Navigation – Plan du site

AccueilNuméros112Persian Refugees in Ancient Greece

Persian Refugees in Ancient Greece

Réfugiés perses en Grèce ancienne
Paolo A. Tuci
p. 167-190

Résumés

Cette étude examine le cas d’hommes persans qui, ayant fui leur pays, sont arrivés comme réfugiés en Grèce. Pour le ve siècle av. J.-C. on connaît les cas de Rhoesace, Zopyrus et Amorges, tandis que pour le ive siècle un fils sans nom de Pharnabazus, Artabazus, Amminapes et Sisines. Bien que les détails sur leur fuite demeurent souvent obscurs, ces épisodes s’inscrivent de façon intéressante dans le cadre de la politique internationales. Les principaux éléments à prendre en considération sont le pays où ils se sont réfugiés, les raisons de leur fuite, les relations avec le pays qui les a hébergés et le rôle de cette particulière catégorie de réfugiés dans la politique internationale.

Haut de page

Entrées d’index

Haut de page

Texte intégral

  • 1 See e.g. Cagnazzi, 2001.
  • 2 For the applicability of the modern label of “political refugee” to the ancient world, see recently (...)
  • 3 Seibert, 1979, p. 621 n. 340. The study of Balogh, 1943 offers a framework of the issue of politica (...)

1It is well known that several Greek leaders, for various reasons, after falling in disgrace in their homeland, found refuge in Persia: typical examples are the Spartan Demaratus and the Athenians Themistocles and Alcibiades.1 The opposite case, that of Persian leaders who fled to Greece and lived there as refugees,2 though attested, is much less known. Jakob Seibert’s important study of political refugees in ancient Greece devotes only a brief reference to this issue.3 This paper will attempt to explore this topic more deeply, by identifying common and different features in the cases examined, focusing on the period between the Persian Wars and the Kingdom of Philip II of Macedonia. We will proceed by distinguishing three categories: Persian refugees in Athens, in the Peloponnese and in Macedonia.

1. Persians refugees in Athens

1.1. Rhoesaces

2A first case is known from Plutarch’s Life of Cimon (10.9), in which he mentions the Persian Rhoesaces.

  • 4 Translation by Blamire, 1989, p. 51 (with minor changes).

“They say that a man named Rhoesaces, a Persian who had defected from the King (τινὰ βάρβαρον ἀποστάτην βασιλέως), came to Athens with a large sum of money in his possession. Hounded by the sycophants (σπαραττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν), he sought refuge at Cimon’s house and placed by his door two bowls, one full of silver darics, the other of gold. When Cimon saw them he smiled and asked the man whether he wanted Cimon as a friend or a hireling (πότερον αἱρεῖται Κίμωνα μισθωτὸν φίλον ἔχειν). ‘As a friend’, said the Persian. ‘Well, then – Cimon replied – go and take your money with you, for, now that I am your friend, I shall be able to use it whenever I need it’.”4

  • 5 Doubts about historicity of the event have been expressed e.g. by Miller, 1997, p. 90. In my opinio (...)
  • 6 Piccirilli, 1990, p. 237. Obviously Ῥωσάκης in Diod. Sic. 16.47.2 is a different individual (Blamir (...)

3This text belongs to chapter 10, devoted to the well-known theme of Cimon’s euergesia, in which he is praised for both his generosity and his incorruptibility. The Rhoesaces episode appears as evidence of this second feature.5 The historical reliability of the episode might be questioned, but there is no actual ground for rejecting its core, purged of its anecdotal aspect.6

  • 7 See Balcer, 1993, p. 259 (n. 292) for a possible identification with a Persian man (Rauzaka) mentio (...)
  • 8 The events mentioned both before and after the episode of Rhoesaces (particularly in Plut. Cim. 9.3 (...)

4Rhoesaces is otherwise unknown7 and the event he is involved in is not datable, both because it is included in a section in which the biographer does not seem to follow a strict chronological order, and because references to events and personages that appear in the nearby paragraphs cannot be placed with certainty; all that can be said is that Rhoesaces was in Athens either before Cimon’s ostracism in 461 or in the short term between his return to Athens and his death in 450 (or even in both periods).8 In any case, it is not possible to say whether Rhoesaces fled from Persia under Xerxes’ Kingdom or under that of Artaxerxes I. Nor can we ascertain why he abandoned his country, whether due to a conflict with the sovereign or with a satrap, even if the qualification of ἀποστάτης βασιλέως, attributed to him by Plutarch, while not generic, would tend to lean toward the first possibility. It seems that in any case he was a high-level personality, judging by the wealth he possessed and he arrived to Athens with.

  • 9 Plut. Cim. 9.2-6 = FGrHist/BNJ 392 (Ion of Chius) F 13. About the dating of this campaign several a (...)

5Nothing is known about Rhoesaces’ life in Athens, except from what is related by Plutarch. The fact that the Persian sought Cimon’s help and collaboration may be connected with the strongly anti-Persian policy of the Athenian leader. It should be noted that also in another occasion Cimon had to deal with Persian men, when, in a campaign held in the 470s, he captured many barbarian prisoners at Sestos and Byzantium, who μικρὸν ὕστερον were ransomed at great price by their relatives from Phrygia and Lydia.9 It is not known whether these Persians, who, judging from the money paid by their relatives, were high-ranking men, were taken to Athens or not, but the short time interval between their capture and their release could suggest that they remained where they were taken prisoners. Most important, it is impossible to ascertain whether this event precedes or follows Rhoesaces’ arrival in Athens: in the former case, which may be more likely, Rhoesaces could have turned to Cimon knowing that previously he had had contacts with other Persian dignitaries.

  • 10 Blamire, 1989, p. 136 (cfr. Hornblower, 1991, p. 175).

6It would be interesting to know why Rhoesaces was hounded by sycophants. It is possible that they had been solicited in their accusatory activity by Rhoesaces’ wealth, but it is still to be clarified on what grounds they tried to prosecute him. Blamire’s assumption, according to which Rhoesaces was suspected of espionage or subversion as an agent of the Great king, seems intriguing:10 such an assumption cannot be demonstrated, but it is in any case interesting because, if proved, it would attest either that the Athenians feared that a foreign spy could be disguised as a political refugee, or, at least, that such an accusation could be believable (and perhaps the accuses made by sycophants relied precisely on this).

1.2. Zopyrus

7A second Persian refugee is Zopyrus: his case is reported by the last chapter of Herodotus’ third book (3.160.2).

  • 11 Translation by Mensch, 2014, p. 203.

“This Zopyrus was the father of Megabyzus, who was general of an army in Egypt against the Athenians and their allies; and Megabyzus’ son was that Zopyrus who deserted from the Persians to Athens (ὃς ἐς Ἀθήνας ηὐτομόλησε ἐκ Περσέων).”11

  • 12 These events are usually dated between 522 and 521 B.C. Ctesias’ version is quite different, since (...)

8Zopyrus is therefore the nephew of the homonymous Zopyrus who, in Herodotus’ strongly novelistic version (3.150-159), pretended to be a deserter and managed, with a macabre stratagem, to restore the rebellious city of Babylon to Darius.12

  • 13 Hdt. 3.160.2 (see Asheri, 1990, p. 360; Asheri, 2007, p. 527). See also Thuc. 1.109.3-4 (see Hornbl (...)
  • 14 See Miller, 1997, p. 21 and Lenfant, 2004, p. civ, 131 n. 560, both in favour of the historicity.

9The position of Megabyzus, son of the first Zopyrus and father of the second, is more uncertain: during the Second Persian War he had been one of the main commanders of the Persian army (Hdt. 7.82.1); then, according to Herodotus, in the Egyptian revolt he was a valid general of Artaxerxes13 and so, like his father, a supporter of the King; on the contrary, Ctesias (FGrHist 688 F 40.40) states that Megabyzus had organized a rebellion against the King, but the historicity of the episode is questioned.14

10The son of Megabyzus, the second Zopyrus, deserted from Persia: Herodotus provides no further information, but Ctesias (FGrHist 688 F 14.45) supplies a detailed account.

  • 15 Translation by Stronk, 2010, p. 345.

“After the death of his father and mother, Zopyrus, the son of Megabyzus, revolted against the King and arrived at Athens, because of the services his mother had rendered to the Athenians (ἀπέστη βασιλέως, καὶ εἰς Ἀθήνας ἀφίκετο, κατὰ τὴν τῆς μητρὸς εἰς αὐτοὺς εὐεργεσίαν). From Athens he sailed with his followers to Caunus and summoned it to surrender (εἰς Καῦνον δὲ ἅμαὐτῶν ἑπομένων εἰσέπλευσε, καὶ ἐκέλευσε παραδιδόναι τὴν πόλιν). The inhabitants pretended they were willing to hand the city over to him (Καύνιοι δὲ αὐτῷ μὲν παραδιδόναι τὴν πόλιν ἔφασκον), but not to the Athenians who accompanied him (Ἀθηναίοις δὲ τοῖς συνεπομένοις οὐκέτι). While Zopyrus entered within the wall, a Caunian named Alcides struck him on the head with a stone and this is how Zopyrus died. His grandmother Amestris ordered the Caunian to be impaled.”15

  • 16 About the episode of Zopyrus and the rebellion of Caunus (and the issue of their dating): How-Wells (...)

11This episode is not dated, but it is generally placed in the decade between 440 and 430, therefore probably under the reign of Artaxerxes I.16 It is unknown why Zopyrus escaped from the country; there would be at least a partial explanation if we could trust the information provided by Ctesias about the rebellion of the father: the uprising of the son against the King would be a resurgence of that of his father. Besides, according to the same fragment (668 F 14.40), Zopyrus fought valiantly alongside his father Megabyzus and his brother Artyphius against a certain Ousiris, who had been sent by the King to fight them.

  • 17 Lenfant, 2004, p. 270 n. 529 (cfr. Badian, 1993, p. 194 n. 45), on the grounds of Ctesias FGrHist 6 (...)
  • 18 Concerning the causes of Caunian revolt, see Hyland 2018b, p. 25-27.

12On the other hand, the reasons for which he sought refuge in Athens are known, namely, according to Ctesias, because of his mother’s benefaction for the Athenians: it has been tentatively suggested that this could be connected with the Athenians whose lives were spared following their involvement in the Egyptian revolt,17 but this hypothesis is rather fragile. It seems in any case unquestionable that Zopyrus repaid Athenian hospitality by serving in an expedition against Caunus: clearly the Carian city, which was a member of the Attic-Delian League, had defected18 and Zopyrus had been chosen to accompany an Athenian contingent with the aim of bringing the city back to the alliance.

  • 19 Hyland 2018b, p. 28 wonders whether Zopyrus was the only commander of the expedition or he operated (...)
  • 20 Hyland 2018b, p. 32.
  • 21 A different interpretation is that the Caunians had no intention to surrender and that they lured Z (...)
  • 22 Hyland 2018b, p. 35-40.

13Some aspects seem in any case particularly interesting. First, this refugee was a very high-level man: he was the son of one of the most important generals of Xerxes and his mother Amytis was the daughter of Xerxes himself. His arrival in Athens should have been particularly sensational and he could not have resided in Athens as just an ordinary man. He was most assuredly in contact with high-ranking citizens and, during his stay in Athens, probably earned the confidence of a good number of Athenians and thus he was entrusted with a military expedition19 useful for both parties: on the one side, Zopyrus protected the interests of the city that was hosting him, and, on the other, as has been suggested, he could gain the advantage of becoming Caunus’ administrator on behalf of the Athenians or maybe even the city’s dynast.20 Clearly, Zopyrus’ mission was at least partially effective, since the parties apparently found a compromise on the grounds that Caunus had to be handed over personally to Zopyrus, but not to the Athenians. In fact, he entered the city, but unfortunately he overlooked the fact that not all the Caunians agreed with that decision and the man who killed him clearly was a member of the party that opposed that agreement.21 Caunus was later occupied by Persian forces.22

14It also seems interesting that the issue of the defection from the imperial power (real or, as in the case of his grandfather, fictitious; historically reliable or, as in the case of his father, questioned) spans all the vicissitudes of Zopyrus’ family, making his conduct perhaps more understandable, even in the silence of the sources.

