• 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, translated by A. M. Cohler, B. C. Miller and H. S. Stone (Camb (...)

1The central theme of The Spirit of the Laws is the 'relations (rapports)' that laws of a region have with such diverse elements as the constitution, mores, commerce, climate, and religion.1 Montesquieu’s magnum opus discusses these 'relations' comprehensively, with ancient Rome rather than England or the French monarchy as the focal point. This paper explores how Montesquieu’s deepening interpretation of Roman history—particularly in the realm of economic analysis—from Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline (henceforth referred to as 'Considerations'), published in 1734, to The Spirit of the Laws, published in 1748, informs his understanding of modern England.

• 2 Lowenthal, David, 'Introduction' in Montesquieu, 1965 [1734].
• 3 Montesquieu, Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence suivi de (...)
• 4 Ehrard, Jean, L’Esprit des mots – Montesquieu en lui-même et parmi les siens (Genève : Droz, 1998) (...)
• 5 Montesquieu, Considérations, p. 341; this quote is translated by the author.

2Previous studies on Montesquieu’s interpretation of Roman history focused primarily on Considerations, with insufficient attention being paid to the differences in his interpretation of Roman history in Considerations and The Spirit of the Laws. Thus, on the one hand, D. Lowenthal suggests that Montesquieu’s true intentions regarding polity are better revealed by his full approval of military expansionism in Republican Rome in Considerations.2 However, this interpretation is inconsistent with Montesquieu’s judgment of the untenable nature of large-scale military conquests in modern Europe like those made by ancient Rome. This view was already expressed in his Reflections on the Universal Monarchy in Europe,3 which was printed at the same time as Considerations but never published for fear of censorship of statements that could be considered criticisms of Louis XIV, thus providing a prototype for his later commercial peace theory in The Spirit of the Laws. Conversely, as J. Ehrard points out, considering Montesquieu’s criticism of Louis XIV’s despotic tendencies and ambitions for military domination in Europe, the subject of Considerations appears to be imperial Rome.4 However, concerning his original intention in writing Considerations, Montesquieu prepared the following passage for the preface, although it was not included in the published version: 'I had at first thought of writing only a few pages on the establishment of the monarchy among the Romans, but the greatness of the subject won me over, I went back imperceptibly to the first times of the republic, and I descended to the decadence of the empire.'5 We may thus assume that Montesquieu’s interest since Considerations had been the causes that gave rise to the monarchical structure of the government in the late Roman Republic. For this purpose, The Spirit of the Laws concentrated on Roman history from the beginning to the end of the Roman Republic, rather than on the imperial period.

• 6 Gilmore, Nathaniel K., 'Montesquieu’s Considerations on the State of Europe' in Journal of the Hist (...)
• 7 Postigliola, Alberto, 'Une république parfaite: Roma, i poteri, le libertà tra la Considérations e (...)

3N. Gilmore’s (2020) work is one of the few to have focused on the close relationship between Considerations and The Spirit of the Laws. Gilmore considers these works 'partners', contrasting a 'violent, pessimistic history of Rome' in Considerations with the 'optimistic history of commerce' of modern times in Book XXI of The Spirit of the Laws.6 While sharing Gilmore’s general framework, this paper focuses not on the complementary relationship between these two works but rather on their differences, namely, the fact that Montesquieu developed his economic analysis between the first edition of Considerations, published in 1734, and The Spirit of the Laws, published in 1748.7 This analysis not only reveals that Montesquieu contrasted ancient Rome with modern commercial society but also that his axis of comparison between ancient Rome and modern England changed between 1734 and 1748.

• 8 F. Millar argues that the notion of 'republican Rome' dominant in the history of ideas and historio (...)

4In Considerations, Montesquieu believed, as did Machiavelli in Discourses on Livy, that internal conflict in the early Roman Republic was the cause of liberty as well as the government of law; he subsequently conceived of common features between the early Roman Republic and modern England. In contrast, in The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu recognized that the emergence of a middle class associated with commercial activity brought about English liberty and the government of law, and he contrasted England with the extreme inequality of wealth and military despotism at the end of the Roman Republic. In this respect, contrasting Montesquieu’s interpretation of Roman history with Machiavelli’s helps us locate the issues Montesquieu addressed as his economic analysis developed between these works.8

• 9 Machiavelli, N., Discourses on Livy, pp. 312-313; pp. 167-168.
• 10 Montesquieu, Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline, transla (...)
• 11 See Roberto, Umberto, 'Diritto e storia: Roma antica nell’Esprit des lois' in Leggere L’Esprot des (...)

