1Value, Historicity, and Economic Epistemology: An Archaeology of Economic Science immediately appears as a very ambitious project. The author, Alain Herscovici, is a full professor of economics at Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo in Vitória, Brazil. His works relate mainly to the methodology of heterodox economics, and especially to neo-Ricardian theory and the controversies about the concept of capital. Nevertheless, his most recent book has a wider scope. Historiographically, he aims to consider the main “schools of thought” in the history of economics “since its foundation with the Physiocratic School until today” (5). Epistemologically, he draws on Foucault’s (1966; 1969) concept of “episteme” to provide his own interpretation of the evolution of the history of economic thought (HET). Herscovici acknowledges that Foucault himself had already commented on the political economy of the 18^th and 19^th centuries (see Vigo de Lima, 2010), so his intention is to see if one can extend the coverage of Foucault’s analysis. Herscovici’s proposal is to outline a proper epistemological approach with which to identify, analyze, and explain the main turning points in the HET up until its contemporary developments (6).

2The book has 9 chapters. After giving an outline of the project (Chapter 1), Herscovici discusses Foucault’s contribution to economic methodology (Chapter 2). Then, he provides his own review of the major theoretical developments in the HET (Chapter 3). His own interpretation of the evolution of the HET arrives next as a test of Foucault’s conceptual tools (Chapter 4). Accordingly, the predominance of the “neoclassical school” motivates a revision of three major strands of criticism of it in the second part of the book (chapters 5, 6, and 7). The book ends with a reassessment of Foucault’s contribution to studies on the HET and the suggestion of an alternative grid for future studies (chapters 8 and 9).

3Chapter 2 discusses the “received” view of science as opposed to the “historicist” conception (16). Herscovici regards Foucault as a great exponent of the historicist conception. In particular, he focuses on the concept of “episteme” that Foucault used to analyze the developments of pre-20^th century economics. Episteme refers to the “set of relations between sciences, epistemological figures, positivities and discursive practices, that allows understanding the game of restrictions and limitations that, at a given moment, are imposed on the discourse” (Foucault, 1969, 250-251 in Herscovici, 32; the translation seems Herscovici’s). Herscovici profits from Foucault’s definition to distinguish between “epistemological analysis,” an assessment of the internal coherence of a system of thought, and “sociological” analysis, which establishes the conditions for a system’s emergence and decline based on contextual constraints (31). Nevertheless, he considers Foucault’s association of episteme with the “history of mentalities” (6, 104) to mean that the concept belongs to epistemological analysis. Along these lines, episteme might be better understood as the common set of beliefs and persuasion tactics that characterize different periods of time. By the end of the chapter Herscovici declares his purpose of uncovering the similarities and distinctions of the different epistemes in the HET (40).

4Herscovici reviews major “schools of thought” along chapters 3 and 4. His review is limited to the Physiocrats, Smith, Ricardo and Marx, and the “neoclassical school.” Briefly, he interprets the Physiocrats as the pioneer developers of the utility-value theory that Smith would then formalize and develop. Smith constitutes a main “bifurcation point” in the HET (57). Not only is he said to have developed the notions of “spontaneous coordination” and of the marginal (dis)utility of labor (56), he also produced a theory of labor-value. Allegedly, the former foreshadowed the advent of marginalism, neoclassical economics, and Hayek, while the latter set the ground for classical economists Ricardo and Marx (62). Ricardo and Marx represent “a fundamental epistemological rupture” (84). Their labor-value theory favored an objective analysis (vs. subjective “psychological” analysis) of “production and labor” (84). Their view on capital allowed to consider how social and historical contexts play major roles in the determination of wages and income distribution (89). The subsequent arrival and predominance of neoclassical economics, based on utility value, is said to have simply ignored such contradictory developments. Herscovici concludes that the HET is marked by a tension between “universalists” and “historicists.” Universalists hold the “belief in a human nature that acts as an invariant element across space and time” (82). Conversely, historicists Ricardo and Marx drew away from psychology into labor-value and thus “allow[ed] emancipating Economics from religion, moral, politics and ideology” (79).

