue to build up their individual “cultural repertoires”.