5In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu above all observes that Rome acquired wealth not through trade but by plundering and taxing conquered nations; his attention to the sources of wealth in the Roman Republic is inevitably linked to concerns about its distribution. Like Machiavelli, who understood that the private distribution of booty by military commanders formed 'partisanship (partigiani)', prioritizing individual interests over the public interest,9 Montesquieu remarked, in the first chapter of the first edition of Considerations, on the siege of Veii as 'a kind of revolution' when the prolongation of the wars became possible by the establishment of pay for soldiers.10 However, while Machiavelli did not further develop a specific analysis of the history of pay for soldiers, Montesquieu added significantly to this in the 1748 edition of Considerations. Extending this, in The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu analyzes the history of the transfer of movable property and land as one of the important causes of the transformation of the Roman Republic into an empire.11

• 13 Larrère, Catherine, 'Montesquieu et l’histoire du commerce' in Le temps de Montesquieu édité par Mi (...)
• 14 On the point that Montesquieu himself oscillated under the tension between the antagonism among sta (...)

7Thus, Montesquieu contrasts the military conquests of ancient Rome with the commerce of modern England, though without positing a simple, dichotomous scheme of ancient virtuous imperialism and modern peaceful commerce.13 Indeed, what The Spirit of the Laws analyzes in detail is the historical context in which Rome maintained the government of law in the early years of the republican period, only to lose it toward its end. Moreover, in this draft letter, Montesquieu explains the historical origin of the commerce and liberty of the English in contrast with the late Roman Republic, even suggesting conditions under which the English might maintain their 'liberty' in the future.14 To demonstrate this, The Spirit of the Laws focuses on the sources of Roman wealth and explains the profound effect of wealth from military conquests on the transformation of the constitution. The originality of The Spirit of the Laws lies in the fact that this analysis of ancient Rome, combining political power theory and economic analysis, is reflected in the analysis of modern society. Therefore, this study seeks to clarify the significance of the implicit contrast between modern England and the late Roman Republic in The Spirit of the Laws.

• 15 SL XI-5; Myers, Richard, 'Montesquieu on the Causes of Roman Greatness' in History of Political Tho (...)
• 16 SL XI-17.
• 17 SL XI-17.
• 18 SL XI-13.

8In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu, on the one hand, idealizes England, stating that its constitution has 'political liberty' as its 'direct object' in Book XI, Chapter 5, titled 'On the Purpose of Various States'. On the other, he points out that the 'purpose' inherent in ancient Rome was military 'expansion'.15 While the English Constitution distributed legislative, executive, and judicial powers to function as a system of checks and balances, the Roman Constitution was not primarily designed to prevent abuse of power. In Republican Rome, limited government was de facto maintained because the nobility and plebeians had to cooperate so long as Rome continued to pursue military expansion. After the expulsion of the king in 509 BC and the subsequent foundation of the Republican regime, the plebeians greatly increased their legislative power, especially with the establishment of tribunes. However, the Senate continued to retain executive power over public funds, the imposition of taxes, and military and diplomatic affairs.16 In war, the nobility needed the 'heroic courage' of the plebeians, and the plebeians needed the 'consummate wisdom' of the nobility.17 In this context, the conflict between the nobility and plebeians served as a 'noble emulation' between the defenders of a declining constitution and those seeking a better constitution.18 Rome’s military expansion aimed at world domination, and Rome constantly usurped other nations to pay the expenses necessary to conduct wars. To explain the nature of this wealth acquired from military expansion, Montesquieu analyzes the history of the interest rate in Book XXII, Chapter 22, titled 'On the Loan by Contract and on Usury among the Romans', as indicating changes in the structure of internal conflict in the Roman Republic.

• 19 SL XXII-22, als.1-3.
• 20 Cf. SL XI-19, V-8.
• 21 SL XXII-22, al.5.
• 22 SL V-3.
• 23 The Spirit of the Laws gives the years in which various events took place in the Roman calendar in (...)

9According to Montesquieu, because they participated in wars at their own expense, Roman citizens borrowed at high interest under the assumption that they would make more profit than the interest payment. In Rome, where laws to regulate the usury did not exist, high interest rates of 'ordinarily 12 percent per year' persisted because citizens could always expect to reap the benefits from plundering conquered nations.19 In the early years of Republican Rome, lenders demanded higher interest rates for the glory of the state, rather than to accumulate personal wealth. In addition, based on the census system, wealthier nobles assumed more military and tax obligations in exchange for greater political authority.20 'At the time when senate defended so consistently the cause of usury, the Romans’ love of poverty, of frugality, and of mediocrity in fortunes was at its peak; but the constitution was such that the principal citizens bore all the burdens of the state and the common people paid nothing'.21 As long as Roman citizens practiced frugality, the wealth gained from conquests was distributed among the people. The surplus was either kept in the public treasury or consumed in a triumphant celebration of the nation’s glory: 'Wealth gives a power that a citizen cannot use for himself, for he would not be equal'.22 However, in 'the Roman year 398 [356 BC]',23 the interest rate was reduced to 1 percent per year by 'the first one [law] the Romans made to fix the rate of interest'. Furthermore, in 'the Roman year 413 [341 BC]', lending to Roman citizens at high interest was prohibited. While, in Book XXII, Chapter 22, Montesquieu does not specify the reasons for the prohibition of usury in Rome, these become clearer from his additions to the 1748 edition of Considerations.