  • 23 Asheri, 1990, p. 357 and Asheri, 2007, p. 524. For some doubts about this assumption, see Schmitt, (...)
  • 24 Miller, 1997, p. 24 suggests that Zopyrus’ stay in Athens lasted approx. from 435 to 425 or maybe l (...)
  • 25 Miller, 1997, p. 90; Hyland 2018b, p. 27-28, observing that Zopyrus had personal contacts with many (...)
  • 26 Concerning Herodotus, the theory has been suggested by Wells, 1907, p. 37-47 (see also e.g.: Burn, (...)
  • 27 Welsh, 1983, p. 145-150. Against this supposition: Miller, 1997, p. 24; Starkey, 2013, p. 501-510. (...)

15Moreover, it has been observed that Zopyrus could be the Greek translation of a Persian name,23 an aspect that induced someone to assume that his stay in Athens lasted for a certain period24 and that he reached a certain degree of familiarity with some citizens.25 Consequently, it has been assumed that Zopyrus could have been an oral source for Herodotus or Thucydides26 and that he could have been a source of inspiration for Aristophanes’ Babylonians, a comedy of “exotic” subject.27 These suggestions can be hardly proved, but what is important here is that the case of Zopyrus is particularly interesting as it shows the example of a Persian refugee who tries to maintain his social status and collaborates with the Athenians even against his homeland.

1.3. Amorges

  • 28 Concerning this peace, see e.g.: Blamire, 1975, p. 21-26; Lewis, 1977, p. 76ff.; Edwards, 1995, p.  (...)

16One more case to be considered is that of Amorges. Its primary source is Andocides’ third oration, On the Peace with Sparta, in a passage that immediately follows the mention of the peace concluded by the Athenian Epilykos with the Persian king (Andoc. 3.29).28

  • 29 Translation by Edwards, 1995, p. 29.

“After this we were persuaded by Amorges, the runaway slave of the King, to reject the power of the King as being nothing, and we chose the friendship of Amorges, thinking it was stronger (μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀμόργῃ πειθόμενοι τῷ δούλῳ τῷ βασιλέως καὶ φυγάδι τὴν μὲν βασιλέως δύναμιν ἀπεβαλόμεθα ὡς οὐδενὸς οὖσαν ἀξίαν, τὴν δὲ Ἀμόργου φιλίαν εἱλόμεθα, κρείττω νομίσαντες εἶναι); in return for this the King, in his anger at us, became an ally of the Spartans (σύμμαχος γενόμενος Λακεδαιμονίοις) and provided them with five thousand talents to prosecute the war until he had overthrown our power.”29

  • 30 Thuc. 8.5.5 and 28.3 (νόθος). About this repetition, see Hornblower, 2008, p. 832. Concerning the r (...)
  • 31 Thuc. 8.5.5; 28.3 (with Hornblower, 2008, p. 771-773); FGrHist 668 (Ctesias) F 15.53. The rebellion (...)
  • 32 Bearzot, 2017, p. 37-57.

17Amorges was the illegitimate son of the satrap of Sardis, Pissuthnes.30 As attested both by Thucydides and Ctesias, Pissuthnes rebelled against the Persian king (Darius II); Ctesias adds that he also had the support of “the Athenian Lycon and the Greeks under his command”, but later Lycon (otherwise unknown) and the Greeks were bribed by the King’s generals and so they deserted Pissuthnes, who was captured and killed.31 As has been recently pointed out, the fact that Lycon supported Pissuthens does not imply that the Athenians favoured the policy of the latter, who, on the contrary, had always been anti-Athenian: in fact, Lycon was simply the leader of a mercenary band.32

  • 33 The same doubt occurs e.g. in Westlake, 1977, p. 321-322.
  • 34 About this army, see below n. 40.
  • 35 Possibly from Arcadia (Hornblower, 2008, p. 833).
  • 36 Concerning these events, see: Westlake, 1977, p. 319-329 (who is sceptical about the trustworthines (...)
  • 37 See Tuci, 2013, p. 52 and n. 59, 53-54.

18It is unknown whether or not Amorges’ revolt was the continuation of his father’s and, in this second case, whether or not it broke out for other reasons.33 In any case, this revolt is well known, also thanks to Thucydides. He relates about Amorges’ rebellion for the first time in the winter 413/2, when he states for the first time that Amorges had rebelled in Caria (8.5.5); in the summer of 412 Thucydides provides the first piece of information of Amorges being accompanied by an army (19.2).34 Tissaphernes sent soldiers against him, who was in Iasus (28.2), the Carian town which was part of the Delian League. The city was later conquered and a band of Peloponnesian soldiers handed over Amorges to Tissaphernes (28.2-5), who had been tasked by the King to capture the rebel alive or dead (5.5). The Peloponnesians took with them the mercenaries led by Amorges, because many of these mercenaries came from the Peloponnese35 (28.4), and subsequently, at the end of summer (of 412), they entered Spartan military service (28.5).36 It is moreover known that, in the framework of the Athenian coup d’état of 411, Pisander requested Phrynichus’ removal because he had “betrayed Iasus and Amorges” (54.3), since Phrynichus had not been committed enough to bring help to the city and to the Persian man.37

  • 38 Lewis, 1977, p. 86 and Briant, 2002, p. 591-592 date the agreement between Athens and Amorges to 41 (...)
  • 39 Hyland, 2018a, n. 45 p. 186. Among the suggestions provided by Hyland, it seems to me to be exclude (...)
  • 40 Moreover, the mercenary army attested in summer 412 by Thuc. 8.28.4 (and 19.2) is likely the same a (...)

19Strictly speaking, the only passages that can be used to substantiate an agreement between Amorges and Athens are Andoc. 3.29 and Thuc. 8.54.3, but the affair is undisputable in its basic facts: Amorges rebelled against the Persian king and the Athenians, as they had also done at first in the case of his stepfather Pissuthnes, supported him. There are two preliminary questions that need to be addressed: first, when did Amorges rebel against Persia and obtained Athianians’ assistance and, second, by what means did Athens support him. As for the first question, Thucydides simply provides a terminus ante quem: in the winter of 413/2 Amorges had already revolted (Thuc. 8.5.5), but it is hard to suggest a date both for the beginning of his revolt and for the agreement with Athens. It has been proposed that the agreement was made in 414, but this date is disputed since some scholars prefer to place it a couple of years later.38 As for the second question, one may wonder whether the friendship of Athens included the supply of money, soldiers or Athenian generals:39 since Amorges was accompanied by a mercenary army (Thuc. 8.28.4), at least a financial support seems likely; and this was the same manner in which the Athenians had previously supported his stepfather Pissuthnes.40 In any case, a date prior to the Sicilian defeat seems to me more persuasive, because, after that tragic event, Athens was probably less able to invest money and/or human resources in the Carian area.

  • 41 Panagopoulos, 1979, p. 247-248. In his wide study about “fugitives and refugees in the Peloponnesia (...)
  • 42 Seibert, 1979, p. 621 n. 340.
  • 43 One may wonder if the contact between Amorges and the Athenians took place in Iasus, the Carian cit (...)

20In this case too, the motives for Amorges’ rebellion are unknown, but Andoc. 3.29 explicitly states his status of φυγάς: this term is absolutely vague, since it may refer to both a fugitive and a refugee.41 Seibert42 mentions Amorges among the refugees and, in this case, even if we prefer the earlier dating for his agreement with the Athenians, it should be assumed that his actual stay in Athens would have been extremely short, since we soon find him involved in military actions in Asia Minor. However, strictly speaking, he could also have been just a Persian defector who collaborated with the Athenians, not unlike his father Pissuthnes. Although this latter assumption seems to be preferable, apparently there is no way to solve this problem43. In any case, it may be equally interesting to inquire into the case of Amorges, also because it shows some contact points with that of Zopyrus: they both travelled to Caria, probably to protect the Athenians’ interests, for activities that ended tragically; moreover, if the piece of news of Megabyzus’ defection is reliable, both of them followed in the footsteps of a father (or stepfather) who had already defected.

  • 44 For an updated and wide list of the scholars who accept Andocides’ account, see Hyland, 2018, n. 1 (...)
  • 45 Hyland, 2018, p. 37-38 (see also 42, 44) points out that also the support previously given by the A (...)
  • 46 See above, nn. 34, 40.

21Other aspects are worthy of further investigation in the case of Amorges, notwithstanding the scarcity of the sources. First, one may wonder whether Andocides’ accusation is reliable or not: did the cooperation with a Persian φυγάς imply as a consequence that the Persian king became an ally of the Spartans? If Andocides was right, this could be very interesting, because it would mean that accepting a φυγάς, maybe as a refugee, could had serious consequences in foreign policy: more specifically, if Andocides’ allegation was reliable, the support given to the rebel was the coup de grace for the Athenians, the ultimate cause of their defeat in the Peloponnesian war, since it led the Persian to give financial support to the Spartans. Therefore, the reception granted to a φυγάς and foreign policy could be two strictly related fronts. Unfortunately, although most scholars have accepted Andocides’ account,44 there is no way to definitely confirm his allegation, not only because he may have been tendentious, but also because of chronological uncertainties: it is unclear whether Athenian support for Amorges was the cause of the alliance between Sparta and Persia (as it would have been if the agreement between Athens and Amorges could be dated to 414), or its consequence (if that agreement followed the treaties between Sparta and Persia). Actually, my impression is that the two events were almost simultaneous: the first mention of cooperation between Amorges and Athens (which therefore should have started earlier45) can be found in Thuc. 8.19.246 and the first treaty between Tissaphernes and Sparta (which obviously implied itself preceding contacts) is mentioned in Thuc. 8.18. Therefore, it is unlikely that Andocides’ claim was a complete forgery: the two events were strictly connected and mutually influenced; that being so, it can be asserted that having started a cooperation with a φυγάς, maybe a refugee, contributed to determining the international political situation, thus having a serious impact on the policy of Athens and, ultimately, on the outcome of the war.

  • 47 See FGrHist 688 (Ctesias) F 15.53.

22Besides, it might appear remarkable that the soldiers under Amorges’ command were Peloponnesian mercenaries. His stepfather Pissuthnes had been accompanied by the Athenian Lycon as leader of a band of soldiers generically defined “Greeks”47 and Zopyrus to Caunus by Athenians. We may wonder whether such an evolution could have had a specific political motivation, but it would be difficult to find an answer; however, maybe Amorges did not have Athenian soldiers with him both because the Athenians did not completely trust in him, given his stepfather’s strong anti-Athenian policy, and because of Athens’ dramatic shortage of men since the Sicilian defeat of 413.

23Lastly, it would be interesting to know whether the accusation by Pisander against Phrynicus was grounded or not, as maybe seems more probable, provided his turbid political vicissitude. In the former case, on the contrary, it would be an interesting evidence of the fact that not the whole public opinion was favourable to the collaboration with Persian individuals; moreover, in the past, Pissuthnes was easily dumped by the Athenians and left to his own fate. In any case, it is highly significant the fact that the protection of a political refugee is used as an element of internal political fight in the city.

