1Since its beginning in the late 19th century, the modern canned fish industry has always played an important role in the Portuguese economy, being one of its few export sectors (Cordeiro 1989). The Portuguese canned fish industry developed dramatically during World War I but fell into a crisis after the end of the conflict due to the downturn in external demand (Cordeiro 1989). The following study aims to examine the relevance of the export of Portuguese canned sardines by focusing on the case study of the U.S. market during the interwar period. It addresses the diagnostic strategies for Portuguese canned sardines in the U.S. market, a subject that has not been the focus of previous research. The primary source of this research is the 1938 report by Francisco José Guerra, a highly qualified member of the Portuguese Institute of Canned Fish. His report is an innovative study of the Portuguese canned fish industry based on fieldwork in the U.S. which focused on that market. This paper also uses quantitative sources and external trade statistics.

2The canned fish industry from the 19th century to the outbreak of World War II has been the subject of several studies dealing with the historical evolution of the canned fish industry in Portugal (Barbosa 1941; Quintas Júnior 1941; Faria 1950; Cruz 1958), the role of the Portuguese New State (Estado Novo, 1933-1974), the institutions that oversaw the canned fish industry (Cordeiro 1989 and 1995; Madureira 2007; Mata 2009; Henriques 2019 and 2022), and overfishing and fishery sustainability (Garrido and Starkey 2020; Amorim 2020). Our study highlights the quality of Portuguese canned sardines, their low price, and the limitation to the growth in their demand due to insufficient advertising within the U.S., thus contributing to the existing literature. This article is divided into two parts followed by a conclusion. In the first part, the macroeconomic context of the Portuguese canned fish industry from the end of World War I until the beginning of World War II is presented. The second part presents a case study of the U.S. market. The study focuses specifically on the following issues: 1) competition with the Portuguese canned fish industry; 2) U.S. consumption and production of canned sardines; 3) the role of marketing in the promotion of Portuguese canned sardines to the U.S.

1. The Portuguese Canned Fish Industry

3On the eve of World War I, Portugal was the main global producer of canned fish. However, from the canned fish produced, only two types were considered important in terms of exports: tuna and sardines. Of these two, sardines became important for the Portuguese trade balance due to the high quality of the sardines, the very stable fishery, and the attractiveness of the Portuguese coastal conditions (Amorim, 2020). In 1913, Portugal exported 24,554 tonnes of canned sardines against approximately 20,000 tonnes from Spain and only 5,600 tonnes from France (Cordeiro 1989, 27). Meanwhile, a new competitor appeared in Northern Europe: Norway, which began to conquer major markets and exported approximately 18,000 tonnes of canned fish in that same year (Cordeiro 1989, 27). World War I stimulated a large increase in the capacity of the Portuguese canned fish industry. Many new canning plants were established because of increased demand by nations at war (Portugal would only enter the war in 1916) and restrictive measures on exports from producing countries, some of which, like France, participated in the conflict. However, the quantitative increase in production took place at the expense of product quality. A large number of the canning plants that were created during the war to meet the demand did not fulfil the necessary conditions required to survive after the end of this exceptional period.

4Thus, during this period, the Portuguese canned fish industry acquired a dimension for which it was not adequately prepared. Many of the problems it would face in the following decade resulted from the conditions in which the sector grew during the war and in the years that followed. Even after the conflict, the number of canning plants and their production continued to increase. In 1922, there were 289 canning plants of canned fish in olive oil in Portugal (66 more than in 1918), in addition to the 150 establishments that prepared the fish in brine (Cordeiro 1989, 28). During this period, the canning industry began to move to the Northern part of the country, particularly to the port of Matosinhos, near Oporto. During the 1920s, despite continuous demand, the structural problems identified during the war were still affecting the industry. In 1923, new canning plants were established, and production was encouraged through exceptionally high catches. In that year, 53,600 tonnes of canned sardines were exported, an amount that was not reached again until 1934 (Cordeiro 1989, 28). The great crisis of the Portuguese canning industry began in 1924 when the absorption capacity of traditional foreign markets fell dramatically as the economies of these countries adapted to the economic conditions of the post-war period. These economies suffered a sharp increase in customs barriers due to difficulties in the settlement of international debts and credits and, in some cases, to a policy of self-sufficiency.