• 24 CR, chap.1.
• 25 CR chap.1; when discussing Montesquieu’s interpretation of Roman history, J. G. A. Pocock quotes th (...)

10Already in the first edition of Considerations, published in 1734, Montesquieu, like Machiavelli, noted that the establishment of salaries for soldiers during the siege of Veii, which lasted from 406 to 396 BC, made long-term war possible: 'When the senate had the means of paying the soldiers, the siege of Veii was undertaken. It lasted ten years. The Romans employed a new art and a new way of waging war. […] In short, the taking of Veii was a kind of revolution'.24 Then, two paragraphs after this passage, in the 1748 edition of Considerations, Montesquieu added the following: 'With the establishment of military pay, the senate no longer distributed the lands of conquered peoples to the soldiers. It imposed other conditions on these peoples; it required them, for example, to furnish the army with its pay for a certain time, and to give it grain and clothing.'25 In other words, after the establishment of pay for soldiers, citizens no longer needed to borrow money to participate in war. Furthermore, in the 1748 edition of Considerations, Montesquieu made significant additions to Chapter 16, 'The Condition of Empire from Antoninus to Probus', regarding the history of pay for soldiers in the period between the siege of Veii in the early Roman Republic and the imperial period, which had not been discussed by Machiavelli.

• 26 CR chap.16.
• 27 SL XI-17.
• 28 SL XI-17.

11This addition on the history of pay for soldiers explains the growing dependence of soldiers on their military commanders. However, Montesquieu did not intend to explain the transformation of the Roman Republic into a monarchy solely based on the history of soldiers’ pay systems.26 Instead, in The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu discusses the sources of Roman wealth throughout the republican period. To explain the change in the Roman Constitution within a larger historical context, Montesquieu analyzes the transfer of wealth in ancient Rome, including land and movable property, especially in Book XXVII on the law of inheritance and in Book XXII on the history of the rate of interest. The role of soldiers’ pay is explained as only a part of this overall picture, even though it became the means by which military commanders such as Marius, Caesar, and later emperors would gain power. By tracing the development of this economic analysis from Considerations to The Spirit of the Laws, it becomes clear that the nature of Roman warfare changed after Rome’s conquest of the Italian peninsula. In the early republican period, Roman citizens aimed to achieve glory rather than wealth. However, Montesquieu observes that after uniting the Italian peninsula, Romans gradually lost the 'virtue' that had been the moral basis of their Republic. Roman citizens, 'in the drunkenness of their prosperity',27 acquired executive power that they had once entrusted to the Senate for the glory of the state. Specifically, in 'the Roman year 444 [310 B.C.], they themselves created tribunes in the legions who had until then been named by the generals, and sometime before the first Punic War, they ruled that they alone would have the right to declare war'.28

• 29 SL XXII-12.
• 30 SL XI-12.
• 31 SL IV-6.
• 32 SL XXII-12.
• 33 SL IV-5.

12What Montesquieu then questions is the effect of the introduction of money on political society. As confirmed in Book XXII, Chapter 12 of The Spirit of the Laws, titled 'The Circumstances in which the Romans performed their Operation on Money', silver denarii were not introduced to Rome until after the Pyrrhic War, which ended in 275 BC,29 that is, 'shortly before the First Punic War'30 that began in 264 BC. The effect of 'money (argent)' is 'to fatten the fortune of men beyond the limits nature has set for it, to teach men to preserve vainly what has been amassed vainly, to multiply desires infinitely and to supplement nature, which has given us very limited means to excite our passions and to corrupt one another'.31 Compared with copper, silver money made it easier for citizens to privately accumulate acquired wealth: 'The peace that ended the First Punic War had left the Romans masters of Sicily. They soon entered Sardinia: they began to know Spain: the stock of silver continued to increase in Spain'.32 In an era in which individual citizens could more easily accumulate wealth, wars gradually came to concern the pursuit of individual interests more than the glory of the republic. As citizens began to lose their 'love of poverty, of frugality, and of mediocrity in fortunes', they lost at the same time their 'love of the laws and homeland'33 that demanded that the public interest always take precedence over private interests. According to Montesquieu, although various laws prohibited usury after 341 BC, illegal and de facto usury persisted because the benefits of looting conquered nations and collecting taxes from Roman provinces outweighed the risk of circumventing these laws.