2. Persians refugees in the Peloponnese

  • 48 It could be mentioned also the case of the high-born Persian Spithridates, who broke with Pharnabaz (...)
  • 49 Various attempts have been made for identifying this youngster: Sekunda, 1988, p. 178 suggests that (...)
  • 50 Shipley, 1997, p. 193 doesn’t exclude that Xenophon could be wrong about the identity of the youngs (...)

24We know one case of a Persian refugee in the Peloponnese:48 the case of Pharnabazus’ son, reported by Xenophon (Hell. 4.1.39-40) and by Plutarch (Ages. 13.1-4). During a famous meeting between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus which occurred in the winter of 395/4, the unnamed49 son of the latter and Parapita, proclaimed with a smile the Spartan king as his ξένος, giving him a javelin as a gift.50 According to Xenophon, who is used as a source also by Plutarch,

  • 51 Concerning this issue, see also a different interpretation by Bresson, 2002, p. 22-57.
  • 52 Xen. Hell. 4.1.40 (translation by Bronson 1918, 281).

“afterwards, when his brother had deprived the son of Parapita of his domain (ἀποστερῶν ἁδελφὸς τὴν ἀρχήν) during the absence of Pharnabazus (ἐν  τῇ  τοῦ Φαρναβάζου ἀποδημίᾳ), and had made him an exile (φυγάδα ἐποίησε), Agesilaus not only cared for him in every way, but in particular, since he had become enamoured of the son of Eualces an Athenian,51 made every effort for his sake to have Eualces’ son, inasmuch as he was taller than any of the other boys, admitted to the stadium race at Olympia.”52

  • 53 Concerning this problem, see: Sekunda, 1988, p. 178 (who knows only Plutarch’s version); Krentz, 19 (...)
  • 54 About this Artabazus, see below, par. 3.1. For other brothers of Artabazus (and children of Pharnab (...)
  • 55 Xen. Hell. 5.1.28; Plut. Artax. 27.7. See e.g. Briant, 2002, p. 309, 339; Hyland, 2018, p. 165.

25Xenophon does not explicitly state that the anonymous youngster took refuge in the Peloponnese (while Plut. Ages. 13.3 does: φυγόντος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδελφῶν εἰς Πελοπόννησον), but this seems likely because of the protection given by Agesilaus and of the Greek affair involving Athens and Olympia. In this case, the reason Parapita’s son choose the place for his flight is clear: the Peloponnese was chosen because of his joyful meeting with Agesilaus and for the relationship of ξένία which had been established with him. It is harder to understand why this youngster was compelled to leave his homeland, which Xenophon’s account leaves ambiguous. In fact, it is not entirely clear whether the son of the satrap had been expelled by his own brother or by his father’s brother; besides, Plutarch clearly states that it occurred because of his own brothers (ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδελφῶν), plural.53 If the dispute concerned Pharnabazus and his brother, it seems to have been mainly a family conflict; while if, as seems more likely, the problem concerned the unnamed youngster and his (step)brother(s) (e.g. Artabazus54), political issues could also have been involved. Indeed, it is known that in 388/7 Pharnabazus married Apame, the daughter of king Artaxerxes II:55 this marriage may have overshadowed Parapita’s son, since the child/children born of Pharnabazus and Apame would have been much more important than his/their half-brother born of Parapita, given that Apame’s son had the Persian king Artaxerxes III as an uncle; in this case, the family dispute concerning the inheritance of Pharnabazus could have a political background.

  • 56 Shipley, 1997, p. 192-193 and Primo, 2002, p. 425. Krentz, 1995, p. 208 suggests as possible occasi (...)
  • 57 Shipley, 1997, p. 192-193; Bresson 2002, p. 41, but with a different interpretation.
  • 58 It could be unlikely that Agesilaus accepted a Persian exile after the King’s peace of 387/6, but i (...)

26It is also hard also to date the youngster’s flight: this hinges on identifying the occasion in which Pharnabazus was absent (probably his journey to the court to marry Apame56) and of the Olympiad mentioned by the sources;57 anyhow, the fact is usually dated in the 380s.58

  • 59 See Xen. An. 5.3.7 and Sordi, 2005, p. 17-19.

27The complexity of the situation does not make it possible to reach certain conclusions in several respects, but I think that in this case two aspects must be highlighted. First, what should be stressed is the singularity of someone who takes refuge in the Peloponnese (one more example is that of Themistocles, but he fled to Argos, which was not controlled by the Spartans). We do not know if this refugee lived in Sparta or elsewhere in the areas of the Spartan-controlled Peloponnese. It is obvious that the choice of finding refuge in Sparta would be absolutely peculiar, since this city practised xenelasiai. Nonetheless, the choice of seeking refuge in Spartan-controlled areas depends on the close personal ties of the youngster with Agesilaus. In fact, in those very years the same situation also occurred in the case of Xenophon, who, exiled from his own country, took refuge in Scillus, not far from Olympia, as a guest of Agesilaus.59 Secondly, it seems interesting the intertwining of motivations which could have caused of Pharnabazus’s son to escape: a feud within the satrap’s family or a consequence of the marriage policy of the father, whose loyalty towards the King could have induced him to accept sacrificing the son he had previously had with Parapita.

3. Persians refugees in Macedonia

28For the fourth century we have knowledge of three episodes in which Persian exiles arrived in Macedonia, all of them during the reign of Philip II: the cases of Artabazus, Amminapes and Sisines.

3.1. Artabazus

  • 60 Sordi, 1969, p. 45-46.
  • 61 Sordi, 1969, p. 65 places the alliance between Artabazus and the Thebans in 354. See also Griffith, (...)

29As can be easily imagined, Artabazus, the son born of the pre-mentioned marriage of Pharnabazus and Apame, had a better fate than his half-brother, son of Parapita: as the nephew of the king Artaxerxes III, he became satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. However, according to Diodorus, in 356/5 he rebelled against his uncle, also obtaining the support of the Athenians: they sent the general Chares with all his forces and defeated the King’s army in a battle. Later the King sent ambassadors to Athens, threatening to join Athens’ enemies in their war against the Athenians (the social war); so they broke off with Artabazus (Diod. Sic. 16.22.1-2).60 Afterwards, in 353/2, Artabazus, qualified as ἀποστάτης τοῦ βασιλέως, got help from the Thebans, thanks to which he defeated the Persian troops in two battles (Diod. Sic. 16.34).61 Then the Persian king, since his Rhodian general Mentor had performed great services for him in the war against the Egyptians, appointed him satrap of the Asiatic coast and placed him in charge of the war against the rebels. In the account of 349/8, Diodorus (16.52.2-3) relates as follows.

  • 62 Translation by Sherman, 1963, p. 383.

“And since Mentor was related to Artabazus and Memnon, both of whom had warred against the Persians in the preceding period and at the time now under consideration were fugitives from Asia residing at the court of Philip (τότε δὲ πεφευγότας ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ διατρίβοντας παρὰ Φιλίππῳ), he requested the King and prevailed upon him to dismiss the charges against them (δεηθεὶς τοῦ βασιλέως ἔπεισεν αὐτὸν ἀπολῦσαι τοὺς ἄνδρας τῶν ἐγκλημάτων). Immediately afterwards he also summoned them both to come to his presence with all their families for there had been born to Artabazus by the sister of Mentor and Memnon eleven sons and ten daughters.”62

  • 63 Curt. 5.9.1 (hospitem Philippi fuisse); 6.5.2 (hospes Philippi fuerat, cum Ocho regnante exularet). (...)
  • 64 Concerning the ties of kinship, see e.g.: Debord, 1999, p. 104 (p. 393-396 for Artabazus’ rebellion (...)

30Thus, according to Diodorus, Artabazus took refuge in Macedonia, a fact also confirmed by Curtius Rufus.63 His rebellion, supported by Memnon of Rhodes, ended thanks to the mediation of the latter’s brother, Mentor, who moreover was also related to Artabazus, since Mentor and Memnon’s sister was Artabazus’ wife.64 This revolt shows some interesting aspects.

31First, it is remarkable that Artabazus asked for the support of the Greeks and obtained it: at an earlier stage, from the Athenians and later from the Thebans. Moreover, it is interesting that the Athenians, after their initial support, held back since they were threatened by Artaxerxes. As for the Thebans, it seems that they did not back out; Artabazus simply no longer requested their assistance.

32Second, it is noteworthy that the rebellion was not concluded by military means, but thanks to the help of Memnon’s brother, Mentor. It cannot be excluded that Artaxerses actually counted on this opportunity, when he entrusted Mentor with the task of quelling the rebellion. The rebellion had begun within a family circle (Artabazus was son of Apame, the King’s stepsister) and was resolved within a family circle.

  • 65 Briant, 2002, p. 682.
  • 66 Diod. Sic. 15.91, dated to 362/1, but probably to be placed in 359 (Stylianou, 1998, p. 541-543). C (...)
  • 67 Griffith, 1979, p. 484 n. 5: from 352 or 351 until 344. Olbrycht, 2010, p. 347: from about 352 to a (...)

33Unfortunately, we lack many details. It is unclear what the motivation was for Artabazus’ rebellion. Diodorus alludes to charges (ἐγκλήματα), probably coming from some colleagues of his,65 that were perhaps connected to Artabazus’ failure in the expedition (undertaken by assignment from Artaxerxes II) against the rebel Datames.66 Moreover, it is not completely clear at what point of his rebellion Artabazus, along with his wife and his extended family, abandoned his satrapy and took refuge in Macedonia, because Diodorus mentions this escape only at the moment of Artabazus’ return back to Asia. Anyhow, his stay in Macedonia probably lasted for several years.67

  • 68 Besides, according to Briant, 2002, p. 688, a Persian noble could find in Macedonia a structure and (...)
  • 69 Griffith, 1979, p. 404. Besides, as pointed out by Olbrycht, 2010, p. 347, Macedonia was safe for t (...)
  • 70 See Ellis, 1976, p. 92 and King, 2018, p. 93.
  • 71 Diod. Sic. 16.52 places the capture of Hermias after the coming back of Artabazus and Memnon to Asi (...)

34With regard to the place he chose for his escape, it is clear that it would have been inappropriate for him to apply to the Athenians, because formerly they had abandoned him for convenience; Macedonia was probably an almost compulsory choice, not only since it was close to Artabazus’ satrapy,68 but also because in those years Philip’s power was rising (Artabazus should have arrived in Macedonia approximately in the years in which Philip was appointed tagos of the Thessalians and intervened in the Third Sacred War).69 It has been suggested that, during his stay in Macedonia, Artabazus might have had influence on future Philip’s plans for an invasion of Persia.70 Similarly, once returned in Asia, he might have informed the Persian king about the growing power of Philip in Greece, which could be dangerous for Artaxerxes, and maybe, if Diodorus’ chronology is correct, also about the plans of Hermias, the tyrant of Atarnaeus, who had revolted and was intriguing against the Persian king with Philip II:71 the former refugee Artabazus, welcomed back home, could have become a “spy” of what he had learned during his Macedonian stay.

  • 72 Curt. 6.5.1ff. and 22 (see also Arr. Anab 3.23.7-9).
  • 73 Artabazus satrap of Bactria: Curt. 7.5.1; Arr. Anab 3.29.3. Artabazus’ loyalty to Darius: Arr. Anab(...)

