• 1 Li Zhi, « Author’s Preface » (Zixu 自序, 1590), Fenshu, 1, translated by Pauline Lee, Li Zhi, Confuci (...)

« I find joy (xing 幸) in those few who might comprehend me and thus I have etched these printing blocks. » 1

• 2 Jacques Pimpaneau, Histoire de la littérature chinoise. Paris : Éditions Philippe Picquier, 1989, p (...)

1This article deals with an aspect of the late Ming thinker Li Zhi 李贄 (Zhuowu 卓吾, 1527–1602), renowned for his unconventional life and groundbreaking ideas, « philosophe maudit », as Billeter called him, and that Jacques Pimpaneau appreciated for « il faut garder l'esprit d'enfance (tongxin), car c'est l'esprit vrai »2.

• 3 Nylan (« On the Politics of Pleasure » ; « Lots of Pleasure but Little Happiness » ; The Chinese Pl (...)
• 4 Shirley Chan, « Xing 性 and Qing 情 : Human Nature and Moral Cultivation in the Guodian Text Xing zi (...)
• 5 Ge Zhaoguang, « Tang-Song or Song-Ming: The Significance of a Perspective Shift in Chinese Cultural (...)

2Classical Confucianism can aptly be defined as a guiding path to a fulfilling life. It doesn't negate the pursuit of personal happiness or the practical endeavour to achieve both individual and communal well-being (fu 福, le 樂, the tranquility and contentment, an 安, and fulfillment, zu 足)3. Precedents can be found in Guodian manuscripts that mention the notion of satisfaction (yue 悦) felt when an intrinsic need or desire is met. As Shirley Chan explains, « yue is the cause of and the ultimate reason for the action and functioning of the subject », dai yue er hou xing (待悅而後行)4. Ge Zhaoguang contends that the elevated ethical standards advocated by the trailblazers of Neo-Confucianism and the eminent philosophers of the Song era, that can be exemplified by the dichotomy principles and desires, and the veneration of the widows' chastity, remained lofty ideals cherished by a select cadre of erudite thinkers. These ideals wielded limited influence over the societal fabric during their inception and dissemination in the Song period. It was only as the Southern Song dynasty neared its twilight and the Yuan dynasty came into being that these principles gradually started to infiltrate the mindset of the Han gentry. Over time, these principles and endorsements garnered widespread acceptance, progressively moulding people's ideologies and conduct. Consequently, social norms, traditions, and the prevailing milieu underwent a gradual metamorphosis, increasingly aligning with the standards upheld by the scholarly elite5.

• 6 Cf. respectively Spinoza, Ethics, III « Definitio » 1, and Ibidem, « Explicatio » 3, and Augustine, (...)
• 7 For instance, money-lending for profit was regarded as a transgression against the command of God ((...)

4Analogously, in modern Europe, the rediscovery of the self, among others, was articulated by Spinoza (1632-1677), who explored the positive primacy of the emotive sphere in his eudaemonist discourse, and by Hume (1711-1776). Spinoza's assertion regarding desire's vital dynamic function, « Desire is the actual essence of man » (Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essential), overturned Augustine's caution against self-love as the root cause of humanity's Fall, « Prima hominis perditio, fuit amor sui »6. One of the most fervent debates revolved around acknowledging the natural precedence of the self in decisions and actions that are not necessarily antisocial, as well as the elevation of « avarice », once deemed a deadly sin7, into a potent and positive social force. In the 17th and 18th centuries, this stance was adopted by some proponents of natural law and the Scottish Sentimentalists.

• 8 Li Zhi, « Da Geng Zhongcheng » 答耿中丞 (1584), Fenshu,1:17. In Mingdeng Dao gulu, shang, in Li Zhi qua (...)

5Li Zhi's insight was profoundly centered on an individual's self-motivation and self-interests, concepts he boldly referred to as « selfishness ». Within this framework, he believed that each individual could uncover their inherent virtue — a virtue that serves as the ultimate driving force behind their actions, guided by their unique inclinations. Distinct motivations characterize different individuals, a phenomenon rooted in their individual personality traits. As Li elegantly phrased it, « each person follows their own interests and harnesses their strengths » (ge cong suohao, ge cheng suochang 各從所好，各騁所長)8. Li Zhi intentionally refrained from drawing rigid distinctions between higher (dati 大體) and lesser inclinations (xiaoti 小體), as his primary focus was the quest for an authentic self rather than the establishment of an absolute moral archetype. He perceived the core of this genuine self as residing within the realm of emotional and sensory experiences — an arena encompassing not only moments of joy and anger, but also worries and fears, yearnings for happiness, aspirations, desires, wealth accumulation, affection for loved ones, the pursuit of interests, and moments of leisure. All of these emotional currents fell under the umbrella of « selfishness », as they stemmed from self-initiated impulses. Yet, Li Zhi also recognized that these inclinations inherently fulfilled the fundamental needs of each individual, thereby contributing positively to society. As a result, his analysis diverged from Xunzi's doctrine of an inherently evil human nature :