• 34 SL XXII-22, als.10-11.
• 35 SL XI-19.
• 36 Montesquieu, Défense de L’Esprit des lois in De L’Esprit des lois édité par Robert Derathé, vol. 2 (...)

13In the Roman Republic, where taxes were collected for war needs, the taxes imposed on the conquered Roman provinces increased, and fewer Roman citizens were liable for taxation. Therefore, to consider the transfer of wealth in Rome during the period after the spread of conquest outside the Italian peninsula, it is necessary to look at transactions not only within urban Rome but also between Rome and its provinces. After tracing the history of interest rates within Rome, Montesquieu, in the same Book XXII, Chapter 22 discusses the suffering of the Roman provinces from usury as follows: 'I leave the town to glance briefly at the provinces. / I have said elsewhere [Book XI chap.19] that the Roman provinces were devastated by a despotic and harsh government. That is not all; they were further devastated by frightful usuries.'34 When Montesquieu discusses this 'despotic and harsh government' in the Roman provinces in Book XI, Chapter 19, he aims to explain 'why the force of the provinces added nothing to the force of the [Roman] republic and, on the contrary, only weakened it'.35 The history of interest rates explains the transfer of wealth not only within the city of Rome but also between the city and its provinces and how this transfer of wealth influenced the change in the Roman Constitution. As Montesquieu states in response to clerical criticism of The Spirit of the Laws, the subject of 'the chapters on lending at interest loans and on usury among the Romans' is 'probably the most important in their [Romans’] history' and has 'much to do with the constitution'.36 Indeed, in The Spirit of the Laws, the distribution of wealth is inextricably linked to the distribution of political power.

• 37 SL XXII-22, al.17.

14Montesquieu interpreted the prohibition of lending at interest among Roman citizens as a source of legal circumvention because creditors extended loans in the name of an ally or Latin who was not at that time subject to Roman civil law. Observing the frustration of the people, who had no share in this law circumvention, Marcus Sempronius, their tribune, extended the scope of that prohibition to their allies and the Latins in 'the Roman year 561 [193BC]'. Furthermore, the Gabinian law, passed in 'the Roman year 615 [139 BC]', extended this prohibition to the Roman provinces; its purpose was to check corruption in voting, 'for usury always increased at the time of elections because silver was needed in order to win votes'.37 For Montesquieu, the high interest that persisted in this period in defiance of the Gabinian law testified to the arrival of an era in which lenders became rapacious and the wealth acquired from the governments of Roman provinces became directly linked to political influence. Regarding the necessity of enacting the Gabinian law and the motives behind its circumvention, Montesquieu stated the following:

• 39 SL XI-19.
• 40 SL XIII-19.

15As regard the city of Rome in the late republican period, creditors were often 'knights, who were tax-collectors for the republic'.39 Roman citizens acquired 'all the silver in the world' through conquest, from which the knightly class benefited most. This wealth became a hotbed of corruption in Roman elections. Powerful figures thirsting for political power relied on the knightly class for funds to buy votes: 'Since the one who has silver is always the master of the one without, the tax farmer is despotic over even the prince; he is not a legislator, but he forces him to give laws'.40

• 41 SL XI-19.
• 42 SL V-8.
• 43 SL XXII-22, al.19.
• 44 SL XXII-22, al.19.
• 45 SL XI-18, al.19.

16The Roman Republic sent the governors to the provinces, giving them full executive, legislative, and judicial powers41; therefore, the knights could levy taxes in the provinces like 'princes of despotic states, who confiscate the goods of whomever they please'.42 Additionally, the knights profited from loans with 12 percent interest rates per annum or even higher; these were loans that the subject nations in the provinces needed to pay the taxes imposed by Rome. Simply put, as the knights helped administer the provinces, they deprived the provinces of their wealth through high interest on these loans. Consequently, 'the ravage of the armies, the rapaciousness of the magistrates, the extortions of men of business, and the bad usages that were continually established'43 infested the provinces. Provincial government became a means of personal enrichment for knights, resulting in extreme inequality of wealth between Rome and the provinces, and even within the city of Rome itself. '[O]ne had never been as rich or as poor'.44 As The Spirit of the Laws demonstrates, the knights thus became 'the richest men'45 by the time of the Gracchi brothers; this explains the sources of Roman wealth and the historical circumstances in which this extreme inequality of wealth occurred.