5Other circumstances also contributed to the worsening crisis. In 1925, there was a great shortage of fish, especially in the southern region of the Algarve. The volume of exports fell to 31,500 tonnes, approximately 60% of what it had been in 1923 and, in 1926, production capacity by plant decreased to 49% of what it had reached in 1918. The quantities produced did not fluctuate much until the end of the 1920s as annual exports averaged 33,700 tonnes between 1925 and 1930 (Cordeiro 1989, 28). Summarising the chaotic situation in which the Portuguese canned fish industry found itself, Barbosa (1941, 21) mentions the following aspects: “The lack of industrial education, limited financial potential of companies and the lack of commercial preparation”. These constitute factors that explain the situation that was created, to which one can add “the drop in prices in foreign markets and costly conditions for obtaining credit” (Barbosa 1941, 21).

6This led to several initiatives being taken by the industry to draw the attention of authorities to the serious situation in which the sector found itself and, thereby, to try to obtain the implementation of measures that could contribute to the solution of the existing problems. In December 1927, the 1st Congress of Fisheries and Canned Fish took place in Setúbal, where various aspects of the crisis that threatened to paralyse the industry were addressed. Among the resolutions taken, the Congress demanded the intervention of the state in the sector’s affairs. Because of this, most of the suggestions made then served as a basis for the preparation of a decree that outlined regulations which would reorganise the industry by creating corporatist organisations. The decree itself was not very clear about time limits for prohibiting new canned fish plants from being established, stating that these would be maintained until the industry’s regulations had been published. The military coup of 28 May 1926, which put in place a military dictatorship that was not favourable to the implementation of strong economic measures, delayed the continuity of state intervention for some time. However, it was during this period that the then Minister of Finance, António de Oliveira Salazar, would carry out his study visit to the main canning centres in the country, enabling him to produce the famous report "Notes on the Industry and Trade of Canned Fish" (Salazar 1935, first published in 1931). The institutions created by the Estado Novo to reorganise the industry in 1932 played an important role in the growth of the canning industry (Henriques 2019).

7However, recent Portuguese historiography has reduced the actual impact of the crisis of 1929 on the economy of the country to its real proportions, demonstrating that it did not have the catastrophic consequences that occurred in other countries. The Portuguese economy was quite isolated from the outside as exports accounted for only approximately 10% of the gross domestic product. Furthermore, “the relatively low presence of foreign capital made the Portuguese economy somewhat immune to the catastrophic losses of capital that shook other more developed countries during the crisis” (Rosas 1986, 260). Portuguese canned fish were also a type of product that did not have much international competition, “so that the market for them never suffered drastic restrictions in quantity” (Rosas 1986, 260). Reflecting the negative, albeit limited, influence of the effects of the Great Depression on the canning industry, this resided more in the aggravation of the negative aspects of the industry’s structural characteristics than in a direct influence of the crisis. These characteristics were mainly caused by the expansion of the canning industry during World War I and the time immediately following, that is, a context of industrial overequipping. This was felt more intensely in Setúbal and the Algarve, although it was negligible in Matosinhos, since this was a more recently developed industrial area where companies had a solid economic structure (Cordeiro 1989). The crisis was also beset with a somewhat serious problem regarding exports and their marketing systems, although this was only the 'tip of the iceberg'.

8One of the key features of the Portuguese canned fish industry lies in the fact that, since its inception, it has essentially been an export industry. The quality of the fish that existed off the coast of the country, particularly sardines, quickly promoted Portuguese canned fish in the most significant importing centres, ensuring that Portuguese canned sardines were widely accepted in nearly all parts of the world. From the establishment of the first canning plants, the quantity of exported canned sardines increased steadily although there were variations. In addition to the constraints caused by fluctuations in international trade, the Portuguese canning industry had a wide range of other difficulties and problems. As already mentioned, one of the major problems was the extreme, and often unfair, competition triggered by the canning companies in the import markets. Manufacturers tried to sell their products at successively lower prices, which caused a natural shrinkage in the number of buyers due to the discrediting of Portuguese goods. Because of this, many of the companies established during the decade following the beginning of World War I lacked basic technical and financial requirements. In fact, financial conditions in the canning industry represented one of the main weaknesses of this sector. In 1931, the nominal share capital of 162 canned fish companies in Portugal was distributed as follows:

10Understandably, these companies had to sell their production, sometimes at any price, to meet their basic commitments, namely the purchase of raw material and packaging, as well as their employees’ wages. For this reason, in 1936, manufacturers in Matosinhos tried to establish a Canning Industry Bank. However, the initiative was not successful due to the lack of agreement between the manufacturers and the strict regulations imposed by the corporatist system (Cordeiro 1989). Another attempt to regulate the market gave rise to a policy of fixing minimum export prices (Cordeiro 1989). In general, it can be stated that resistance to that policy was expressed by manufacturers and by those who were only exporters. Its implementation required the manufacturers to improve quality, especially those who did not have continuity of sales, who did not keep their clientele, or who manufactured poor quality products and, thus, attached little value to the sale of their products in foreign markets. In other words, this policy acted not only as a supervisory agent, but it also freed the industry from unfair competition. However, the circumstances that existed in the 1920s, especially in the canning centres of Setúbal and Algarve, where companies were economically weaker and whose survival was incompatible with the acceptance of the “minimum price”, created a situation of permanent disrespect of this policy. In 1937, the magazine Conservas even proposed a plan to prevent “the incompliance with the minimum price policy and ensure that this policy would continue”. Two years later, the same magazine lamented that no one mentioned the issue of minimum price. With the outbreak of World War II and the resulting exponential increase in demand for canned fish, these concerns were forgotten (Cordeiro 1989).

11At the beginning of the 1930s, there were essentially two strategies for solving the problems that the canning industry was facing. One had to do with private initiatives and a market economy, which was reflected either in the proposals of the Portuguese Industrial Association or in the initiatives of a group of industries in the canning centre of Matosinhos. Another strategy lay in action taken by the government and which constituted the embryo of the “corporatist economy”. The study that Salazar (1935) had carried out investigating the causes of the crisis affecting the canning industry played a central pioneering role in the structuring of the future industrial policy of the Estado Novo. The main concern was the total lack of organisation of the export sector, exacerbated by a restriction of the markets affected by the crisis of 1929, which led the industrial sector to develop extreme competition overseas that abused prices and discredited goods. As noted then, “the need for capital has led to selling at any price and in any way, so far below cost, that it has sometimes been considered dumping – an absurd dumping, with no benefit to anyone” (Salazar 1935, 26). The negative consequences of a situation like this, anarchising and miseducating a market subject to large offers of goods at successively decreasing prices, led to manufacturers increasingly encountering “greater retractions on the part of the buyer who is still waiting for better prices and conditions” (Salazar 1935, 26). Another point also emphasised was:

There can be no doubt that [...] we must go further in disciplining the export trade [...]. It seems to me that from now on, even if the internal market is free from competition, we should work toward the organisation of foreign trade, monopolising it in an export centre for canned fish, formed by those manufacturers who are interested in exporting. (Salazar 1935, 35)

12The active intervention of the state in the canned fish industry began in August 1932, with the publication of two decrees. The first established the rules that would govern the future of production and trade, and the second created the Portuguese Consortium of Sardine Canning. In 1933, the basic laws of the corporatist system were published. Among these were the National Labour Statute and the consequent creation of National Trade Unions and the National Institute of Labour. The need to readjust the structure and nature of the Portuguese Consortium of Canned Sardines to the principles expressed in those documents forced some changes in that body which, despite maintaining its name, would now work in the form of a union of guilds comprised of manufacturers and exporters of canned fish, as a corporatist organisation. The creation of the so-called bodies of economic coordination in July 1936 also caused changes in the corporatist organisation of the canning industry. The Consortium was then broken up into the Portuguese Institute of Canned Fish – a body of economic coordination – and into various corporatist bodies, including the Guilds of Manufacturers and Guilds of Exporters (Cordeiro 1989).

13Corporatist organisation and, in particular, the guilds of manufacturers played a dual role, both economically and socially. This corporatist philosophy worked in relation to the problems and contradictions occurring at the heart of the canning industry. The corporatist system not only blocked the economic development of the sector, preventing the concentration and formation of strong industrial groups, but also impeded the effective resolution of existing problems, such as trying, at all costs, to eliminate competition between companies, stopping the rules of the market economy from being exercised naturally, and forcing unworkable companies out of the game. The weakness manifested in the canning industry in the early 1930s facilitated the implementation of this strategy, which emerged by itself. As noted by J. M. Brandão de Brito (1985, 53), the corporatist economy would emerge “as a kind of managed capitalism in which competition, meaning selection, considered one of the main causes of the crisis and of the demotivation of business, had to be drastically limited”. The author also underlines that “it is this blindness in competition, its propensity to excesses [that] legitimised the intervention of the state and constituted full justification of the conditioning of the industry: a strategy of industrialization imposed by law and controlled by it”.