5At the end of Chapter 3, Herscovici shows an attempt to tie the authors he reviewed to different epistemes. In fact, Foucault discussed the existence of three major epistemes which would be distinguished by their conception of the origins of social order, their rhetorical tools, their analytical tools, and their conception of time. Accordingly, there would be an episteme proper to the pre-classical period (up to the 16^th century), one proper to the classical period (17^th and 18^th centuries), and one proper to the modern period (since the end of the 18^th century onward; 33-5). Herscovici discusses how Physiocracy is a product of the pre-classical and classical epistemes, how Smith presents elements from all three, how Ricardo and Marx remain ambiguous (74), and how, again, neoclassicism presents elements from all three epistemes. Chapter 4 ends with a variety of considerations about why there could not be “an episteme proper to Economic Science, neither to Modern Economics” (103), mainly because of the diversity of Ricardo and Marx, whose historicism makes them incompatible with the rest of economics.

6In the second part, Herscovici deals with three “contemporary” cases of “epistemological ruptures” (112). The first, neo-Ricardian economics, builds upon the controversies around the concept of capital (Chapter 5). Herscovici explains that, because capital is considered to be heterogeneous, neo-Ricardians undermine the foundations of the neoclassical production function. Thus, neo-Ricardian theory is said to oppose general equilibrium constructions in microeconomic, macroeconomic, and growth models (132). The second case is Hayek’s, which presents an apparent ambiguity for Herscovici (Chapter 6). Methodologically, according to Herscovici, Hayek stands far from neoclassical economics: he considers “interindividual” relationships (vs. atomistic individualism, 147-148) and refuses both mathematical modelling and the neoclassical concept of equilibrium (153). Yet, Hayek also shares with neoclassicism his views on competition as a normative benchmark for policy analysis, the dichotomy between real and monetary variables, and a belief in the efficiency of markets. The third case is post-Keynesianism (Chapter 7), which is said to challenge the distinction between monetary and real economic variables that is so dear to neoclassical economics. Herscovici reconstructs first how Keynes conceived the monetary determination of the interest rate (the “non-neutrality of money”). Then, he reconstructs how post-Keynesians established the impact of financial markets on real variables (the “non-neutrality of the finance”). Regarding neo-Ricardians and post-Keynesians, Herscovici concludes that they represent a rupture regarding the dominant paradigm of neoclassical economics. Meanwhile, in Hayek “[t]he differences appear at the level of the auxiliary hypotheses, that is, the modus operandi. Neoclassical and Hayekian approaches … are not two different and incompatible Research Programs, but simply two different developments of most part of the same hard core” (159).

7Chapter 8 comes with a surprise: Herscovici criticizes Foucault’s concept of episteme. First, he recognizes that the linkages between “schools” and epistemes that he discusses before (see Chapter 3) are “inadequate,” resulting in an inconclusive taxonomy (214). Second, he asserts that episteme is unable to explain how contradictory research programs may emerge at the same time (216). He says, in sum, that “the monolithic character of the concept of episteme does not allow understanding the links existing between the different periods considered” (216). Another surprise follows as Herscovici proposes a new concept, “order,” as the new tool for reading the HET. Order has to do with how authors “articulate the micro and macroeconomic levels” (186). Herscovici distinguishes two orders:

The liberal order, whether in the neoclassical or Hayekian version, is an ex ante order: the mechanisms that, from an initial position of disequilibrium, allow explaining how this order is carried out, are voluntarily ignored. The system spontaneously carries out this order: a Deus ex machina. …

On the contrary, the institutional order is carried out ex post: as institutions correspond to “social pacts” that allow for the temporary conciliation of antagonistic interests (Boyer 1987), it is through the mediation of these institutions that order is being achieved. (190; emphasis in the original)

8The author illustrates his views by reviewing the opposition between Mandeville, Smith, Hayek, Pareto, and the neoclassicals on the one side, and Keynes, (Ricardo and) Marx, and Grossman and Stiglitz on the other. The author seems to rebrand his previous discussion of the tension between universalists and historicists with a focus on institutions.

9Chapter 9 complements the previous chapter by discussing how the passage from one system of thought to another can be explained by a process of “assimilation and distinction” (214). Assimilation refers to works that share a “hard core” and differ in their “auxiliary hypotheses” (e.g., Hayek and neoclassical economics). Distinction refers to cases of epistemological rupture, where the critique of a theory announces “a different paradigm, already built or under construction” (215). In the end, Herscovici offers a brief discussion of how each episteme (pre-classical, classical, modern) presents elements from different orders and how the concept of order—unrestricted by chronology—is more versatile than its Foucauldian counterpart (220).