• 10 Li Zhi, Mingdeng Dao gulu, shang, Part one, in Li Zhi quanji zhu, vol. 14, 9:252.
• 11 Li Zhi, « Ruchen zhuan » 儒臣傳, « Deye ruchen houlun » 德業儒臣後論, Cangshu, 32:544; « Da Deng Mingfu » (1 (...)
• 12 Cf. Slingerland, Effortless Action, p. 180.

6To support his thesis, Li turned to Confucius himself, referencing two passages from the Analects where the pursuit of wealth and honours is portrayed as an inherent inclination10. Li's emphasis on « selfishness » should not be misconstrued as cynicism. The primary point is that his analysis aligns with his profound exploration of the self and strives to unveil the genuine, authentic essence of human beings. The true individual (zhenren 真人) is not the one delineated by philosophers and moralists. Without such an objective comprehension, the construction of any philosophical, moral, or reformative framework remains unattainable. Thus, « selfishness » is better viewed as an uncovering of authentic human nature. Consequently, this serves as the foundation for a profound shift in the overall perception of individuals within society. Personal dignity hinges on innate emotions, and genuine nature and desires underpin morality11. The term « selfish » holds significance when linked to the subject's self, personal motivations, interests, and essential creative drives. It is unsuitable for its negative moral connotation, unless it is employed provocatively against prevailing hypocritical rhetoric. The original childmind, the tongxin 童心, is not immoral but rather a pre-moral mindset, an essential intellect for safeguarding one's vital interests in its innate innocence. This concept resonates with Zhuangzi's notion of « innate emotional disposition » (xingming zhi qing 性命之情). Moreover, the restoration of the original mind entails discovering the self-propelled nature that humans cannot escape albeit within their social and practical dimensions. The loss of tongxin evokes the symbolism of Mencian Ox Hill or Zhuangzi's body mutilations12.

• 13 Li Zhi, « Fu Jiao Ruohou » 復焦弱侯 (1589), Fenshu,2:46. Cf. also « Wang Longxi xiansheng gaowen » 王龍谿先 (...)
• 14 Plato, Republic, book IV, 444e4– 445b2, cit. and commented by Christopher Morris, « The Trouble wit (...)
• 15 Mizoguchi Yūzō 溝口雄三, Zhongguo de gong yu si 中國的公與私中国的公与私 (Public and private in China).Translated i (...)

8The childmind, thus, was the potential wellspring of all authentic moral insight. The sole yet substantial distinctiveness lay in its genuine (zhen) manifestation according to one's individual attributes. This signifies that the concept of morality diverged from Wang Yangming's perspective, as one needs not suppress desires and self-centered inclinations to achieve a clear intuition and realization of conscience. The original conscience is not hindered by desires and self-interests that are parts of it, as humans are « selfish », albeit not malevolent. Moral assessment concerns the transformation of self-motivation into tangible actions. Li Zhi posits that the first stride in self-cultivation necessitates the rejection of hypocrisy and pretense (jia 假), often imposed by conventional norms that ostensibly advocate for morality and rectitude (daode renyi zhi shi 道德仁義之事), while the mind secretly craves advantages13. Genuine enlightenment materializes upon attaining one's « original heart-mind » (benxin 本心), entailing a reasonable and balanced comprehension of social inclinations and rational desires, achievable through self-cultivation. Li Zhi has confidence that self-cultivation can forestall conflicts, as he posits that properly understood human interests do not clash, akin to Plato's belief14. Li does not contemplate the possibility of self-deception. However, one might question the reliability of uncovering the authentic self through self-cultivation. What if this presumed true self does not correspond to the actual self ? Additional doubts arise due to the challenge of striking a balance between desire, addiction, and autonomy. Furthermore, contemporary studies reveal that desires are frequently guided by an imperceptible genetic code, following its own directives rather than an individual's interests or considerate intentions. Blindly adhering to genetic and societal instructions may result in relinquishing control of consciousness and becoming estranged, passively subject to impersonal forces. This introduces the enduring question of inherent malevolence within human inclinations or the problem of evil. Ultimately, questions emerge when contradictions surface within a community, particularly when resources are scarce. These questions revolve around the potential conflicts stemming from contrasting interests. For instance, conflicts may arise between social and economic desires, differing judgments in matters such as exam results and criminal cases, disputes between major and minor landowners, as well as between landowners and tenants, and conflicts between merchants and artisans. Such questions also extend to concrete claims related to household ownership and landholding15.