14The grouping of four major canning companies in Matosinhos in 1926 to deal with the problems triggered by the crisis that had begun in 1924 was a confirmation of the ability of private enterprises to solve their own problems. The Union of Canners, as this group was called, not only had a wide range of intentions to solve the crisis but also swiftly demonstrated a remarkable ability to put them into practice (Cordeiro 1989, 31). One of the first measures implemented addressed the situation of external trade. Due to the confusion in prices among the various markets, the manufacturers decided to merge their sales, achieving positions of prominence and acceptance of their products, which could be sold at higher prices than those of their competitors. Another measure that they aimed to carry out involved building a factory for the production of cans for which they acquired a piece of land in 1919. However, the Union of Canners was forced to break up in 1932 after the publication of the decree that created the Portuguese Canned Sardines Consortium.

15The set of measures that the state applied in the canning industry also prevented the concentration of the industry. The insistence on these measures and policies resulted in limited growth of industrial capital (Rosas 1986). It must be acknowledged that the corporatist organisation of the industry initially raised great expectations and was strongly supported by the canning industry. The political environment of the time, the rapid response of the state in the restructuring of the sector, the fact that the initiatives of the private business sector were limited to the canning centre of Matosinhos, and the proposal of the Portuguese Industrial Association to form a cartel remained a theoretical plan which served to explain the manufacturers support. On the other hand, these serious problems required a quick response that, in the eyes of the manufacturers, only the state could provide. However, in 1936, the first criticisms began to appear. Although the manufacturers in Matosinhos confirmed their support for the principles of the Estado Novo, they expressed their differences with the corporatist organisation represented by the Consortium of Portuguese Canned Fish, created almost four years previously.

16There is a fundamental aspect in the corporatist organisation of the canning sector that must be noted. One of the main problems was that companies in the import markets went into competition with each other, sometimes unfairly. In the study mentioned previously, Salazar (1935, 35) addressed the problem by proposing a solution through the reorganisation of all foreign trade, concentrating it in “a centre for canning exports, formed by manufacturers interested in exporting”. In fact, Salazar’s proposal was not only the most appropriate, but it was also a possible solution to the problem because it bore in mind the success of other countries exporting canned fish, such as Norway, after similar organisations had been created there. However, that aspect of Salazar’s study was not established in corporatist law and, therefore, it was not put into practice. It was put forward again on several occasions over the following few decades, but it was never implemented. Nevertheless, the canned fish industry played a strategic role in Portuguese trade, particularly during World War II, constituting a pillar of neutrality for the country and allowing access to imported goods that helped to minimize the social effects of the war (Henriques 2022 and 2023).

2. The Conquest of the U.S. Market: Diagnosis and Strategies

17The analysis of the annual export values of canned sardines between 1918 and 1929 shows that up until 1922 the main export destinations for this product were France, England, and Italy, with Belgium also being an important client in the two first years of that period. After 1923, the three main clients were France, England, and Germany, although France was the industry’s main customer every year except for 1918 (England) and 1926 (Germany). In this twelve-year period, the U.S. was the fourth export destination for Portuguese canned sardines in 1923 and 1928 and the fifth in 1922, 1926 and 1929 (Table 2). Research is ongoing into the period up to 1939. From 1919 until 1923, there was a clear increase in the U.S. demand for Portuguese canned sardines, reaching 3.9 thousand tonnes. In the remaining years of the decade of the 1920s, nearly 2 thousand tonnes of canned sardines were exported annually to the U.S.

18The great years of Portuguese canned fish consumption in the U.S. between the World Wars were the first years after the Great Depression of 1929, namely 1931, when 3.7 thousand tonnes were exported; 1932, with 7.1 thousand tonnes; and 1933, with 2.9 thousand tonnes. Although there was a marked decrease in demand for Portuguese canned sardines in the American market in 1934 (0.4 tonnes), the following years up to 1939 saw the annual amount not only recover the levels it had reached between 1925 and 1930 of almost 2 thousand tonnes but also rise to 3.8 thousand tonnes in 1936 and 3 thousand tonnes in 1939 (Figure 1). The price level of canned sardines for export to the U.S. developed similarly to that of the average price for the three main customers of Portuguese canned sardines. Between the two world wars, the values of the annual price level observed until 1922 were 0.5 to 1.3 contos, and after that export prices of Portuguese canned rose to higher values ranging from 3.1 to 5.5 contos (Figure 2).