• 46 SL XI-6, al.68.
• 47 Montesquieu, Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu édité par André Masson, vol. 3 (Paris : Nagel, 1955), (...)

18The exchange with Domville begins with the following statement near the end of Book XI, Chapter 6, titled 'On the Constitution of England' in The Spirit of the Law: 'Since all human things have an end, the state of which we are speaking will lose its liberty; it will perish. Rome, Lacedaemonia, and Carthage have surely perished. This state will perish when legislative power is more corrupt than executive power'.46 These ominous and prophetic words led Domville to send a letter dated June 4, 1749, to Montesquieu to inquire about his true intentions, posing the following question: 'Please allow me to ask you, Sir, who has given much thought to the causes of the decadence of nations, how this relaxation of mores (mœurs), this abandonment of first principles (premiers principes) will end'.47 Here, 'first principles' suggests that Domville interprets the 'principles' of governments presented in The Spirit of the Laws through the lens of the 'principles (principii)' in Machiavelli’s Discourses, implying the virtuous mores of the Roman Republic. Domville further says that, according to The Spirit of the Laws, the English have degenerated from liberty to licentiousness; they have lost the idea of the public good, and not only does the sinister fate of the wealthy and corrupt people of the past await them, but they have thrust themselves toward it. Domville then asks Montesquieu to what extent and in what way they can find alternatives to the ancient rules and whether it is difficult for the English to abandon them. Domville also confides that he does not precisely understand in what sense The Spirit of the Laws considers 'honor' a 'principle' of a monarchy. He does not dispute Montesquieu’s idea that the 'principle' of the government drives the nation as a whole but states that the most shameful economic 'interests' are the 'principle' of his country, England, where state assets are stolen by parliamentary representatives, and the law itself fails to fulfill its role of correcting their crimes due to cumbersome legal procedures and high associated costs. Thus, Domville complains about the corrupt conditions in England, urging Montesquieu to agree.

• 48 Montesquieu, My Thoughts, p. 593.
• 49 Montesquieu, My Thoughts, p. 593.
• 50 SL I-3.
• 51 SL I-3.

19Understanding that Domville was inquiring about the ominous future of the English government and the consequences of its corruption, and perhaps aware of Domville’s many misunderstandings of The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu, in a draft reply, responds as follows: 'I believe, Sir, that what will preserve your government is that in essence, the People have more virtue than those who represent them'.48 Montesquieu continues that even if the military officers, deputies, and officials appear corrupt, '[i]t is not like this with the entire body of the People, and I believe I have noticed that a certain spirit of liberty that is still alight and not ready to go out'.49 The composition of this draft letter corresponds to the logical structure of The Spirit of Laws, constituting a treatise on 'the spirit of the laws' of the English. In The Spirit of the Laws, “political right” is considered as 'laws concerning the relation between those who govern and those who are governed', whereas 'civil right' is considered as 'laws concerning the relation that all citizens have with one another'. Subsequently, following the Italian jurist Giovanni Vincenzo Gravina, Montesquieu defines the 'political state' as the 'union of all individual strength' and the 'civil state' as the 'union of all wills'.50 The relationship between the 'union of wills' reflected in the enactment of laws and the 'union of strength' required for their enforcement can be understood as determining the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. In terms of this relationship, Montesquieu explains the 'character (génie)' of the English in his draft letter to Domville: Indeed, Montesquieu admits that high salaries corrupt military officers in England and that the myriad means of amassing vast fortune in government corrupt deputies and officials, but insists that corruption relates only to the temporary results of parliamentary elections in a limited number of districts: 'One may nonetheless say that the middling sort are not [corrupt], and that the spirit of liberty still reigns among them'.51 Thus, Montesquieu, living under the French monarchy, viewed parliamentary elections in England as an innovative institutional medium wherein people’s mores, manners, and ways of life were reflected in the government’s functioning.

• 52 Montesquieu, My Thoughts, p. 595.

20As this draft letter to Domville explains, the English derived wealth from commerce and industry. A middle class was formed among the English that accumulated small profits over time from commercial activities based on the mutual needs of their trading partners. By contrast, the sources of Rome’s wealth included taxing and plundering subject nations. Subsequently, extreme inequalities of wealth emerged that excluded a middle class. Hence, Montesquieu exclaimed, 'There could not be middling people, as with you [the English], nor a spirit of liberty, as with you. There could only be a spirit of ambition, on the one hand, and a spirit of despair on the other—and consequently, no more liberty!'52 It seems that Montesquieu feels the need to indicate exactly which period of Rome he is referring to here; he mentions Cicero at the end of this draft and specifies that he is referring to Rome at the collapse of the Republic:

• 54 SL XI-19.
• 55 SL V-5.
• 56 Hulliung, Mark, Montesquieu and the Old Regime (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1976). H (...)