• 16 Becker, Accounting for Tastes, pp. 4-23, 118-121.

10Li's writings furnish instances of « selfishness », spanning from avarice and the pursuit of wealth to attraction to beauty, both material and spiritual interests, ambitions for a bureaucratic career, and the accumulation of assets for offspring and descendants. He adopts a modern anthropological viewpoint, acknowledging the role of self-motivation in social capital, encompassing personal relationships, networks, habits, trends, affiliations, philia, beliefs, values, and fashions, encompassing both tangible and intangible assets, as a universal and innate phenomenon16. Notwithstanding these instances of self-interest, they do not present any peril or detriment to others, and Li Zhi does not allude to any instances of aggressive or hostile intentions and actions. Instead, he underscores that even a bandit like Dao Zhi possesses a sense of rectitude and humanity within his heart. Zhen is authentic, intrinsic, and genuine, in contrast to contrived imposition and hypocrisy, devoid of aggressive implications. On the contrary, genuine self-love, borne out of the sociable nature of self-motivation, is advantageous for both the individual and society.

• 17 Samuel Scheffler (« Potential Congruence »), p. 118. David Schmidtz (« Self-interest: What’s in It (...)

11Scholars within the field of moral philosophy have long engaged in spirited debates concerning the fundamental question of conflicts and the potential harmony between self-interest and morality, as well as their respective implications. One notable figure in this discourse is Samuel Scheffler, who presents a compelling argument for the conceivable compatibility between individual self-fulfillment and morality, albeit within specific circumstances. He underscores that human motivations are intricately shaped by the imperative need for a harmonious integration into one's personal life and the broader societal expectations. Furthermore, Scheffler places considerable emphasis on the pivotal roles of education and socialization in this intricate interplay. He astutely observes that powerful motivations, which are responsive to moral considerations, can indeed emerge over the course of an individual's development. These motivations become deeply ingrained within the structure of the individual's personality, fostering a profound alignment between self-interest and moral values : « These motivations help to shape the interests of those who possess them, and while their presence does not guarantee that conflicts between moral demands and the agent’s interests will never arise, it does reduce the frequency of such conflicts, and moral motivations do not normally work to the long-term disadvantage of their possessors »17.

• 18 Li Zhi, « Fu Jiao Ruohou » 復焦弱侯 (1589), Fenshu, 2:46
• 19 Santangelo, « Is the Pursuit of Self-interest Really Selfish? », pp. 4, 7, 25, 31.
• 20 Li Zhi, « Da Deng Mingfu » 答鄧明府 (1588), Fenshu, 1:41.
• 21 Li Zhi, « Jida Geng dazhongcheng » 寄答耿大中丞, Fenshu, 1:43-44.
• 22 Li Zhi, « Da Deng Shiyang » 答鄧石陽 (1585), Fenshu, 1:4.

12In his response to Jiao Ruohou, Li Zhi extols individuals who heed their innate tendencies in accordance with their own needs and desires : « If they are apprehensive about holding official positions, they relinquish their bureaucratic roles ; if they possess an inclination for officialdom, they assume office ; if they are inclined towards teaching, they impart knowledge ; if they lack an inclination for teaching, they decline to lecture. Thus, they achieve contentment in body and mind, and harmony in their actions and movements (身心俱泰，手足轻安) »18. Hence, morality is not something detached from ordinary life but intrinsic to it, and every pursuit and vocation holds its own dignity, legitimately rooted in self-interest19. The pursuit of gain and the avoidance of harm (qulibihai 趨利避害) constitute universal sentiments shared by all human beings, (renrentongxin 人人同心)20. Then, « helping heaven and earth to create all beings, and to make everyone get what they want to live is just something that even deaf, blind, lame people and dwarfs can do » 贊助天地生成萬物使人各得其所使物各遂其生這不過是失聰之人、失明之人、侏儒、跛腿之人也都能做到的21. This position indicates the awareness of basic self-motivation which is useful to understand oneself as well as the needs of others ; consequently, the love for self is extended to others, starting with friends, and so on. Thus, rediscovering one’s self-motivation does neither mean being imprisoned in it, nor excluding the other: the self is part of greater unities, and the extension of « selfishness » is a natural tendency, the basis of a progressive natural empathy. For instance, Li Zhi considers the pursuit of profit by merchants, often blamed by conventional morality, worthy of recognition. Li is one of the demolishers of the traditional dichotomy of virtue-profit, as profit is a natural tendency in human beings. The principles of things and human relations (renlun wuli 人倫物理) are no longer metaphysical immutable entities and prescribed rules but anchored to concrete personal and often material needs and practices, such as clothing and food, rather than abstract rules for the good and harmonious society22.