19In the 1930s, international trade was affected negatively by the growth of protectionism and by financial instability (Eichengreen and Irwin 2010). Nevertheless, the decade registered an increase in the demand for canned food in the more industrialised countries, potentially benefiting producers such as the Portuguese canned fish industry (Henriques 2022). The problems and difficulties affecting the Portuguese canning industry during the 1930s led to an attempt to find solutions by both increasing and diversifying the markets where the product was sold. It was at this time that the possibility of increasing the exports of Portuguese canned food to the lucrative American market was suggested. Therefore, the Portuguese Institute of Canned Fish (Instituto Português de Conservas de Peixe, IPCP) instructed one of its most qualified members, Francisco José Guerra, to conduct an investigatory mission to the U.S. with the aim of analysing the American market and presenting strategies that could be implemented.

20The concern of the Estado Novo with exports from the canning sector was also reflected in the international promotion of Portuguese canned sardines by the Swiss-born graphic artist Fred Kradolfer, who designed a remarkable advertising campaign in 1938. The political objective of entering further into the American market was not an easy goal to achieve. The Portuguese canning sector faced many difficulties each time it had previously tried to enter that vast market, which reflected the weaknesses that existed in the Portuguese canning sector, particularly the existing marketing structures. Furthermore, the greatest problem for Portuguese exports in the U.S. market during the 1930s was the fact that lead salts were detected in Portuguese canned goods and, as a result, the American authorities were wary of Portuguese export products.

21The problem of the presence of lead salts in canned goods resulted from outdated methods still in use at that time in the production of the vacuum, especially in the sealing of the cans. This was done manually, with the lid being welded to the rest of the can. Consequently, it was necessary to develop new machinery to produce the vacuum so that stamped and riveted cans could be sent to the American market. These new canning methods had been adopted by Portugal’s main competitors in the American market, such as Norway, as well as by the American canning industry itself, which had already been using them for some time. Portugal's competitors also used a thinner and more flexible sheet of metal, which allowed the cans to be opened more easily. The metal sheet used by the Portuguese industry was too heavy and rigid, which, together with the excessive amount of solder, made the can difficult to open. When the key used to open the cans of fish did not work smoothly, the cans became deformed, and it was difficult to remove the fish. At that time, when someone faced an obstacle in a physical skill, the popular phrase “it is almost as difficult as opening a can of Portuguese sardines” was used.

22The main constraint concerning the introduction of Portuguese canned fish into the U.S. market was the need for a sufficiently robust productive and commercial structure to enable it to withstand competition. The export values of Portuguese canned fish to the U.S. market of 130 million inhabitants in the 1930s were still far below the possibilities offered by this market, which had special features that required the use of more efficient marketing techniques, such as those of Portugal's main competitor, Norway. In a market where all details were considered, the Norwegian canning industry benefited from superior presentation and intense advertising. In the years from 1936 to 1938, Portugal was the second main exporter of canned sardines to the U.S. market (and the first of genuine sardines) both in quality and quantity, with 14% of the market share, while the other exporters of canned sardines, namely Spain, Italy, Morocco, and Japan, had a lower quality product and a smaller share of the U.S. market (Guerra 1938).

23The average American consumption of canned food per year was 12 billion cans (92 cans per capita). The consumption of canned sardines represented about 20% of the total canned fish consumption. Keeping in mind the superior quality of the Portuguese canned sardines, as well as their reasonable price, Guerra’s research underlines that the only reason why Portuguese sardines did not have a greater expansion in the North American market was because they were not known by the great mass of consumers. According to Guerra, the expansion of Portuguese canned sardines in the American market required the implementation of an educational propaganda campaign aimed at the American people. In his report (Guerra 1938, 98), the words transcribed from the project by the advertising agency Ayer & Son are an illustrative example of the growing value of the advertising industry in the North American market at that time:

The advertising industry is at the head of every industry in North America. Currently, $1,750,000,000.00 is spent on advertisements (that is, in our currency, thirty-nine million, three hundred and seventy-five thousand contos). Twenty years ago, this amount was $1,250,000,000.00 (twenty-eight million, one hundred and twenty-five thousand contos) which proves its continuous increase. Of the ten largest advertisers in the United States of North America, four manufacture food products that are sold in grocery stores. Food advertisers spend $51,000,000.00 each year (one million one hundred and forty-seven thousand contos) in advertisements and the same amount is spent by genre establishments. The large chain stores alone spend $15,000,000.00 (three hundred and thirty-seven thousand five hundred contos) annually.