22As The Spirit of the Laws explains in more detail, it was the census, regarded as ‘the fundamental principle of the constitution',54 that helped maintain a 'middle class' in Republican Rome. This system contributed to limiting wealth inequality by stipulating the burden of taxation based on the amount of property. Under this condition, specific laws reduced inequality by imposing financial burdens on the rich and providing relief to the poor. 'Only wealth of middling size can give or suffer these kinds of adjustments, because, for men of immoderate fortunes, all power and honor not accorded them is regarded as an affront'.55 Unlike the 1734 edition of Considerations, in The Spirit of Laws in 1748, Montesquieu asked what degree of wealth inequality could be compatible with a republican regime by considering the functioning of the census in the Roman Republic. Insofar as Roman knights formed a middle class that supported the Constitution, their social existence was a necessary condition for the census to function. As previously mentioned, while accumulating private wealth through participation in provincial governments, the knightly class lost its public spirit and eventually relinquished its military duties. This historical context also explains why the census gradually became dysfunctional.56

• 58 SL XVIII-12.
• 59 SL XVIII-13.
• 60 SL XVIII-14.
• 61 SL XVIII-2.

24Book XVIII of The Spirit of the Laws argues that people’s wealth depends on the nature of their terrain, and that the amount of their property affects the type of government. In the same book, political societies in which citizenship was based on land property, such as ancient Athens, Sparta, and early Republican Rome, are contrasted with the Germanic peoples, who did not cultivate the land. Regarding these Germanic peoples, Montesquieu states, 'lacking territory, they will have so many things to regulate by the right of nations that they will have few to decide by civil right',58 and also that '[o]ne can call the institutions of these peoples mores rather than laws'.59 Regarding their 'political state', he explains that people not attached to the land have little reason to yield to the strongest and that a relationship of domination-submission is unlikely to arise.60 Montesquieu thus sees the 'spirit of liberty' in this 'independence' of the governed from the ruler.61 The draft letter to Domville sheds light on the fact that Montesquieu compared and contrasted the ancient Roman Republic and modern England based on the idea of a constitution supported by the middle class, which The Spirit of the Laws does not explicitly mention. Furthermore, the same draft letter indicates that throughout Book XVIII of The Spirit of the Laws, the 'independence', that is, the 'spirit of liberty', of the English middle class is precisely described in contrast to the 'dependence' of the Roman knights at the end of the Roman Republic.

• 62 Huet, Daniel, History of the Commerce and Navigation of the Ancients (1763 [1716]), chap.46.
• 63 Cf. Spector, C., Montesquieu et l’émergence de l’économie politique, pp. 411-418 ; Larrère, C., 'Mo (...)

25In agreement with Cicero, Montesquieu believes that in the late Roman Republic, the wealthy, especially the knights, were forced to rely on military commanders for the safety of their lives and property, and their search for tranquility resulted in indifference to their participation in politics. However, for Montesquieu, this does not mean that engaging in agriculture or commerce and accumulating wealth would inevitably result in political indifference. For him, the sources of wealth of the Romans were plunder backed by military power; it could not be regarded as commerce, an argument by which there is reason to believe that Montesquieu intended to criticize Daniel Huet’s History of the Commerce and Navigation of the Ancients, published in 1716.62 Huet believed that the late Roman Republic prospered through commercial activities backed by military power. This work was dedicated to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who promoted Louis XIV’s plans for a universal monarchy in the late seventeenth century and understood the role of commerce as supporting military power.63

• 65 SL I-3.

27By describing these two different natures of military magistrates and civilians, Montesquieu sees how the relationship between the 'political state', which is a 'union of the strength', and the 'civil state', meaning a 'union of the wills', is reflected in the reality of government.65

• 67 Cf. SL XXII-22, al.9.

30The Roman Republic acquired enormous wealth by plundering or taxing conquered nations. Despite legal prohibitions, loans at interest rates of 12 percent or higher persisted because Romans continued to acquire more plunder from the conquered nations.67 Montesquieu also considered this high interest rate an indicator of growing wealth inequality in Rome, resulting in the concentration of political and military power in the hands of a few powerful individuals. Thus, his analysis of the history of interest rates reveals that growing wealth inequality undermined the Constitution of the Roman Republic.

• 68 SL XIX-27, al.27.
• 69 SL XIX-27, al.34.