• 23 Li Zhi, « Da Deng Shiyang » 答鄧石陽, Fenshu, 1:4.

13This form of « selfishness » is deemed beneficial to society and integral to individuals. It is so innate that without a vested interest (wuxin 無心), the farmer leaves the field untended, the artisan produces substandard work, and the scholar falters in his endeavours. Li contended that obtaining anything is inconceivable without « selfishness » (= self-interest). Aligned with the inherent principles of the natural world (ziran zhi li 自然之理), the diligent toil of the farmer in the fields necessitates a vested interest in the harvest (gengtian er qiu shi 耕田而求食) ; those overseeing households must harbour an interest in accumulating wealth to adroitly manage domestic affairs; and students aspiring for bureaucratic roles must harbour an interest in the vocation to earnestly prepare for and succeed in their examinations (dushu er qiu kedi 讀書而求科第). While Li also touched upon « human relations and the principles of things » (renlun wuli), he clarified that he was alluding to everyday affairs and what people were interested in (baixing ri yong 百姓日用)23.

• 24 Li Zhi, « Ji da liu dou » 寄答留都 (1592), Fenshu zengbu焚書增補, 1:265; « Ji jing you shu » 寄京友書 (1592), F (...)
• 25 Luo Qinqiang, « Xuanxue yu Wei-Jin shiren xintai », p. 101.

14As we see, Li does not specify the natural inclinations of the childmind, and does not resort to the common term « desire » (yu). It is important to consider this aspect, because it shows how he was aware of the peculiarity of each one and of the difference in character and personality, which is the basis of his ethical discourse. Moreover, when Li deals with natural inclinations, he does not consider only desires, but the commitment to playful, aesthetic and interesting activities of each one. He is also aware that desires are not limited to traditional desires, relating to the body and life of human beings. There are economic, social desires, ambitions, what is subjectively considered as self-realization. For all these reasons he prefers the formula of « selfishness » (sixin) that can be rendered with the general term self-motivation. Li Zhi's practical lifestyle exemplifies his concepts. He asserted his entitlement to self-concern (zisizili zhi xin 自私自利之心) and the enjoyment of life, dedicating his studies and writings solely to his own delight (大凡我書，皆為求以快樂自己，非為人也)24. This declaration underscores Li's dual and unwavering pursuit of liberty and contentment. In many regards, Li Zhi's philosophy echoes the self-liberating path of ancient Daoists and Wei-Jin Neo-Daoists –— unorthodox and unconventional, advocating for individual freedom devoid of constraints25. His quest for autonomy commenced by rejecting any monopolisation of truth and the principle of authority. In his reinterpretation of Confucius' « Four prohibitions of actions against rites » (Lunyu, « Yan Yuan », 1), Li veers in the opposite direction from the passage's original meaning. Li accentuated the distinct essence of each individual (wo suoduzhe wei ji 我所獨者謂己) and argued that « Don't look, don't listen, don't speak, don't move » contradict the notion of freedom. He sharply warned against the stubborn « insistence on one opinion » or adherence to a single doctrine (zhiyi 执一), which runs counter to the natural disposition of humans.

• 26 See Clunas’ Empire of Great Brightness, pp. 137-159 and Elvin, The Retreat of the Elephants, pp. 33 (...)

15Li's eudaemonism is founded upon the empirical recognition of profound self-motivations and the self-gratification inherent in human behaviour and open to a « polytheism of values ». Morality, according to him, is not an ascetic and authoritarian code imposed on subordinates in accordance with the rulers' ideology. Instead, it should mirror the tangible reality of everyday people and their daily existence. Li Zhi's alternative model of human morality rests on preserving one's innate nature and desires, grounding morality in the present, where the self finds joy in engaging activities, relishing life, and experiencing the enthusiasm and wonder akin to that of a child. The childmind is not just the astute pursuit of desire's fulfilment ; it is akin to the flow experience. In Chinese literature, similar occurrences are described through various terms such as hao 好 (« fond of ») and le 樂 (« enjoy »), wan 玩 (« amusement »), qingwan 清玩 (« high-minded amusement »), and xi 戲 (to play) ; or shangxin 賞心 (« delighting heart ») like the enlightenment in contemplation of a landscape »26 ; xiang 饗 (« to enjoy », « to savour ») ; wei 味, qu 趣, nong 弄, for « taste/tasting », « savouring », « fun », and « interest ». Attaining the flow experience, along with the fulfilment of deep personal desires and ambitions, can be seen as aligning with the liberty of tongxin.

• 27 Upon various forms of « self-actualisation » and the theory of flow state see Csíkszentmihályi & Cs (...)
• 28 Ryan & Deci, 2017, pp 13-17, 102-217.
• 29 Quotation from Lunyu, « Yan Yuan » 顏淵, 1. Li Zhi, « Da Geng Zhongcheng » 答耿中丞 (1584), Fenshu, 1:16. (...)