35It could be interesting that, during the Asian campaign, after the death of Darius, Artabazus met Alexander, who was very friendly with him.72 Later, Artabazus was appointed satrap of Bactria by the Macedonian king: in fact, according to Arrian, Alexander appreciated that he had not abandoned the Persian king during the Asian campaign, but remained loyal until Darius’ death (besides, it should be remembered that Artabazus’ daughter Barsine had become Alexander’s lover).73 Artabazus’ career suggests that, notwithstanding his alleged “loyalty”, he was a clever political opportunist, able to switch several times his conditions: he was subject of Artaxerxes, then a refugee at Philip’s court, then again a subject of Darius, and finally of Alexander.

3.2. Amminapes

  • 74 Curt. 6.4.25 calls him Manapis, but he is undoubtedly the same man. Concerning this Parthian refuge (...)

36The case of the Parthian Amminapes contains several interesting aspects.74 Curtius Rufus (6.4.25) relates that, during the reign of Artaxerxes III (regnante Ocho), he came to Philip of Macedonia as an exile (exul… ad Philippum pervenerat). We also have knowledge of a couple of episodes of the life of this Amminapes, in which he got involved with Alexander; however, both of them pose problems.

  • 75 This seems to be the assumption of Atkinson, 2000, p. 423.
  • 76 For Mazaces, Arr. Anab. 3.1.2 (Μαζάκης  Πέρσης); for Amminapes, Anab. III 22, 1 (Ἀμμινάπης Παρθυαῖ (...)
  • 77 About this issue, see also Briant, 2002, p. 845.

37Arrian (Anab. 3.22.1) relates that Amminapes, together with Mazaces, ruler of Egypt, surrendered that satrapy to Alexander (ἦν δὲ οὗτος τῶν Αἴγυπτον ἐνδόντων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ μετὰ Μαζάκου). Nevertheless, the actual role of Amminapes is unclear. Does the source imply that he was in Egypt on behalf of the Persian king and that, conversely, due to his former ties with Macedonia, he persuaded the ruler Mazaces to surrender to Alexander? In this case, we must infer that Amminapes went back in Asia and was welcomed back by Darius III.75 Or does the source imply that he reached Egypt from Macedonia, managed to meet Mazaces and, thanks to their common Persian origin,76 persuaded him to surrender? In this case, it follows that Amminapes remained in Macedonia after the death of Philip II and accompanied Alexander on his Asian expedition. The latter assumption seems more likely, but it cannot be proved.77

  • 78 Badian, 1985, p. 453.

38Both Arrian (Anab. 3.23.4) and Curtius (6.4.25) report that Alexander designated Amminapes as satrap of the Parthians and Hyrcanians, but with a slight difference: according to Curtius, this occurred after the former satrap, Phrataphernes, surrendered (Curt. 6.4.23); instead, Arrian provides a different sequence, mentioning Amminapes’ appointment, then Phrataphernes’ surrender to Alexander (Anab. 3.22.1) and later Phrataphernes again as a satrap (Anab. 3.28.2). Arrian’s sequence has usually been considered more correct: it has been suggested by Badian that Amminapes, thanks to his exile in Macedonia, could have entered into relations with Parmenion and, following Parmenion’s execution in 329, Amminapes too may have been disgraced and, therefore, replaced by the former satrap.78

  • 79 It should be remembered that Curtius Rufus mentions the exile in Macedonia for both of them: 6.5.2 (...)

39Since this is all we know about Amminapes, some comments can be provided. It is unknown why he was exul, whether as a result of a revolt or of a decision of Artaxerxes III. However, it is certain that he was a refugee and that he lived for a certain period in Macedonia, during the reign of Philip II: he probably met Artabazus there79 and it seems not unlikely that they either arrived together, perhaps having been banished for the same reason, or the arrival of one of them determined later that of the other one (in this case it remains unknown which one of them arrived first). If we assume that Amminapes did not return to Asia, he later followed Alexander on his expedition, reached Egypt and convinced his fellow countryman Mazaces to surrender to Alexander: if this is correct, it means that Amminapes proved to be an important ally of the Macedonians and that he repaid the hospitality received by means of a considerable support during the expedition; once more time it appears that accepting a refugee could have useful results, since he could be a weapon against his country of origin.

  • 80 See: Bosworth, 1980, p. 346; Heckel, 2006, p. 268-269; Olbrycht, 2010, p. 357. But Tlepolemus is no (...)
  • 81 The following assumption has been already suggested by Rapin, 2017, p. 70 (and 76), but without a d (...)
  • 82 According to this assumptions, the mention of Phrataphernes as satrap only of Parthia (and not also (...)

40Moreover, it was perhaps for this very reason that Alexander later designated him as satrap of Parthians and Hyrcanians. On the contrary, the reasons for Amminapes’ deposition are unknown. In this regard, Badian’s assumption is quite possible, also because, as Arrian relates (Anab. 3.22.1), Τληπόλεμος Πυθοφάνους τῶν ἑταίρων ξυνετάχθη αὐτῷ (scil. Amminapes) σκοπεῖν τὰ ἐν Παρθυαίοις τε καὶ Ὑρκανίοις: this Tlepolemus seems to be an “overseer” of the satrap,80 which suggests that perhaps Alexander did not completely trust Amminapes, even if the latter had proven himself entirely loyal in Egypt. But we might also consider an alternative explanation.81 A careful reading of the sources shows that, according to Arrian, Amminapes was at first σατράπης Παρθυαίων καὶ Ὑρκανίων (3.22.1) and later Phrataphernes is mentioned only as τῶν Παρθυαίων σατράπης (3.28.2), whereas Curtius simply relates that Alexander gave the satrapy of Hyrcania to Amminapes (6.4.25): therefore, it cannot be ruled out that at a certain point, after assigning Parthia and Hyrcania to Amminapes, Alexander for some reason decided to reshape the satrapy by dividing the two regions and assigning the former to Phrataphernes and leaving only the latter to Amminapes. In this way, differences between Arrian and Curtius are settled and neither of the sources should be considered mistaken: Curtius would just attest to the end point of the process, when Alexander gave Hyrcania to Amminapes. This alternative solution is possible, but it is not without difficulties: on the one side, Curtius is not consistent with himself, because at 9.10.1 he mentions Phrataphernes as satrap of Parthia, which is consistent with the assumption presented above, while at 8.3.17 he relates that Alexander Phratapherni Hyrcaniam tradidit; on the other side, Arrian mentions Phrataphernes several times at an earlier stage as satrap of Parthia (not only at 3.28.2, but also subsequently at 4.7.1 and 4.18.1), while he later refers to him as satrap of Parthia and Hyrcania (5.20.7; 6.27.3; 7.6.4). A possible explanation for these apparent contrasts could be that at a certain point Amminapes died and thus his Hyrcania satrapy was assigned to Phrataphernes (Curtius would be relating to this event at 8.3.17), who became once more satrap of both regions, as he had been before his surrender to Alexander.82

  • 83 Amminapes could have been deprived of Partia for reasons imputable either to himself or to Phrataph (...)

41Both assumptions seem possible, even if Badian’s is much simpler than the other one. If Badian is right, it means that Amminapes should be especially connected to Parmenion, which is far from being unlikely, since he arrived in Macedonia under Philip’s reign; he was later deprived of his satrapy (or even he himself was executed) as a result of Parmenion’s disgrace; moreover, in this case it would be almost certain that Amminapes never returned to Asia and that instead he accompanied Alexander on his expedition from the very beginning, arriving in Egypt together with him. Conversely, if the alternative explanation is trustworthy, neither a particular link with Parmenion nor a disgrace in 329 connected with the assassination of Philip’s general should be assumed; besides, in this case we are not compelled to assume that Amminapes completely lost Alexander’s trust; actually, the fact that he was deprived of Parthia (which, it should not be forgotten, was Amminapes’ motherland) could depend on different grounds;83 then, the fact that he lost Hyrcania as well might have occurred because of his death. In any case, Badian’s assumption is admittedly more straightforward, even if the alternative explanation presented above cannot be completely dismissed.

42In conclusion, the case of the refugee Amminapes is interesting for various reasons: both because he returned the favour of the Macedonian hospitality by persuading Mazaces to surrender and therefore he proved himself as crucial to Alexander’s Egypt campaign, and because, as an exile, he managed not only to return in his homeland, but also to become a satrap. The former event shows how a refugee could be useful for those who hosted him and the latter how the fate of an exile could change thanks to the support given by his hosts.

3.3. Sisines

  • 84 Curtius’ codices actually report Sisenes, but the name is usually corrected in the form Sisines acc (...)

43For the case of Sisines84 the main source is a passage from Curtius Rufus (3.7.11-15). He was a Persian quondam a praetor Aegypti missus ad Philippum; Sisines, donis et omni honore cultus, exilium patria sede mutaverat; he then followed Alexander in his Asian expedition and inter fideles socios habebatur. He received from a Cretan soldier a letter sent by Nabarzanes, a general (praetor) of Darius, urging him to accomplish something worthy of his rank and character (probably the murder of Alexander). Sisines tried repeatedly to present the letter to Alexander, but he failed because the King was busy preparing for the battle of Issus; but Sisines didn’t know that the letter had previously been read by Alexander, who had arranged it to be delivered to its recipient in order to test his loyalty; but Sisines’ hesitation in informing the King was interpreted as an evidence of his guilt and later Sisines was killed by the Cretans, haud dubie iussu regis.

  • 85 About the second Persian conquest of Egypt by Artaxerxes III and about the satrap Pherenates, see D (...)

44The case seems to be very interesting for several reasons. It concerns an individual who became an exile not by his own decision, but induced by corruption: this implies that Philip considered it very useful to have Persian individuals on his side. It is unknown why the satrap of Egypt (probably Pherendates II85) sent an envoy to Philip and, moreover, whether at that time Artabazus and/or Amminapes were in Macedonia, in which case it could be assumed that one of them suggested that Philip should attract the Persian envoy. Besides, Sisines was the only Persian exile at Philip’s court who was explicitly attested as accompanying Alexander to Asia: during the Asian expedition the “refugee” Sisines could have been a key figure in communicating and negotiating with the Persians. He probably gained the trust of the Macedonian court and perhaps even cooperated with Amminapes in persuading Mazaces to surrender. Alexanders’ trust, however, was not absolute, if he used the incident of the letter to test his loyalty.

  • 86 For Curtius’ version of the name, see above n. 84.

45Unfortunately, this framework is complicated by a passage of Arrian (Anab. 1.25.3-4), dealing with a certain Sisines, who was sent by Darius to Alexander of Lycestis in order to persuade him to kill Alexander; later he was captured by Parmenion and sent to Alexander. This episode, compared to the passage of Curtius, presents both similarities and differences. In both cases there is a Sisines86 who acts as an envoy, his message concerns an attack against Alexander and he is eventually arrested. Among the various differences, the Sisines of Arrian is not (at least, at the moment in which he is used as messenger) an exile.

  • 87 For a framework of the issue, see Atkinson, 1998, p. 208-209 and Sisti, 2001, p. 382-385. Curtius’ (...)
  • 88 Badian, 2000, p. 57-58.
  • 89 Arr. Anab. 7.6.4. Although it has been attempted to identify this Sisines with that of Curt. 3.7 or (...)