31In The Spirit of the Laws, the ancient Roman Republic is contrasted with modern England. Montesquieu paints an idealized picture of the English Constitution and its people’s mores and manners. He presents the country’s commercial activities as a desirable example of commerce that took advantage of the peculiarities of a European island nation and stresses that England would not pursue conquests belligerently.68 In contrast to ancient Rome, which extended its military dominance, England sent colonizers to expand its commerce.69 Indeed, The Spirit of the Laws demonstrates that commerce contributes to the establishment of peace in interstate relations.

• 71 SL XX-23.

32However, this does not imply that Montesquieu wholeheartedly supported commerce in modern Europe. When asked in Book XX, Chapter 23 of The Spirit of the Laws, 'to which nation is it disadvantageous to engage in commerce?' Montesquieu understands that, in practice, modern commerce can be either a cause of peace or a reason for conquest: 'The avarice of nations disputes the movables of the whole universe. There may be a state so unhappy that it will be deprived of the movable effects of other countries, and even of almost all its own. The owner of its land will be but the colonists of foreigners'.71 While knowing these realities of world commerce of his day, Montesquieu still regards his English contemporaries as a 'commercial nation', and it is conceivable that he intends to show what world commerce should be.

• 73 On the growing interest in the rate of interest among seventeenth-century English intellectuals, se (...)
• 74 SL XII-1 ; in fact, Book XXVII of The Spirit of the Laws on the laws on inheritance in Rome explain (...)
• 75 See SL XIX-27, al.56.

34English commerce was based on the exchange of products derived from their own industry; this commerce was conducted at an interest rate of no more than 4 percent per annum, corresponding to the scale of their economic growth.73 In this way, buyers and sellers could be expected to create peace through the 'natural effect of commerce' since they were bound together by their mutual needs. Montesquieu also believes that, although luxury increased in proportion to inequality in wealth,74 a certain equality of wealth was maintained in England because there existed only 'a solid luxury, founded not on the refinement of vanity, but on that of real needs'; the middle class comprised people having these needs.75

• 76 Cf. SL III-5; IV-5; V-3.
• 77 SL 19-27, al.62.
• 78 SL XIX-27, al.30.

36In modern societies, with well-developed commerce, individuals pursue their own profits. Therefore, no one can demand that citizens put the public good above their own as demanded by ancient republics of the virtuous era; nor can one expect them to practice 'love of homeland' or 'self-renunciation' at the point of sacrificing their own lives if necessary.76 Montesquieu believes a republic does not always require 'virtue', meaning 'love of the laws and the homeland', from its citizens. In England, even though the people of this 'commercial nation' do not have a self-sacrificing 'love of the homeland', they still share a 'love of the laws' as long as they reflect their will in legislation through a medium of representation; the security of property is thus guaranteed, and laws respecting their commercial interest are enacted: 'As the laws there would not be made for one individual more than another, each would regard himself as the monarch; the men in this nation would be confederates more than fellow citizens'.77 According to Montesquieu, while the constitution guarantees the security of life and property of the English, the 'spirit of liberty' rooted in their mores and manners sustains the same constitution. In international commerce, this 'commercial nation' further influences the parliamentary administration to create alliances in which 'all unions are founded on mutual needs'. '[C]hoosing which states it would favor with an advantageous commerce, it would make reciprocally useful treaties with the nation it had chosen'.78 For the English, the state becomes a means of protecting its own commercial activities, rather than an entity to be loved for its glory.

• 79 For studies that interpret the 'harmony of dissonances' created by the internal conflicts presented (...)

37Indeed, it is always possible that real English commerce driven by the greed of great merchants may push toward robbing other countries of their wealth. However, that is why Montesquieu explains the inner workings of the commercial activity that creates the 'unions that are founded on mutual needs' in the same way in which he explains how the 'union of wills' between citizens in a political society creates the conditions for the government of law.79 It is England that Montesquieu adopts as a specific example in Book XX, Chapter 12, titled 'On the Liberty of Commerce'. In The Spirit of the Laws, 'right of nations', 'political right', and 'civil right' are always interwoven, and what is at stake here is the condition for the genesis of laws and rights in human society.

• 81 Cf. SL XI-3.

38Ideally, laws on commerce are also enacted due to a mutually agreed 'union of wills' between merchants. Just as 'political liberty' is defined as 'the right to do everything the laws permit' and consists in 'having the power to do what one should want to do (ce que l’on doit vouloir)', in commercial relations, certain great merchants are not allowed to escape from the 'duty (devoir)' imposed by their own laws.81

• 82 Cf. SL XX-1 ; XIX-27, al.29.