17Mihály Csíkszentmihályi, in particular, has directed his attention towards a enduring pattern : the human inclination to evade psychological disorder and embrace fulfilment in accordance with both genetic and sociocultural imperatives. At the heart of his work lies the exploration of « flow experiences », where individuals enter a state of profound engagement and concentration. Unlike the mere pursuit of practical outcomes, these experiences transcend immediate goals, immersing the self in the very process and engendering a paradoxical sense of self-dissolution27. The « self-determination theory », elaborated by Edward Deci and Richard Ryan, distinguishes between autonomous and controlled motivation. According to this theory, human beings possess three fundamental psychological needs crucial for their optimal well-being and performance. By nurturing feelings of competence and the freedom to act with volition, individuals become autonomously motivated or self-determined28. There are some similarities between these theories and Li Zhi’s part of thought in which he advocates achieving self-realisation and restoring the childmind through self-cultivation. Eudaemonism is the basis of Li Zhi’s concept of autonomy and freedom. Li Zhi posits that an individual's moral compass can only truly manifest through their own agency, rather than being derived from external moral frameworks. He draws upon Confucius to bolster this notion, asserting that « the practice of humaneness depends only on oneself » (wei ren you ji 為仁由己)29. This concept of personality is strengthened by the principle of intellectual freedom which in Li’s thought is manifested through the rejection of all models of heteronomous wisdom and of masters who pretend to have a monopoly on truth and morality. He maintains that any human being can discover wisdom within him/herself : the greedy and the arrogant who exploit people are no worse than « the virtuous » (renzhe 仁者) who torment others (貪暴者擾之，而仁者害之也) in the name of their truth. Nobody is entitled to interfere paternalistically and worry about others and their virtues.

• 30 Luo Qinqian, Xuanxue yu Wei-Jin shiren xintai, p. 101.

18As noted, Li Zhi's system often parallels the path of self-liberation observed in ancient Daoists. These unorthodox and idiosyncratic artists and writers embodied unrestricted individual freedom30. Li's quest for autonomy was ignited by his rejection of any monopolisation of truth and the dominance of authoritative principles. He asserts that the inherent inclinations of the childmind (tongxin), including self-interests and desires, hold intrinsic moral value. He posits that morality springs from the authentic sentiments and innate self-motivations found within the childmind, and expands the Mencian moral potential to encompass natural desires and self-interests. As long as sentiments remain genuine and natural, there is no necessity to categorise them as morally upright or wrong based on societal norms. The concept of innateness, possibly influenced by Wang Yangming's liangzhi, further bolsters his autonomy in moral decision-making, enabling him to discern value across various spiritual traditions. This notion empowers him to transcend doctrinal confines.

• 31 On Buddhist influences on Li Zhi, both in the interpretation of scriptures and according to his dis (...)
• 32 Li Zhi, « Da Mingyin » 答明因, Fenshu, 4:175, quoted by Wang Junjiang, « On Li Zhi's Theory of Growing (...)
• 33 Li Zhi, « Da Deng Shiyang » 答鄧石陽 (1585), Fenshu, 1:4, transl. by Pauline Lee in A Book to Burn, p.  (...)
• 34 Li Zhi, « Da Deng Shiyang », Fenshu, 1:4. transl. by Pauline Lee in A Book to Burn, pp. 8-9.
• 35 Cf. with Feng Menglong’s prefaces to the Sanyan collections, where he contrasts the spontaneity of (...)
• 36 Li Zhi, « Da Deng Shiyang » 答鄧石陽 (1585), Fenshu, 1:4. transl. by Pauline Lee in A Book to Burn, pp. (...)