24The above-mentioned investigation into the possibility of increasing the export of Portuguese canned sardine to the North American market resulted in an interesting study that Guerra submitted to the Portuguese Institute of Canned Fish, the regulatory body for this industry, in 1938. Unfortunately, the project was never implemented due to the outbreak of World War II, but his report clearly showed that Portuguese canned fish had already been successfully introduced into the North American market and that an expansion of that market was possible. The report recommended the development of an effective process based on an extensive advertising campaign to help further launch Portuguese products. Guerra’s report also suggested that New York City be the target for the campaign seeing that it was the only market open to Portuguese sardines at that time. The goal was to increase Portugal’s percentage of the market in relation to the Norwegians and the Americans. Of the number of stores in New York City that sold food products, 46% catered to the upper and middle classes. In the 1938 report, 243 retailers were surveyed in the city as to the distribution of the Portuguese, Norwegian, and American sardines across the different consumer typologies. The distribution of Portuguese sardines was 22.5% lower than that of the Norwegian product overall. However, in the upper-class stores, the Portuguese sardines had a 14% greater distribution than the Norwegian while, in the middle and lower-class stores, the distribution was 31% and 51% lower, respectively, than the Norwegian (Table 3).

25Thus, the Portuguese campaign needed to focus on newspapers, which were read by the upper and middle classes, who were the prime consumers of the Portuguese canned sardines. Based on the opinion of well-known medical experts, the campaign would underline the sardines’ nutritional value and the vitamins they provided. The campaign also aimed at increasing the lower-class market by supplying canned sardines sold at a lower price specifically for that market. To be 100% effective, the campaign needed to win over not only the consumer, but also achieve the cooperation of the retailer (namely, by including Portuguese canned sardines in the advertisements of chain stores), the wholesaler, and the importer, with reasonable profits for each party. According to the study, the effective introduction of Portuguese canned sardines into other regions of the U.S. market would require the creation of a delegate from the Portuguese Institute of Canned Fish, who would go forth with the objective of opening up those markets. Delegates would have the following functions: educate retailers and wholesalers, collect and disseminate information, and record financial transactions. Moreover, Guerra emphasised that the Portuguese Institute of Canned Fish should oversee and lead the advertising campaign. Guerra also provided statistics on the production of canned sardines by the main plants in the U.S. in California and Maine (Table 4) during the first seven years of the 1930s.

26An extensive survey carried out with retailers of Portuguese canned fish also allowed a strategy for overcoming the weak points of the export of these products to be outlined. The answers given by the 492 retailers showed that, in New York, 89% of those surveyed consumed Portuguese sardines and only 43.5% in the other cities where the survey was administered. With regard to the origin of the canned sardines consumed, the most popular in terms of sales were from Norway (51% in New York and 60.6% in the other cities), followed by those from Portugal in New York (46.5%) and those from Maine and California in the other cities, with 24.3% and 16.8%, respectively (Table 5). In these cities, Portuguese canned sardines were in fourth place, with 13.7%. Regarding the sales method applied, the questionnaire reflected a clear preference for buying from wholesalers: 91% in New York and 78.5% in the other cities. Of the thirty-six brands of Portuguese canned sardines, “Granadaisa” was the favourite brand in New York (36.4%), while “Martel” was preferred in the other cities (13.4%). The main reason why the American public bought canned fish was that the price continued to be competitive, and this was a decisive factor in allowing Portuguese canned fish products to penetrate the U.S. market. However, the issues of brand, country of origin, and advertising were significant additional factors, which justified the need to organise an effective advertising campaign that focused on these aspects in order to achieve customer loyalty (Table 6).