46It is disputed whether the two homonymous individuals should be identified and, in that case, how to reconcile the two versions.87 This is not the place for dealing in detail with this issue. With regard to the topic of this paper, I merely confine myself to remarking that Curtius is quite clear in pointing out that Sisines moved definitively to Macedonia and followed Alexander: it is impossible to reconcile these statements with the assumption that he returned to Asia, was welcomed back by Darius and then used by the Persian king as an envoy for ordering the murder of Alexander. In a comparison between Curtius and Arrian, the latter should be more reliable, but, as has been noted, his account is not without inconsistencies.88 Thus, although it would be a curious coincidence that two individuals with the same name are involved in as many conspiracies against Alexander (but with completely different roles), such an eventuality can’t be excluded; after all, there is even a third Sisines known to have been involved in Alexander’s expedition.89

47In conclusion, it is quite hard to reconstruct the core of the episode and it is possible that either in Curtius or in Arrian or even in both some confusion has occurred. In my opinion, it is unlikely that the existence in Macedonia of an exile called Sisines should be rejected: in fact, the story of the Persian man who has been persuaded through money and honours to move to Macedonia as a refugee seems too uncommon and original to be the result of confusion or forgery. Therefore, Curtius’ account should, in my opinion, be considered trustworthy at least on this point.

  • 90 About Isocrates’ Philippus, see e.g. Pownall, 2007, p. 13-25. For the contacts between the Macedoni (...)

48It is important to remark that in the Macedonian court under the reign of Philip II there was a “Persian lobby”, made up of Artabazus, Amminapes and Sisines (regrettably we cannot assess which one of them arrived earlier and thus attracted the others), and, obviously, this cannot be without consequences in Philip’s politics. It is well known both that in 346 Isocrates wrote his Philippus, in order to encourage the Macedonian king to embark on an expedition against Persia, and that Philip was interested in Persia well before the creation of his League of Corinth in 337: undoubtedly, the presence of Persian refugees at the Macedonian court has to be considered closely related to Philip’s Asian interests.90

49Being a refugee at the court of Philip was useful both for the exile, who could find refuge in an increasingly powerful country, and for the Macedonian king, who could use these Persian men as informers, agents or even (during Alexander’s expedition) governors of regions of which they had better knowledge. In any case, Alexander apparently did not completely trust them, but this (partial) mistrust was not groundless since Artabazus had left Macedonia to return to Asia: this is why he placed an episkopos next to the appointed satrap Amminapes, and this is why, if we can trust Curtius, he tested Sisines’ loyalty concerning the letter from Nabarzanes.

4. Conclusions

50The issue of Persian refugees in Greece, which till now has not been investigated, has proven to be very interesting. At the end of this survey, some concluding remarks can be provided.

  • 91 Greek terminology for refugees is wide: see e.g. Gray, 2017, p. 192.

51The lexicon used to define the individuals analysed is rather consistent:91 the root of ἀφίστημι recurs, both in its verbal variant (in the case of Zopyrus), and in the nominal one (ἀποστάτης: Rhoesaces), as well as that of φεύγω, whether as a verb (Artabazus) or as a substantive (φυγάς: Amorges, Pharnabazus’ son). As for the Latin lexicon, we find the terms hospes (Artabazus) and exilium (Sisines). This lexicon does not distinguish specifically the case of the refugees from that of mere exiles: this may sometimes create confusion or troubles in classifying the cases, as for Amorges, whose definition as a refugee can be reasonably disputed.

52The cases considered extend from the mid-fifth century up to the age of Philip II and Alexander, even in periods of alleged peace between Greece and Persia (e.g. the case of Zopyrus, which occurred after the so-called peace of Callias). An increased frequency occurs during the Kingdom of Philip II, in which three refugees are attested simultaneously in Macedonia: it cannot be excluded that Artabazus and Amminapes arrived there in the same occasion, but in any case it is evident that Macedonia was considered in that period a safe haven for Persian escapees.

53The actual provenance of the exiles is frequently unknown (e.g. for Rhoesaces), while in other cases the region of provenance is known. Very often exiles came from Asia Minor, that is from the area that had the most contacts with the Greek world: Amorges possibly came from Lydia, because he was the son of the local satrap, and the two sons of Pharnabazus, the unnamed one and Artabazus, came from Hellespontine Phrygia, because this was Pharnabazus’ satrapy. On the contrary, it is known that Amminapes was a Parthian, but honestly this does not exclude the possibility that, notwithstanding his origin, before his flight to Macedonia he was operating in areas close to Greece.

54As for the destinations of their escape, the attested episodes are not accidental. Athens was a perfect destination during the pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian war, when its political power was still broad and when Athens was the leader of a League whose primary task was, at least formally, to fight against Persia. Macedonia was a favourite destination during the age of Philip II, also for its growing influence in the international arena: here, as stated above, the refugees probably created a “Persian lobby” at the court of Philip II, which the king hoped to take advantage of for his Asiatic interests (actually, Alexander benefited the most from the Persians who accompanied him to Asia, probably Amminapes and certainly Sisines). In any case, it is quite remarkable that Philip attracted Sisines to his court by corrupting him (this is a peculiar case of an “induced” refugee), because it proves that the Macedonian king was very interested in Persian world.

  • 92 The flight of Pharnabazus’ son would be even more interesting if it could be proved to be earlier t (...)
  • 93 Mitchell, 1997, p. 131-132.

55Sometimes completely personal factors played a role in the choice of the country in which to take refuge: this was the case of the good relations of Zopyrus’ mother with the city of Athens and of the relationship of xenia between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus’ son that prompted him to choose such an unusual destination as the Peloponnese.92 In fact, it is known that often international relations between Persians and Greeks took place on a personal and individual level:93 this feature surely affected the choice of the host-country and facilitated the collocation of the refugee in his new place of residence.

56It is rarely possible to go back to the causes of the escape from the Persian empire. In the few cases where this is possible, a fundamental role is played by the family environment: sometimes the rebellion against the Great king could be the continuation or the resurgence of a fracture already consumed previously (Zopyrus and Amorges); the role of family ties was important in Artabazus’ case too, but not as an explanation of the destination of his exile, rather for his readmission to his homeland thanks to Mentor. On other occasions, the decision to abandon the home country could depend on an intra-family struggle or on the predilection of one offspring at the expense of another (Pharnabazus’ son). Also charges, well founded or groundless, coming from some courtesans could generate an atmosphere that prompted departure (Artabazus). Lastly, as recalled above, on one occasion the Persian man had no intention to go into exile, but was induced mainly by means of corruption to settle in the country where he had been sent on an embassy mission (Sisines).

  • 94 Zopyrus’ father (Megabyzus) was satrap of Syria; the father of Amorges (Pissuthnes) was satrap of L (...)

57The social rank of these Persian exiles was as a rule high. This was obviously due to the facts that common people had fewer reasons to become refugees (and clearly also much fewer chances to be accepted as refugees) and that sources usually declined to deal with them. Several exiles were satraps’ sons, or satraps themselves, or even relatives of the imperial family (Zopyrus, Amorges, the unnamed son of Pharnabazus, Artabazus94). In other attested cases, no information is provided about the status of the Persian before his exile, but in any case he would hardly have been of low rank: Rhoesaces because he was rich and Amminapes because he was later appointed satrap by Alexander. The only possible exception may be that of Sisines, because Curtius relates that he was donis et omni honore cultus: this might suggest that he considered Philip’s offer as an improvement of his social condition, which therefore may be supposed not to have been very high; but, admittedly, it is more likely that he was just a greedy and ambitious rich man, also considering that Curtius (3.7.12) refers to his nobilitas and his maiores.

58It is probably due to his high-ranking status that the Athenians, Agesilaus and Philip II were willing to welcome the exile, and obviously also because they hoped to gain something through their hospitality: in fact, on the one side the host state could fear that the refugee actually was a spy to gather information, but on the other side the refugees could be used as informers; besides, they could also act as military agents or governors in the area of Asia Minor (Zopyrus and Amorges) and in other Persian satrapies (Amminapes). These refugees were probably well-connected with the elite of their host country, especially in the cases of Macedonia and Athens: the three exiles in Macedonia had contacts not only with Philip, but probably also with Alexander (and, in the case of Amminapes, perhaps also with Parmenion); as for the refugees in Athens, Rhoesaces had contacts with Cimon, while Zopyrus and Amorges (if he could be considered a refugee) led (on their own or along with Athenian officers) important military actions on behalf of the city.

59The refugees were often involved in the dense network of international political life. For example, Alexander used Amminapes to gain the satrapy of Egypt; Zopyrus and Amorges were used by the Athenians to deal with difficult situations regarding the Delian League in Caria, an area they would have known well; moreover, the case of Amorges was used politically by Pisander to get rid of Phrinicus and it is not unlikely that the support given him by the Athenians was one of the circumstances that induced the Persian king to ally himself with Sparta, causing in effect Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War. In any case, accepting a refugee implied no marginal consequences for international politics.

  • 95 Concerning spies in ancient Persia, see e.g. Briant, 2002, p. 344. Further references in Sheldon, 2 (...)
  • 96 For the acceptance of refugees by the Athenians, see Rubinstein, 2018 (although for the fourth cent (...)

60We have no information about their acceptance in the countries where they moved. This issue concerns less the monarchical societies, such as Sparta or Macedonia, while it was more likely to affect cities like Athens, whose citizens might consider it inappropriate to host Persian dignitaries, or even fear that those refugees were actual spies.95 The charges made by sycophants against Rhoesaces could hint at the possibility that not all Athenians were willing to host a Persian, especially so shortly after the end of the Persian Wars (besides, it is worth considering that Pissuthnes had previously been abandoned by the Athenians).96 Instead, in monarchical countries, this issue obviously had less importance: the situation of exiles in Laconia or, even more so, at the royal Macedonian court must have differed from that of Persians who had sought refuge in Athens.

61As for the end of their sojourns in the host-country, some interesting remarks could be made, with the exception of a couple of cases, for which there is no information (those of Rhoesaces and Pharnabazus’ unnamed son). Zopyrus and Amorges came to a bad end while on a mission for Athens: the former died in Caunus and the latter was arrested, handed over to Tissaphernes and later probably executed. Amminapes’ fate is not completely clear: after being appointed satrap, flanked by an episkopos, he was later (at least partially) replaced for unknown reasons (perhaps for misconduct or motives not depending on him) or died during his office. If Curtius is reliable, Sisines was executed by Alexander due to a misconception, but it is interesting that the Macedonian king did not have complete trust in this Persian exile. Only one case is explicitly attested in which a refugee returned to Asia, that of Artabazus: he was welcomed back in Persia through the good offices of Mentor, a relative of his; it is conceivable that he obtained this privilege also by promising that he would reveal all he had learned in Macedonia about the resources of the region and Philip’s plans. Therefore, at times refugees came to a bad end while returning the favour to the country that hosted them, while on other occasions they were further rewarded for their support, and only very seldom were they accepted back in their homelands (and only thanks to intermediaries, and probably by promising something in return).

62The issue of Persian refugees in Greece has proved to be very interesting and deserves further study, also in order to look for other possible cases. Unfortunately, the sources about the cases here investigated do not provide many details, and therefore some questions cannot find a definitive answer. Nevertheless, despite these problems, this paper shows the kind of impact that acceptance of a Persian refugee could have in the Greek world and in the international political context.

Haut de page

Bibliographie

Almagor, E., 2018, Plutarch and the Persica, Edinburgh.

Asheri, D., 1990, in Erodoto, Le storie. Libro III, La Persia, Milano.

Asheri, D., 2007, in D. Asheri, A. Lloyd, and A. Corcella, A Commentary on Herodotus, Books I-IV, ed. by O. Murray and O. Moreno, Oxford.

Atkinson, J.E., 1998, in Q. Curzio Rufo, Storie di Alessandro Magno, I, Libri III-V, Milano.

Atkinson, J.E., 2000, in Q. Curzio Rufo, Storie di Alessandro Magno, II, Libri VI-X, Milano.