19Moreover, Li underscores human autonomy vis-à-vis Confucian social rules through the secularization of Buddhist terminology31. He expounds that the authentic emptiness of zhenkong 真空 is not the same as the « nothingness » perceived by Buddhists and the general populace. Li interprets it creatively : « nothingness » cannot engender anything (此太虗空不能生萬有)32. « Authentic Emptiness » doesn't aim to negate everything ontologically or promote moral nihilism. Instead, it signifies an awareness that there is neither abstract concepts nor concrete entities that can be unequivocally labelled as « emptiness ». Its essence lies in an epistemological pursuit — the acquisition of wisdom to free oneself from delusion and attain genuine liberation from preconceived notions. Drawing from Buddhist formulations, Li proposes a more personalised and context-dependent approach to morality and intellectual freedom. Following one's own inclinations constitutes a spontaneous existence. Leaving aside the epistemological implications, the concept of « emptiness » serves as a reconciling instrument, blending Buddhist detachment –— reminiscent of the Platform Sutra familiar to Li Zhi — with the fluidity and adaptability of the self's quest for self-realisation. The challenge lies in harmonising innate self-motivations with self-sufficiency, day-to-day necessities, and intellectual autonomy. Li accomplishes this by reconciling Buddhist detachment (without its asceticism) with an acknowledgment of the desires or self-motivations present in those who have not lost their tongxin. The childmind embodies an individual's natural disposition, representing the innate tendency towards their vital nature, their genuine and inherently true nature (juejia chunzhen 絕假純真). This inclination towards self-realisation resides within every human being. Through the act of « recognising authentic emptiness in human relations and the principles of things » (於倫物上識真空), he neither advocates negation of the self nor the renunciation of social life. Instead, he champions individual liberation from all external moral structures and conventions, as he believes that morality emanates from one's inner conscience. Li Zhi conveys this pivotal idea several times using Dao-Buddhist terminology like « no-self » (wuji 無己, wuwo 無我), « authentic emptiness, self-emptiness » (zhenkong 真空, xuji 虛己), and « self-restraining » (keji 克己), expressions that encapsulate « renouncing one's way » (sheji 舍己) — a breakaway from prejudices, instead of the common formula of « repressing selfish desires ». Li encourages an open-minded approach, unshackled from fixations or subjugation to theoretical or orthodox moralities. Emptiness becomes a potent tool for acquiring a broader perspective on the relativity of the social realm, enabling liberation from clichés. This grants individuals the opportunity to view their existence from a distance, rediscovering their authentic self and unburdening themselves from the confines of life and abstract conventions. This transformation downgrades hierarchical relationships and roles, adjusting an individual's self-motivations in accordance with individuals’ capabilities and the prevailing societal context. By acknowledging the inherent void within human interactions and the fundamental principles governing existence (於倫物上識真空), Li Zhi posits that morality emanates from an individual's internal conscience rather than being imposed by external regulations. This affirmation of « true and authentic emptiness » acquires additional depth in a letter addressed to Deng Shiyang, where Li Zhi acknowledges the intrinsic morality woven into the fabric of nature : « if one perceives True Emptiness through insight and scrutiny, one will naturally act in accordance with benevolence and righteousness » (明察得真空，則為由仁義行)33. Conversely, if this genuine emptiness remains elusive, virtuous conduct may become limited to a meticulous examination of isolated particulars (不明察，則為行仁義，入於支離而不自覺矣). In such a scenario, concrete self-enlightenment stands in contrast to the pedantic pursuit of isolated details within societal conventions34. Viewed through the prism of emptiness, an individual can naturally navigate the realm of humaneness and righteousness, free from the confines of predetermined moral doctrines. This echoes the role of qing, as delineated by writers linked to the Gong'an literary group, such as Feng Menglong and Tang Xianzu35. The principles underpinning existence and human interactions (renlun wuli) transcend their former status as metaphysical or mandated directives; they now encapsulate the ordinary occurrences and immediate concerns of daily life, even encompassing such basic aspects as « wearing clothes and eating food »36. These Dao-Buddhist evocations, rather than serving as austere admonitions for self-restraint, foster a constructive and secular narrative that not only promotes the satisfaction of commonplace desires like material needs but also encompasses a mental disposition that transcends these desires. This mental attitude extends beyond, implying freedom of thought and judgement. These Dao-Buddhist evocations, in place of an ascetic call to self-restraint, lead to a constructive and secular dialogue, fostering the fulfilment of common desires such as material needs. Simultaneously, it engenders a mental stance that transcends these desires, encapsulating freedom of thought and judgement.

• 37 Li Zhi, « Da Geng Zhongcheng » 答耿中丞 (1584), Fenshu, 1:17.
• 38 Lawrence Haworth, Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics. New Haven : Yale Unive (...)

20Li Zhi's exploration of « selfishness » commands significant attention due to its role in fortifying individual autonomy, transcending societal constraints and individual disparities. In Li Zhi's view, the essence of what is natural does not adhere to rigid schemas of norms and customs, which may shift with changing times and circumstances. Instead, it resonates with the irrepressible urge for self-realisation and the pursuit of happiness. People, as individuals, ingeniously shape themselves through a process of negotiation with their social milieu until they discover a state of self-realisation (zhi zide 止自得) : « From birth, every person has his/her lifestyle » (天生一人，自有一人之用)37. This personal autonomy carries universal significance, as the aspiration for self-assertion aligns with the quest for independence — a fundamental and intrinsic yearning intertwined with our sense of self38.

• 39 Li Zhi, « Shengjiao xiaoyin » 聖教小引(序彙), Xu Fenshu, 2:66. The metaphor of the dwarf was used also by (...)
• 40 Zhu Xi, Zhuzi yulei, 6:117-18; 13:228-30, where universal principles are contrasted with personal i (...)