27Guerra’s report also pinpointed the main factors that influenced the American consumer when purchasing Portuguese canned sardines; indeed, the survey showed that the main factor in selecting Portuguese canned sardines was price, both in New York (62.5%) and in the other cities surveyed (55.1%). The brand was also a significant preference marker, with 23.5% of consumers in New York and 20.4% in the other cities citing this factor. Less influence was related to retailers’ recommendations (11.5% in New York and 2.7% in the other cities), country of origin (8% in New York and 12.7% in the other cities), and advertising (6.5% in New York and 5.8% in the other cities). The questionnaire applied for Guerra’s report also gave information on the variation in the profit margins of Portuguese canned sardines, which was between 5% and 40%. The highest values registered by the 219 vendors surveyed were a profit margin of 27.8% (61 vendors) and 24.7% (54 vendors).

28According to Guerra, the most effective method of penetrating the U.S. market was to conduct a gradual and methodical advertising campaign to be extended outside New York. His suggestion was that the campaign last five years, beginning in New York and extending to Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, New Orleans, and finally to the state of California. Each city or state would be approached in advance, and the products would be promoted at discounted prices. Importers, wholesalers, and retailers of the product would be informed that the products would be on sale, thus making it easier for exporters to find potential customers. He also contended that the export of national brands should be encouraged because 90% of Portuguese canned fish exports were in the form of unbranded cans. Moreover, he suggested that the price of these unbranded goods be higher than that of the national brands and set an allowance for empty cans.

29In order to defend the minimum price policy, Guerra proposed the implementation of a number of measures. First of all, the unbranded cans were to pay an additional customs fee, and that customs fee was recommended to be used to strengthen financial support for the advertising campaign. The creation of a National Brand that was meant to be commercialised and distributed throughout the U.S. by a distribution company was also relevant, to protect Portuguese production and regulate market prices. The reduced export of canned sardines with bones to the U.S. (15-20 thousand boxes) required the creation of a good quality product, which would allow a maximum retail price of 10 cents per can to be set. To this end, the production of canned sardines with bones was to be in the usual ¼ 20 mm format, following the Norwegian model. Mandatory supervision by the IPCP was recommended while the goods were being shipped to the U.S. to ensure both the efficient opening of cans and the strength of the keys, as well as control over the graphic appearance of the packaging and the information provided on it. The study also suggested that FOB prices should be substituted by an in-storage price, which would result in a reduction of duties that could provide a great advantage for Portuguese exports.

30Guerra’s clear and informed vision of a strategy aimed at promoting the entire Portuguese canned fish industry with regard to the potential for exporting their goods to the U.S. market, together with his innovative method of studying the local market, culminated in the idea of creating a pioneering “Genuine Portuguese Sardines” brand that would make all Portuguese canned fish easily identifiable via a stamp on the can. As mentioned above, the project did not materialize because of the outbreak of World War II. It can be argued that Guerra’s report was an important contribution to economic thinking on the competitiveness of the canned fish industry in the U.S because it characterized the U.S. market, analysed the competition and laid out a strategy to expand Portuguese canned sardine exports in the year before World War II started.

3. Conclusion

31This study has analysed the situation of the Portuguese canned sardine industry during the interwar period. It has looked at the problems, and the governmental and private sector attempts to solve them, ending with the establishment of a corporatist organisation in the 1930s. The U.S. was a prime golden market that the Portuguese industry wanted to conquer. An innovative approach to achieving this goal was developed by the Portuguese Francisco José Guerra who, after an extensive survey of retailers and consumers in the U.S. in 1938, defined strategies that could be used to further penetrate the American market. The results of Guerra’s survey were included in a subsequent report that provided clear recommendations for the restructuring of the Portuguese canned fish exports to the U.S. The implementation of an aggressive advertising campaign was also suggested, but never came to fruition due to the onset of World War II. Guerra’s report was another attempt to overcome the obstacles of selling Portuguese canned food products to foreign export markets, specifically, the U.S.

32The exports of Portuguese canned sardines to the U.S. market faced problems in three main areas: competition, consumption, and production. However, the leading component and innovative aspect found in Guerra’s report was the strategy he proposed for the use of marketing. The advertising strategies to be used would stress the quality of Portuguese canned sardines and their very competitive price. Once the American consumer was made knowledgeable about the superb Portuguese product, a substantial growth in demand for said product could be expected. Guerra’s report on strategies to increase exports of Portuguese canned sardines to the U.S. market was a pioneering effort. His study expanded the then existing knowledge of the Portuguese canned fish industry and should encourage the realization of additional studies on other important markets for exports of Portuguese canned sardines.