Badian, E., 1985, Alexander in Iran, in I. Gershevitch (ed.), The Cambridge History of Iran, II, Cambridge, p. 420-501.

Badian, E., 1993, From Plataea to Potidaea Studies in the History and Historiography of the Pentacontuetia, Baltimore - London.

Badian, E., 2000, Conspiracies, in A.B. Bosworth and E.J. Baynham (eds.), Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction, Oxford, p. 50-95.

Balcer, J.M., 1993, A Prosopographical Study of the Ancient Persians Royal and Noble c. 550-450 B.C., Lampeter.

Balogh, E., 1943, Political Refugees in Ancient Greece. From the Period of the Tyrants to Alexander the Great, Johannesburg.

Baynham, E., 1998, Alexander the Great. The Unique History of Quintus Curtius, Ann Arbor.

Bearzot, C., 2017, Pissutne satrapo della Lidia, RaRe, 9, p. 37-57.

Bichler, R., 2011, Ktesias spielt mit Herodot, in J. Wiesehöfer, R. Rollinger, and G.B. Lanfranchi (eds.), Ktesias’ Welt. Ctesias’ World, Wiesbaden, p. 21-52.

Blamire, A., 1989, Plutarch, Life of Kimon, London (Bulletin Suppl. 56, Institute of Classical Studies University of London).

Blamire, A., 1975, Epilycus’ Negotiations with Persia, Phoenix, 29, p. 21-26.

Bosworth, A.B., 1980, A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander, I, Books I-III, Oxford.

Bresciani, E., 1985, The Persian Occupation of Egypt, in The Cambridge History of Iran, II, Cambridge, p. 502-528.

Bresson, A., 2002, Un « Athénien » à Sparte ou Plutarque lecteur de Xénophon, REG, 115, p. 22-57.

Briant, P., 2002, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire, Winona Lake (transl. of Briant, P., 1996, Histoire de l’Empire perse: de Cyrus à Alexandre, Paris).

Bronson, C.L., 1918, in Xenophon, Hellenica. Books I-V, Cambridge.

Buckler, J., 1994, Philip II, the Greeks, and the king 346-336 B.C., Illinois Classical Studies, 19, p. 99-122.

Burgin, J., 2010, A Geographical Note on the Xanthos Stele, Kadmos, 49, p. 181-186.

Burn, A.R., 19842, Persia and the Greeks: the Defence of the West, c. 546-478 B.C. Second Edition with a Postscript by D.M. Lewis, London.

Cagnazzi, S., 2001, Gli esìli in Persia, Bari.

Debord, P., 1999, L’Asie Mineure au ive siècle (412-323 a.C.). Pouvoirs et jeux politiques, Bordeaux.

Eddy, S.K., 1973, The Cold War between Athens and Persia, ca. 448-412 B.C., CPh, 68, p. 241-258.

Ellis, J.R., 1976, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, London.

Edwards, M., 1995, Greek Orators, 4: Andocides, Warminster.

Flensted-Jensen, P., 2004, Karia, in M.H. Hansen and T.H. Nielsen (eds.), An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis. An Investigation Conducted by the Copenhagen Polis Centre for the Danish National Research Foundation, Oxford, p. 1108-1137.

Gabriel, R.A., 2010, Philip II of Macedonia: Greater than Alexander, Washington.

Gunderson, L.L., 1982, Quinctus Curtius Rufus: on His Historical Methods in the Historiae Alexandri, in W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza (eds.), Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage, Washington, p. 177-196.

Gimadejev, R.A., 1983, A Possible Persian Source for Thucydides’ Description of the First Athenian Expedition to Egypt, VDI, 163, p. 106-111 (non vidi).

Griffith, G.T., 1979, in N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia, II, Oxford.

Gray, B., 2017, Exile, Refuge and the Greek Polis: Between Justice and Humanity, Journal of Refugee Studies 30, p. 190-219.

Heckel, W., 2006, Who’s Who in the Age of Alexander the Great. Prosopography of Alexander’s Empire, Malden-Oxford.

Harris, E.M., 1999, IG I³ 227 and the So-Called Peace of Epilykos, ZPE, 126, p. 123-128.

Heckel, W., 2003, King and ‘Companions’: Observations on the Nature of Power in the Reign of Alexander, in J. Roisman (ed.), Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great, Leiden-Boston, p. 197-225.

Heckel, W., 20162, Alexander’s Marshals: A Study of the Makedonian Aristocracy and the Politics of Military Leadership, London-New York.

Hegy, D., 1973, Historical Authenticity of Herodotus in the Persian “Logoi”, AAntHun, 21, p. 73-87.

Henkelman, W.F.N., 2011, Der Grabhügel, in J. Wiesehöfer, R. Rollinger, and G.B. Lanfranchi (eds.), Ktesias’ Welt. Ctesias’ World, Wiesbaden, p. 111-139.

Hornblower, S., 1982, Mausolus, Oxford.

Hornblower, S., 1991, A Commentary on Thucydides, I, Books I-III, Oxford.

Hornblower, S., 2008, A Commentary on Thucydides, III, Books 5.25-8.109, Oxford.

How, W.W. and Wells, J., 19282, A Commentary on Herodotus, I, Oxford.

Hyland, J., 2013, Alexander’s Satraps of Media, Journal of Ancient History, 1, p. 119-144.

Hyland, J.O., 2018a, Persian Interventions. The Achaemenid Empire, Athens, and Sparta, 450-386 BCE, Baltimore.

Hyland, J.O., 2018b, The Revolt of Kaunos and the Assassination of Zopyros, GRBS, 58, p. 19-41.

Jensen, E., 2018, Barbarians in the Greek and Roman World, Indianapolis-Cambridge.

Keen, A.G., 1993, Athenian Campaigns in Karia and Lykia during the Peloponnesian War, JHS, 113, p. 152-157.

Keen, A.G., 1998, Dynastic Lycia: A Political History of the Lycians and Their Relations with Foreign Powers, c. 545-362 B.C., Leiden - Boston.

King, C.J., 2018, Ancient Macedonia, New York.

Kuhrt, A., 2007, The Persian Empire. A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period, I, London - New York.

Lenfant, D., 2004, in Ctésias de Cnide, La Perse, L’Inde. Autres fragments, Paris.

Lewis, D.M., 1977, Sparta and Persia, Leiden.

Lewis, D.M., 1985, Persians in Herodotus, in The Greek Historians. Literature and History. Papers Presented to A.E. Raubitschek, Saratoga, p. 102-117 (= in P.J. Rhodes (ed.), Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern History, Cambridge, p. 345-361).

Lindholmer, M., 2016, The Assassination of Philip II: an Elusive Mastermind, in Palamedes, 11, p. 77-110.

Loddo, L., 2019, Alcibiades: Was He a Genuine Political Refugee?, QS, 90, p. 5-28.

Madreiter, I., 2011, Ktesias und Babylonien: über eine nicht existierende Grösse in den Persika, in J. Wiesehöfer, R. Rollinger, and G.B. Lanfranchi (eds.), Ktesias’ Welt. Ctesias’ World, Wiesbaden, p. 247-277.

Marek, C., 2006, Die Inschriften von Kaunos, München.

Meiggs, R., 1972, The Athenian Empire, Oxford.

Mensch, P., 2014, in Herodotus, Histories, Indianapolis - Cambridge.

Mitchell, L.G., 1997, Greeks Bearing Gifts: The Public Use of Private Relationships in the Greek World, 435–323 B.C., Cambridge.

Morgan, J., 2016, Greek Perspectives on the Achaemenid Empire: Persia Through the Looking Glass, Edinburgh.

Olbrycht, M.J., 2010, Macedonia and Persia, in J. Roisman and I. Worthington (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Macedonia, Malden-Oxford, p. 342-369.

Panagopoulos, A., 1979, Fugitives and Refugees in the Peloponnesian War, Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρὶς τῆς Φιλοσοφικῆς Σχολῆς τοῦ Πανεπιστημίου Ἀθηνῶν, 27, p. 247-296.

Pownall, F.S., 2007, The Panhellenism of Isocrates, in W. Heckel, L.A. Tritle, and P.V. Wheatley, Alexander’s Empire: Formulation to Decay, Claremont, p. 13-25.

Primo, A., 2002, La satrapia di Dascilio tra Farnabazo e Ariobarzane, SCO, 48, p. 423-430.

Rapin, C., 2017, Alexandre le Grand en Asie Centrale. Géographie et Stratégie de la Conquête des Portes Caspiennes à l’Inde, in C. Antonetti and P. Biagi (eds.), With Alexander in India and Central Asia, Oxford - Philadelphia, p. 37-121.

Rhodes, P.J., 2011, Alcibiades, Barnsley.

Rubinstein, L., 2018, Immigration and Refugee Crises in Fourth-Century Greece: an Athenian Perspective, The European Legacy, 23, p. 5-24.

Ruzicka, S., 1985, A Note on Philip’s Persian War, AJAH, 10, p. 84-95.

Ruzicka, S., 2010, The “Pixodarus affair” reconsidered again, in E.D. Carney and D. Ogden (eds.), Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives, Oxford, p. 3-11.

Schmitt, R., 2006, Iranische Anthroponyme in den erhaltenen Resten von Ktesias’ Werk, Wien.

Schrader, C., 2005, Plutarco, Epílico y el tratado con Darío II, in A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Bonner Titchener (eds.), Historical and Biographical Values of Plutarch’s Works: Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by the International Plutarch Society, Logan, p. 423-432.

Seibert, J., 1979, Die politischen Flüchtlinge und Verbannten in der griechischen Geschichte, Darmstadt.

Sekunda, N.V., 1988, Persian Settlement in Hellespontine Phrygia, in A. Kuhrt and H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (eds.), Achaemenid history, III: Method and Theory. Proceedings of the London 1985 Achaemenid History Workshop, Leiden, p. 175-196.

Sheldon, R.M., 2003, Espionage in the Ancient World: an Annotated Bibliography of Books and Articles in Western Languages, Jefferson.

Sherman, C.L., Diodorus of Sicily, VII, London-Cambridge.

Sisti, F., 2001, in Arriano, Anabasi di Alessandro, I, Libri I-III, Milano.

Sordi, M., 1969, Diodori Siculi Bibliothecae Liber XVI, Firenze.

Sordi, M., 2005, Note senofontee, Aevum, 79, p. 17-22.

Stylianou, P.J., 1998, A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus, Book 15, Oxford.

Starkey, J, 2013, Soldiers and Sailors in Aristophanes’ Babylonians, CQ, 63, p. 501-510.

Stronk, J.P., 2010, Ctesias’ Persian History. Part I: Introduction, Text, and Translation, Düsseldorf.

Thonemann, P.J., 2009, Lycia, Athens and Amorges, in J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas, and R. Parker (eds.), Interpreting the Athenian Empire, London, p. 167-194.

Tuplin, C., 2011, Ctesias as Military Historian, in J. Wiesehöfer, R. Rollinger, and G.B. Lanfranchi (eds.), Ktesias’ Welt. Ctesias’ World, Wiesbaden, p. 449-488.

Vlassopoulos, K., 2013, Greeks and Barbarians, Cambridge.

Waters, K.H., 1985, Herodotos the Historian. His Problems, Methods and Originality, London - Sidney.

Wells, H., 1907, The Persian Friends of Herodotus, JHS, 27, p. 37-47.

Welsh, D., 1983, The Chorus of Aristophanes’ Babylonians, GRBS, 24, p. 137-150.

Westlake, H.D., 1977, Athens and Amorges, Phoenix, 31, p. 319-329.