21In critiquing orthodoxies, Li presents an alternative approach, steering clear of the Confucian-Legalist quandary between law and virtue. His response diverges from the realms of paternalism and authoritarianism. Rejecting the monopoly of truth and moral supremacy forms the bedrock of his ethos of tolerance, individual freedom, and autonomy. This sense of autonomy, cultivated through self-improvement, permeates his political vision, where each individual can independently govern in harmony with their innate disposition, unburdened by the dictates of authorities. While Li Zhi refrains from overt criticism of authoritarianism and political-moral control, his advocacy for individual independence finds implicit expression in his political outlook. This disapproval can be inferred through various cues — the devaluation of hierarchical structures, the spotlight on historical figures, the emphasis on personal autonomy and non-interference by officials, and the repudiation of societal conventions. In this new paradigm, every individual can independently govern according to their nature, emancipated from the necessity to conform to authoritative ideologies. Against conformism and acritical attitudes, Li Zhi resorts to two allegories, that of a dwarf who can't see the theatrical performance owing to the crowd but follows the reaction of others, just listening to others’ acclamations and imitating them; the other metaphor is that of the dog who barks when other dogs bark at images and shades, just following their reaction39. His teachings deal with keeping a critical attitude and the uniqueness of each individual. One may understand the scope of Li's ideas if considers the contrast between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in the dominant opinion based on the order articulated by Zhu Xi, and its emphasis placed on the concept of « natural » (ziran) within the framework of the universality of heavenly principles (天理之自然) in opposition to the private/selfishness nature of human desires40. Consequently, humaneness and oneness are no longer set in contrast to self-interest and self-motivation, and justice (yi) finds common ground with personal advantage (li).

• 42 Li Zhi, « Yu youren shu » 與友人書, (1596, Fenshu, 2:74. Cf. Gu Jiming (« Qingdai sixiang de yidiao »pp (...)
• 43 The term zizhi - now mainly used for local autonomy and self-government in the political sense - in (...)
• 44 Li Zhi, Mingdeng Dao gulu, xia, Part Two, in Li Wenling ji李溫陵集, 19:10 (in Li Zhi quanji zhu, vol. 1 (...)
• 45 Li Zhi, « Da Deng Mingfu » 答鄧明府 (1588), Fenshu, 1:41. Deng Mingfu (Deng Yingqi 鄧應祁) was the elder s (...)

24In essence, Li Zhi transitions from a moralistic plane to a « liberal » and « secular » one by proposing that rulers should govern their subjects while leaving them free (« through themselves rather than through himself »). This path is attainable through the recognition of humans' inherent capacity for autonomy. Li Zhi repeatedly underscores the necessity to « govern people with consideration of their nature and needs » (yiren zhiren 以人治人, lit. : « governing people according to their standard »), opposing despotic tendencies of « governing people based on autocratic standards and will » (yiji zhiren 以己治人 or junzi zhi zhi 君子之治), rooted in the autocracy of moralism and rites (deli zhengxing 德禮政刑). Only the former approach honours the autonomy, needs, and nature of individuals, requiring the ruler to empathetically place himself in others' shoes (tuiji jiren 推己及人), engaging in introspection and self-criticism (fanji zize 反己自責), and adhering to the principles of justice (xieju 絜矩, lit. : « regulating his conduct as if by a measuring square »). This practice of reciprocation, shu 恕, encompasses empathy and is frequently interpreted as a mode of self-cultivation. Li Zhi, however, employs these expressions in a political context42. He expresses concerns that the ruler's imposition deviates from the Way and subtly suggests refraining from oppressive governance. The crux of the argument lies in the difference between the two methods, authoritarian will, yiji 以己, and the autonomy of the subjects (zizhi 自治), owing to the capability of each human being to self-manage43, according to the phrase « governing people according to their standard, having respect for their autonomy, and spontaneously being so clever to govern and reform the world without interference » (以人治人, 自妙夫無為之化)44. Only then can harmony prevail — « all things grow together without harming each other » (萬物並育而不相害)45 — nurturing symbiotic coexistence between individuals and society.

• 46 « 人能弘道，非道弘人 » (Lunyu, « Wei Ling Gong » 衛靈公, 29). Its basis can be found in another famous sentence (...)