10As it is, the reader will not find it easy to identify the book’s target. For one thing, Herscovici does not position himself very clearly regarding the literature on Foucauldian studies, such as Vigo de Lima’s (2010) Foucault’s Archaeology of Political Economy or Vallois (2015)’s “Michel Foucault and the History of Economic Thought”, which appear sporadically within the book. Indeed, the Foucauldian reader might feel that the rationale for a return to Foucault’s episteme remains unclear. In the end, one can only wonder why Herscovici chose to retain it, even though (i) it is already the main object of Vigo de Lima (2010), (ii) Foucault himself had described it as an imprecise analytical exercise (see Vallois, 2015), and (iii) Herscovici himself would discard it later within the book. Consequently, one gets the impression that the book has not profited from the Foucauldian historiographical reflection that has grown slowly during the past decades (Tribe, 1978; 2022; Guala, 2006; Stapleford, 2017; Düppe and Weintraub, 2019). If there was an opportunity to present a comprehensive perspective on the contribution of Foucauldian epistemology to the HET, that door is still open.

11Otherwise, the book’s interest is not meant to be its account of the HET. Herscovici refers to the authors he deals with as those who studied “the economic system as a whole,” shaping the main evolutions of the HET (49). However, major developments like the steps from marginalism (if I may) to the actual neoclassical synthesis coined by Samuelson or the Lucasian revolution in the 1970s are briefly mentioned. Others such as the decay of the Arrow-Debreu program of general equilibrium, the rise of econometrics, of behavioral economics, and of experimental economics are simply ignored. One may be inclined to doubt if Herscovici’s HET provides a historiographically pondered account of the discipline. In comparison, textbooks might arguably provide more detailed and precise readings of the HET. For instance, the recent textbooks presented by Backhouse and Tribe (2018) or Backhouse (2023) offer a wider history, both chronologically and theoretically, presenting complex networks made up of economists and social thinkers that include developments before the 17^th century and beyond the post-war period. Canonical (although probably a little dated) versions of the HET may be found also in Blaug (1992), Landreth and Colander (2002), and Screpanti and Zamagni (2005), while those interested in heterodox thought could consider Roncaglia (2005) or Deleplace (2022; for French speakers), which Herscovici himself mentions.

12The main argument of the book remains a possible novelty. However, at this stage, the author would have to take some steps to refine and strengthen his reading of the HET in terms of a tension between politically opposed conceptions of social coordination (“order”). Because Herscovici almost systematically ignores recent secondary literature on the HET, he risks portraying old simplistic views of the different authors. Occasionally, there are also unsubstantiated original statements. For instance, one would expect the author to tread lightly when talking about subjective utility in physiocracy or when saying that Smith “tries to reconcile Christian morality with ostentatious consumption, i.e., private vices with public virtues, in the same way that Mandeville does” (53). One would also like to know what it means for Hayek to be an epistemological universalist, given his radical subjectivism, the constant process of theory selection that he attributes to scientists (e.g. Hayek, 1967, 7), and his contextual evolutionism (Kolev, 2024).

13In addition, the reader might still wonder how to ascertain the boundaries of what the author calls “neoclassical economics,” a major character in Herscovici’s story, and why he refers to it as a school of thought. In a footnote, “What I call Neoclassical Economics is composed of a structure that systematically associates GE [General Equilibrium] and social efficiency, this efficiency being evaluated based on Pareto’s criterion” (64). Yet, Herscovici frequently blurs those lines, for example when he presents neo-Ricardian and post-Keynesian critiques as directed toward the same “neoclassical macroeconomics”, or when he asserts that neoclassicals and Hayek share the same “hard core.” Only then it would be easier for the reader to digest the claim, for instance, that both Hayek’s and the new-Keynesians’ differences with the neoclassicals are forms of a “sociological strategy of differentiation” (159, see “false differentiation strategies” in 215). Throughout the book, there are numerous arguments scattered around or left unexplained, and references are sometimes incomplete (e.g., 44, 160). Thus, the reader gets the impression that the book is still in a draft version. Maybe a new revision, along with some professional editing—that manifestly Palgrave MacMillan did not provide—could give another chance to Herscovici’s contention.