Haut de page

Notes

1 See e.g. Cagnazzi, 2001.

2 For the applicability of the modern label of “political refugee” to the ancient world, see recently Loddo, 2019, p. 7-12.

3 Seibert, 1979, p. 621 n. 340. The study of Balogh, 1943 offers a framework of the issue of political refugees in Greece, but does not provide useful remarks for the topic of Persian refugees.

4 Translation by Blamire, 1989, p. 51 (with minor changes).

5 Doubts about historicity of the event have been expressed e.g. by Miller, 1997, p. 90. In my opinion, the details in the anecdote of the encounter with Cimon could be rejected, but not the historicity of his being in Athens as a refugee. Moreover, the fact that Plutarch has knowledge of the name of this Persian refugee is a strong argument in favour of his historic existence.

6 Piccirilli, 1990, p. 237. Obviously Ῥωσάκης in Diod. Sic. 16.47.2 is a different individual (Blamire, 1989, p. 136).

7 See Balcer, 1993, p. 259 (n. 292) for a possible identification with a Persian man (Rauzaka) mentioned in the Persepolis tablets.

8 The events mentioned both before and after the episode of Rhoesaces (particularly in Plut. Cim. 9.3 and 11) are not easy to be dated (see e.g. Piccirilli, 1990, p. 233 and 238-239), and this does not help in dating Rhoesaces’ stay in Athens, admitted that Plutarch follows the chronological order. The obvious conclusion that Rhoesaces was in Athens before 450 is also in Sekunda, 1988, p. 179.

9 Plut. Cim. 9.2-6 = FGrHist/BNJ 392 (Ion of Chius) F 13. About the dating of this campaign several assumptions have been made: see Blamire, 1989, p. 126-128 and Piccirilli, 1990, p. 233. Concerning this episode: Sekunda, 1988, p. 176; Briant, 2002, p. 500.

10 Blamire, 1989, p. 136 (cfr. Hornblower, 1991, p. 175).

11 Translation by Mensch, 2014, p. 203.

12 These events are usually dated between 522 and 521 B.C. Ctesias’ version is quite different, since he ascribes the siege to Xerxes (and not to Darius) and substitutes Zopyrus with Megabyzus (FGrHist 688 F 13.26; cfr. Plut. Mor. 173a). About this issue, see: Welsh, 1983, p. 147-148; Asheri, 1990, p. 355; Balcer, 1993, p. 130-131; Lenfant, 2004, p. lxxxix-xci; Briant, 2002, p. 136; Asheri, 2007, p. 522-523; Bichler, 2011, p. 34-35; Henkelman, 2011, p. 112; Madreiter, 2011, p. 264; Tuplin, 2011, p. 452; Almagor, 2018, p. 278.

13 Hdt. 3.160.2 (see Asheri, 1990, p. 360; Asheri, 2007, p. 527). See also Thuc. 1.109.3-4 (see Hornblower, 1991, p. 175-176) and Diod. Sic. 11.77 (see Kuhrt, 2007, p. 321).

14 See Miller, 1997, p. 21 and Lenfant, 2004, p. civ, 131 n. 560, both in favour of the historicity.

15 Translation by Stronk, 2010, p. 345.

16 About the episode of Zopyrus and the rebellion of Caunus (and the issue of their dating): How-Wells, 19282, p. 302; Meiggs, 1975, p. 436-437; Eddy, 1973, p. 255; Hornblower, 1982, p. 28 n. 176; Welsh, 1983, p. 145-146; Asheri, 1990, p. 360; Badian, 1993, p. 35-36 and 194 n. 44-45; Balcer, 1993, p. 115-116; Keen, 1993, p. 155 (and n. 31); Miller, 1997, p. 24, 90; Briant, 2002, p. 136, 578; Flensted-Jensen, 2004, p. 1120; Lenfant, 2004, p. 270, n. 578-581; Marek, 2006, p. 93 (cautious about the dating); Asheri, 2007, p. 527; Kuhrt, 2007, p. 329 n. 15.2; Thonemann, 2009, p. 171; Vlassopoulos, 2013, p. 101; Almagor 2018, p. 71; Hyland, 2018a, p. 39; Hyland 2018b, p. 19-41, who places Zopyrus’ flight to Athens in the late 440s or 430s (p. 27 n. 22) and the rebellion of Caunus between 431-428 (p. 23-24); Jensen, 2018, p. 92. It should be remembered that in the winter 425/4 the Persian Artaphernes was arrested in Eion and transferred to Athens (Thuc. 4.50); later (ὕστερον) he was freed, but at this moment in all probability Zopyrus was already dead.

17 Lenfant, 2004, p. 270 n. 529 (cfr. Badian, 1993, p. 194 n. 45), on the grounds of Ctesias FGrHist 688 F 14.40 where there is a generic mention of “Greeks” (not Athenians); Hyland 2018b, p. 21 n. 5.

18 Concerning the causes of Caunian revolt, see Hyland 2018b, p. 25-27.

19 Hyland 2018b, p. 28 wonders whether Zopyrus was the only commander of the expedition or he operated in association with an Athenian strategos (in this case Hyland suggests the name of Lysicles). In any case, he draws attention to the fact that in Ctesias Zopyrus appears as the leader in the talks with the Caunian rebels. The aim of the expedition was clearly to prevent the Caunians from passing to the Persian sphere of influence (and for this purpose Zopyrus was the ideal candidate, as pointed out by Hyland 2018b, p. 29) and to gain back the city in the Delian League.

20 Hyland 2018b, p. 32.

21 A different interpretation is that the Caunians had no intention to surrender and that they lured Zopyrus into a trap: Lenfant, 2004, p. 148; Hyland 2018b, p. 33-35 (who anyway favours the assumption of an internal division among the Caunians).

22 Hyland 2018b, p. 35-40.

23 Asheri, 1990, p. 357 and Asheri, 2007, p. 524. For some doubts about this assumption, see Schmitt, 2006, p. 97-100 and Hyland 2018b, p. 21 n. 4

24 Miller, 1997, p. 24 suggests that Zopyrus’ stay in Athens lasted approx. from 435 to 425 or maybe less (cfr. also p. 110). See also Hyland 2018b, p. 27 (implying that Zopyrus was in Athens from the late 440s or 430s to about 431-428).

25 Miller, 1997, p. 90; Hyland 2018b, p. 27-28, observing that Zopyrus had personal contacts with many members of the Athenian intellectual community (maybe including also Socrates: see p. 28 n. 23), but that some Athenians may have suspected his loyalty.

26 Concerning Herodotus, the theory has been suggested by Wells, 1907, p. 37-47 (see also e.g.: Burn, 19842, p. 13, 109, 116, 323; Waters, 1985, p. 77; Balcer, 1993, p. 116; Miller, 1997, p. 24, with further bibliography); against this possibility, also because it is uncertain whether Herodotus could have met Zopyrus in Athens, Hegy, 1973, p. 82-84 (see also e.g.: Lewis, 1985, p. 105-106; Asheri, 1990, p. 360-361; Asheri, 2007, p. 527). Concerning Thucydides, see: Gimadejev, 1983, p. 106-111; Miller, 1997, p. 24; Hornblower, 1991, p. 164. On the whole, see also Hyland 2018b, p. 27 n. 23, with further bibliography.

27 Welsh, 1983, p. 145-150. Against this supposition: Miller, 1997, p. 24; Starkey, 2013, p. 501-510. But we must not forget that also in Acharnians there is a Persian character (Pseudoartabas).

28 Concerning this peace, see e.g.: Blamire, 1975, p. 21-26; Lewis, 1977, p. 76ff.; Edwards, 1995, p. 198; Harris, 1999, p. 123-128; Schrader, 2005, p. 423-432.

29 Translation by Edwards, 1995, p. 29.

30 Thuc. 8.5.5 and 28.3 (νόθος). About this repetition, see Hornblower, 2008, p. 832. Concerning the revolt of Pissuthnes, see most recently Bearzot, 2017, p. 53-54.

31 Thuc. 8.5.5; 28.3 (with Hornblower, 2008, p. 771-773); FGrHist 668 (Ctesias) F 15.53. The rebellion took place between the end of 420s and the 410s.: betweeen 423 and 414 (Thonemann, 2009, p. 173) or 417 and 413 (Lenfant, 2004, p. 272 n. 611); for further bibliography, Bearzot, 2017, p. 53 and n. 54. See also: Lewis, 1977, p. 59-62; Keen, 1993, p. 97; Briant, 2002, p. 591, 674.

32 Bearzot, 2017, p. 37-57.

33 The same doubt occurs e.g. in Westlake, 1977, p. 321-322.

34 About this army, see below n. 40.

35 Possibly from Arcadia (Hornblower, 2008, p. 833).

36 Concerning these events, see: Westlake, 1977, p. 319-329 (who is sceptical about the trustworthiness of Andocides’ piece of information); Keen, 1993, p. 156-157; Miller, 1997, p. 28; Briant, 2002, p. 591-594. About the name of Amorges in the Xanthos stele, see: Keen, 1998, p. 136; Debord, 1999, p. 80, 121, 209, 312; Briant, 2002, p. 608-609; Thonemann, 2009, p. 173-174, 177-178 (see also 180-181 for Amorges a loyal Persian commander); Burgin, 2010, p. 183-185; Bearzot, 2017, p. 53-54; Hyland, 2018, p. 37-38.

37 See Tuci, 2013, p. 52 and n. 59, 53-54.

38 Lewis, 1977, p. 86 and Briant, 2002, p. 591-592 date the agreement between Athens and Amorges to 414 (cautiously also Rhodes, 2011, p. 56). Some scholars connect Amorges’ revolt with an Athenian inscription (ML 77, l. 79), attesting a payment for a strategos operating in Ephesos in 414: it could be a clue in favour of the dating of the agreement in that year, but honestly it is only an assumption and not an evidence. Westlake, 1977, p. 319-329, instead, dates the agreement to 412. About this issue, see also: Thonemann, 2009, p. 174 and n. 58; Bearzot, 2017, n. 62-63 p. 54 and Hyland, 2018a, n. 45 p. 186.

39 Hyland, 2018a, n. 45 p. 186. Among the suggestions provided by Hyland, it seems to me to be excluded that the agreement could consist in “mere verbal assurances of collaboration”.

40 Moreover, the mercenary army attested in summer 412 by Thuc. 8.28.4 (and 19.2) is likely the same army (στρατιά) mentioned by Thuc. 8.19.2.

41 Panagopoulos, 1979, p. 247-248. In his wide study about “fugitives and refugees in the Peloponnesian war”, Panagopoulos does not list the case of Amorges, but this seems just an oversight; in any case, it should not be interpreted as a clue of that fact that Panagopoulos does not consider Amorges as a refugee, since his paper is devoted both to refugees and fugitives.

42 Seibert, 1979, p. 621 n. 340.

43 One may wonder if the contact between Amorges and the Athenians took place in Iasus, the Carian city that was member of the Delian League: in this case, there is no need to suppose that Amorges came to Athens as a refugee. But nothing compels to assume that Iasus was the base of the rebel, as rightly pointed out by Hornblower, 2008, p. 772. Therefore, there is no actual reason to exclude that Amorges came to Athens.

44 For an updated and wide list of the scholars who accept Andocides’ account, see Hyland, 2018, n. 1 p. 183.

45 Hyland, 2018, p. 37-38 (see also 42, 44) points out that also the support previously given by the Athenians to Pissuthnes provoked Persians’ displeasure.