25Viewed from an ethical standpoint, embracing lenient judgments of others while maintaining personal strictness not only fosters better understanding among individuals but also cultivates societal tolerance, rooted in the Confucian principle of reciprocity (shu). Such an approach could significantly mitigate, if not eliminate, double standards and counteract the rise of dual moralities. Recognizing that truth is not confined to any specific cultural, religious, or moral framework could act as a deterrent against fundamentalism and the undue exploitation of ideology. In this respect, Li Zhi's contribution stands out by discrediting the notion that any moral system should reign supreme over human beings, their needs, and natural desires. This awareness echoes back to Confucius' emphasis on human primacy over rules, captured by his assertion: “it is the people that can expand Dao, and not vice versa.” 46This axiom signifies that Dao harmonizes with the everyday requirements of humanity, precluding the sacrifice of individuals for the sake of abstract ideas or ideals.

• 47 Li Zhi, Fenshu, « Lun Zheng Pian », 3:87. The Dao in Li Zhi is not a neo-Confucian moral system; it (...)
• 48 Lunyu, « Zilu », 6 and « Wei Ling Gong » 衛靈公, 33 : « When [the lord] behaves correctly, his governm (...)
• 49 Li Zhi, Fenshu, « Song Zheng Dayao xu » 送鄭大姚序, 3:113.
• 50 Huang Ray, 1587, A Year of No Significance, p. 208, quoting Xu Fenshu, « Fu Jinchuan Weng Shu » 復晉川 (...)
• 51 In Fenshu (« Lunzheng pian » 論政篇, 3:87), Li Zhi stresses the ferociousness and moralism (貪暴者，仁者) of (...)
• 52 Li Zhi, Cangshu, « Waichen zhuan » 外臣傳, « Feng Dao » 馮道, 68:1141–1142. Feng Dao (882-954) was blame (...)

26Uniting these threads, it becomes evident that each individual can autonomously govern themselves (以人治人，以人本自治), thereby transcending the obligation to heed all mandates dictated by authorities (人能自治，不待禁而止之也) against heteronomous rules. This leads to the conclusion that « since every human being has their distinctive personality, there is not only one Way but many Ways » 夫道者，路也，不止一途47. Li Zhi firmly believes that contrary to a few passages in the Analects48, it is not the correctness and morality of rulers, but the tolerance and freedom granted to subjects, that breed peace and prosperity : « letting the people administer themselves, without other methods of governing them (將民實自治，無容別有治之之方歟)49. Therefore, even though Li Zhi's inclination to accept absolute monarchy may be discerned, as noted by Huang Ray, in his affirmation that subjects had no recourse but to endure the emperor's oppressive policies, his work displays instances of independent thinking vis-à-vis authorities50. He advocates a form of governance that doesn't impose doctrines or moral systems on its subjects, but instead champions maximal behavioural freedom and acknowledges the myriad personalities51. Such governance should focus solely on creating the optimal conditions for the populace's well-being. Thus, his concept of freedom does not care about institutional means to cope with state inteferences and authorities despotism. This was partily due to his times political attitude and partly to his wuwei approach. Social and institutional, economic, political, cultural, private, and public environment were different from present world evolution. With a Daoist-like perspective, he accepted the reality around him and cared for promoting harmony with the environment through embracing opposites, and letting go of personal attachments and expectations, that might hinder in the spontaneous changes of the environment. Yet he was independent and kept a critical attitude against any paternalistic and autoritarian attitude. While Li Zhi does not overtly critique authoritarianism and political-moral control, his sentiment can be inferred through devaluation of hierarchical structures, juxtaposition of historical figures, and repudiation of societal norms. For instance, he refers to Feng Dao 馮道to recalibrate the dynamics between subject and sovereign52, thereby shaping a new understanding.

• 53 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain, pp. 167-68
• 54 Lunyu, « Xian Wen » 憲問, 42. Cf. also Slingerland. Effortless Action, p. 66. For modern thought, cf. (...)
• 55 « 從心所欲，不踰矩。 », Lunyu, « Wei Zheng » 為政, 4, tr. by Angle, « Sagely Ease and Moral Perception », p. 3 (...)

27Significantly, according to thinkers like Li Zhi and Spinoza, emotions serve as guides for respectful, self-motivated subjects53. Moreover, the concepts of innateness and emptiness furnish Li Zhi with potent tools to assert autonomy by expanding moral choices and intellectual tolerance, enabling evaluation of the value of alternative spiritual traditions. This allows him to transcend the boundaries between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, sage and commoner, and Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. Li's proposition, rooted in Confucius' counsel to « bring ease to others«  (脩己以安人) and the principle of wuwei54, hinges on the self-restraint of authorities. They should be capable of empathizing with their subjects and earnestly practicing the principle of reciprocation (« self-honesty and reciprocation », zhongshu 忠恕). Yet, this notion diverges qualitatively from the rule of virtue. This equilibrium also evokes Confucius' ability to « follow his heart's desire without overstepping the bounds »55. Sage-like ease emerges from the enlightened perspective afforded by self-cultivation, where one attains equilibrium that adapts self-interests according to abilities and environmental context.