46 See above, nn. 34, 40.

47 See FGrHist 688 (Ctesias) F 15.53.

48 It could be mentioned also the case of the high-born Persian Spithridates, who broke with Pharnabazus because he asked him his daughter as a concubine. Spithridates then joined Agesilaus (Xen. Hell. 3.4.10; Plut. Ages. 8.3), but later returned to the Persians (Xen. Hell. 4.1.27-28): see e.g. Briant, 2002, p. 640, 644. But Spithridates seems to have been a dissident, not exactly a refugee.

49 Various attempts have been made for identifying this youngster: Sekunda, 1988, p. 178 suggests that he could be one of the brothers of Artabazus named by Polyaenus, Oxythres and Dibictus (Strat. 7.33.2); Primo, 2002, p. 426-429 proposes to identify the youngster with the Mithridates mentioned in Diod. Sic. 15.90.3. These are ingenious solutions, but they remain assumptions.

50 Shipley, 1997, p. 193 doesn’t exclude that Xenophon could be wrong about the identity of the youngster’s mother; this seems to me unlikely, because Xenophon was well informed about these events. About the Persian practice of gift-giving, see e.g. Mitchell, 1997, p. 111-114 (p. 122-124 about the episode of Agesilaus and Pharnabazus).

51 Concerning this issue, see also a different interpretation by Bresson, 2002, p. 22-57.

52 Xen. Hell. 4.1.40 (translation by Bronson 1918, 281).

53 Concerning this problem, see: Sekunda, 1988, p. 178 (who knows only Plutarch’s version); Krentz, 1995, p. 208; Shipley, 1997, p. 190-193; Debord, 1999, p. 98; Bresson, 2002, p. 45ff.; Primo, 2002, p. 424-426 (according to whom Xenophon alludes to the brother of Pharnabazus, who was Ariobarzanes).

54 About this Artabazus, see below, par. 3.1. For other brothers of Artabazus (and children of Pharnabazus), see Polyaen. Strat. 7.33.2 and Sekunda, 1988, p. 178.

55 Xen. Hell. 5.1.28; Plut. Artax. 27.7. See e.g. Briant, 2002, p. 309, 339; Hyland, 2018, p. 165.

56 Shipley, 1997, p. 192-193 and Primo, 2002, p. 425. Krentz, 1995, p. 208 suggests as possible occasion also the naval campaign after the battle of Knidos in 394 (Xen. Hell. 4.8.1-9), but this assumption seems less convincing.

57 Shipley, 1997, p. 192-193; Bresson 2002, p. 41, but with a different interpretation.

58 It could be unlikely that Agesilaus accepted a Persian exile after the King’s peace of 387/6, but it should be remembered that perhaps Pharnabazus and Artaxerxes could be not so unhappy about the fact that the son from Pharnabazus’ previous marriage left the Persian Kingdom.

59 See Xen. An. 5.3.7 and Sordi, 2005, p. 17-19.

60 Sordi, 1969, p. 45-46.

61 Sordi, 1969, p. 65 places the alliance between Artabazus and the Thebans in 354. See also Griffith, 1979, p.  264.

62 Translation by Sherman, 1963, p. 383.

63 Curt. 5.9.1 (hospitem Philippi fuisse); 6.5.2 (hospes Philippi fuerat, cum Ocho regnante exularet). See also Ath. 6.69.256e.

64 Concerning the ties of kinship, see e.g.: Debord, 1999, p. 104 (p. 393-396 for Artabazus’ rebellion); Briant, 2002, p. 700; Vlassopoulos, 2013, p. 72.

65 Briant, 2002, p. 682.

66 Diod. Sic. 15.91, dated to 362/1, but probably to be placed in 359 (Stylianou, 1998, p. 541-543). Concerning Datame’s revolt, see e.g. Briant, 2002, p. 659-660. The death of Artabazus’ grandfather (Artaxerxes II) and the ascent to the throne of a new King (Artaxerxes III, uncle of Artabazus) in 358 could have may have facilitated the spreading of calumnies against Artabazus. For different explanations: Debord, 1999, p. 394 (who refers to Schol. Dem. 4.19); Olbrycht, 2010, p. 346 (who suggests, on the contrary, that Artabazus rebelled during his struggle to succeed his father Pharnabazus).

67 Griffith, 1979, p. 484 n. 5: from 352 or 351 until 344. Olbrycht, 2010, p. 347: from about 352 to about 345. Debord, 1999, p. 396 dates to 352 the escape in Macedonia. Ellis, 1976, p. 172 supposes that Artabazus was still in Pella in 341. According to Ruzicka, 2010, p. 5 and Lindholmer, 2016, p. 99-100, Artabazus stayed at the Macedonian court for about ten years.

68 Besides, according to Briant, 2002, p. 688, a Persian noble could find in Macedonia a structure and way of life among the local aristocracy like that to which he was accustomed.

69 Griffith, 1979, p. 404. Besides, as pointed out by Olbrycht, 2010, p. 347, Macedonia was safe for the enemies of the Great king.

70 See Ellis, 1976, p. 92 and King, 2018, p. 93.

71 Diod. Sic. 16.52 places the capture of Hermias after the coming back of Artabazus and Memnon to Asia. About the affaire of Hermias and the possibility that Artabazus became an important informer of Artaxerxes about Hermias’ plans: Sordi, 1969, p. 92-93 (who points out mainly a likely role for Mentor); Griffith, 1979, p. 521-522. See also Briant, 2002, p. 688-689 and Olbrycht, 2010, p. 347-348, who points out that Artabazus returned to Persia with a good knowledge of the Macedonian situation.

72 Curt. 6.5.1ff. and 22 (see also Arr. Anab 3.23.7-9).

73 Artabazus satrap of Bactria: Curt. 7.5.1; Arr. Anab 3.29.3. Artabazus’ loyalty to Darius: Arr. Anab 3.23.7. See Briant, 2002, p. 866, 870.

74 Curt. 6.4.25 calls him Manapis, but he is undoubtedly the same man. Concerning this Parthian refugee, see (in addition to what mentioned in the notes below): Atkinson, 2000, p. 423; Sisti, 2001, p. 529-530; Briant, 2002, p. 688; Olbrycht, 2010, p. 347; Vlassopoulos, 2013, p. 73; Jensen, 2018, p. 92.

75 This seems to be the assumption of Atkinson, 2000, p. 423.

76 For Mazaces, Arr. Anab. 3.1.2 (Μαζάκης  Πέρσης); for Amminapes, Anab. III 22, 1 (Ἀμμινάπης Παρθυαῖος).

77 About this issue, see also Briant, 2002, p. 845.

78 Badian, 1985, p. 453.

79 It should be remembered that Curtius Rufus mentions the exile in Macedonia for both of them: 6.5.2 and 6.4.25. Bosworth, 1980, p. 345 suggests that Amminapes may have been in the entourage of Artabazus.

80 See: Bosworth, 1980, p. 346; Heckel, 2006, p. 268-269; Olbrycht, 2010, p. 357. But Tlepolemus is not the only overseer known for a satrap: see Hyland, 2013, p. 123 n. 21 (see also p. 125 and n. 21 for Amminapes’ replacement).

81 The following assumption has been already suggested by Rapin, 2017, p. 70 (and 76), but without a deep scan of the sources.

82 According to this assumptions, the mention of Phrataphernes as satrap only of Parthia (and not also of Hyrcania) in Curt. 9.10.17 should be considered a case of incompleteness.

83 Amminapes could have been deprived of Partia for reasons imputable either to himself or to Phrataphernes (maybe Alexander wanted to reward the former governor for some reason). The fact that Parthia was Amminapes’ motherland could be an argument against the hypothesis here discussed, but actually it could be assumed that this was due to a specific strategic choice by Alexander.

84 Curtius’ codices actually report Sisenes, but the name is usually corrected in the form Sisines according to the variant referred by Arrian. Anab. 1.25.3-4. The difference could depend either on an error made by Curtius, or on a different rendition of the original Persian name, or even on the fact that they were two different individuals (see below).

85 About the second Persian conquest of Egypt by Artaxerxes III and about the satrap Pherenates, see Diod. Sic. 16.50. See also Bresciani, 1985, p. 526.

86 For Curtius’ version of the name, see above n. 84.

87 For a framework of the issue, see Atkinson, 1998, p. 208-209 and Sisti, 2001, p. 382-385. Curtius’ version is considered reliable by Bosworth, 1980, p. 161 and Baynham, 1998, p. 144-145. For further bibliography, see: Gunderson, 1982, p. 183-184; Badian, 2000, p. 57-58; Heckel, 2003, p. 210-212; Gabriel, 2010, p. 242; Olbrycht, 2010, p. 347; Heckel, 20162, p. 18 n. 42, 25 (n. 31), 27 (n. 37), 29.

88 Badian, 2000, p. 57-58.

89 Arr. Anab. 7.6.4. Although it has been attempted to identify this Sisines with that of Curt. 3.7 or that of Arr. Anab. 1.25, Badian, 2000, p. 57 n. 14 believes persuasively that they are three different individuals.

90 About Isocrates’ Philippus, see e.g. Pownall, 2007, p. 13-25. For the contacts between the Macedonian and the Persian courts during the reign of Philip, see e.g.: Ruzicka, 1985, 84-95 (and also Ruzicka, 2010, p. 4-10 and esp. 6 about the “Pixodarus affair” as part of Philip’s planning for his Persian war); Buckler, 1994, p. 99-122; Olbrycht, 2010, p. 345-351 (p. 346 about Philip’s intentional borrowings from Persian traditions); Lindholmer, 2016, p. 77-110 (according to Lindholmer, the Persian king was the one who ordered Philip’s murder) and esp. 99-100 (among other things, again about the fact that Philip intentionally imitated many of the institutions of the Persian Empire); Morgan, 2016, p. 269ff. and esp. 270-271. See also above, n. 70.

91 Greek terminology for refugees is wide: see e.g. Gray, 2017, p. 192.

92 The flight of Pharnabazus’ son would be even more interesting if it could be proved to be earlier than 387/6, since in this case there would be also another reason for choosing Sparta, that is the war that Agesilaus was waging against Persia.

93 Mitchell, 1997, p. 131-132.

94 Zopyrus’ father (Megabyzus) was satrap of Syria; the father of Amorges (Pissuthnes) was satrap of Lydia and probably related to the imperial family (see Bearzot, 2017, p. 37 n. 2); Pharnabazus’ two children were sons of the satrap of the Hellespontine Phrygia (moreover, Artabazus was related to the imperial family and he himself a satrap).

95 Concerning spies in ancient Persia, see e.g. Briant, 2002, p. 344. Further references in Sheldon, 2003, p. 49-53.

96 For the acceptance of refugees by the Athenians, see Rubinstein, 2018 (although for the fourth century) and Loddo’s contribution to this collection.

Haut de page

Pour citer cet article

Référence papier

Paolo A. Tuci, « Persian Refugees in Ancient Greece »Pallas, 112 | 2020, 167-190.

Référence électronique

Paolo A. Tuci, « Persian Refugees in Ancient Greece »Pallas [En ligne], 112 | 2020, mis en ligne le 01 juillet 2022, consulté le 25 mai 2024. URL : http://0-journals-openedition-org.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/pallas/21344 ; DOI : https://0-doi-org.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/10.4000/pallas.21344

Haut de page

Auteur

Paolo A. Tuci

Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano

Ricercatore (Lecturer) in Ancient Greek History
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano
Dipartimento di Storia, Archeologia e Storia dell’arte
paolo.tuci[at]unicatt.it

Haut de page

Droits d’auteur

CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.

Haut de page
Rechercher dans OpenEdition Search

Vous allez être redirigé vers OpenEdition Search