39Consequently, it becomes clear that the English commerce idealized in The Spirit of the Laws shows the conditions and possibilities for commerce to contribute to peace in interstate relations in 1748. Therefore, given this peaceful order, the 'love of the homeland', which exacerbates discord between nations in military confrontations, appears as a 'destructive prejudice'.”82 From this perspective, the English Constitution, as depicted in The Spirit of Laws, appears as a product of the historical circumstances brought about by the development of modern commerce, rather than an ideal exemplar model of a constitution in one country detached from the rest of the world. The principles and ideals of commercial activities operating in the context of global interstate relations are reflected in a nation’s internal politics and constitution.

• 83 SL V-19.
• 84 SL I-3.
• 85 Cf. SL XI-3.
• 86 Cf. SL XXVI-15.

40Therefore, it is significant that in The Spirit of the Laws, England is characterized as a 'nation where the republic hides under the form of monarchy'83 when discussing the place of military personnel within its constitution. The common question in interstate and internal relations in The Spirit of the Laws is how to realize government of law from an infinitely varied and sometimes shifting relationship between physical forces and people’s will. To explain this, Montesquieu defines the 'political state', which determines the relationship between the rulers and the ruled, as 'the union of all individual strength'—and the 'civil state', which concerns the relationship among the ruled, as 'the union of wills'. He subsequently confirms that 'individual strength cannot be united unless all wills are united'.84 According to this logic, in a state of 'natural independence', or 'license', that is, before the existence of the state, 'people do whatever they will to do'.85 However, after a law has been enacted as a result of the 'union of will' of citizens, judicial power is called upon to give effect to that law, and the physical strength of the state confronts those who infringe on the law.86 This combination of 'will' and 'strength' determines the relationship between military forces and law in monarchical and republican regimes.

• 87 As John Robertson points out, the idea of parliament constraining the army under the command of the (...)
• 88 SL XI-6, al.59.

41In England, the monarch had the power to infringe the law at any time through his command of the standing army. However, the Bill of Rights enacted during the Glorious Revolution placed certain limitations on this military power. Parliament subsequently acquired the power to suspend military spending and disband the armed forces if deemed necessary.87 Alternatively, this legislature was backed by the 'middle class' engaged in commerce, who supported state finances through their tax burden. Therefore, Montesquieu states, '[i]f the executive power enacts on the raising of public funds without the consent of the legislature, there will no longer be liberty, because the executive power will become the legislator on the most important point of legislation'.88 This implies that the sources of wealth that support a country’s finances ultimately determine the operational objectives of its military forces. In other words, if the English relied on military power to plunder wealth from other nations, they might have had an incentive to encourage, rather than deter, executive power to become tyrannical. In contrast, their 'spirit of liberty' was maintained only if they did not rely on military force to acquire wealth. In this sense, their liberty derived from their commercial activities and, in a larger context, from their mores and manners. This is the significance of Montesquieu’s consideration of the 'natural effect of commerce' rather than the presence or absence of commerce itself.

• 89 Cf. SL V-19.
• 90 SL XI-18, et al., 19.
• 91 See SL XI-15.

42According to The Spirit of the Laws, the common aspect between the early Roman Republic and modern England was that the constitutions of these nations succeeded in distributing political power and avoiding its abuse. In England, the monarch, having the power to command the military and enforce the laws, could stand above these laws. Therefore, parliamentary limits on military power were considered essential for maintaining the government of law. In contrast, in the Roman Republic, at least in its early period, the entire citizenry played a part in enacting and enforcing the law. By taking up arms themselves as 'defenders of the laws and of the homeland',89 Roman citizens did not admit military power as being above the law. In this sense, in the early Roman Republic, the qualifications of citizens to participate in lawmaking could not be separated from those of soldiers to defend their laws and homeland. 'The Roman constitution was founded on the principle that those who had enough goods to be responsible to the republic for their conduct should be soldiers'.90 For this reason, as Montesquieu shows, when Appius Claudius usurped and abused his judicial power while drafting the Twelve Tables between 451 and 450 BC, the citizens could resist and overthrow this tyranny to restore the government of law.91

• 92 SL XI-18, et al., 19.

43However, the decisive moment for separating the status of citizens and soldiers in Rome came with Marius’ military reforms in the late Roman Republic. Since the knights benefited the most from the wealth acquired through military conquest, becoming 'the richest men', they ceased to form the legion’s cavalry. To face the penury of soldiers, Marius replaced it with 'another cavalry' levied from the ranks of the indigent citizens, and, in the words of Montesquieu, 'the republic was lost'.92

• 94 CR chap.16.
• 95 CR chap.16.

45Corresponding to this account of the distribution of wealth, Montesquieu, in Chapter 16 of the 1748 edition of Considerations, further adds an argument on how soldiers’ pay changed during the transition from the republican to the imperial period. The period of reduced salaries for soldiers during the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) is described as 'a time when most of the citizens blushed to accept payment at all and wanted to serve at their own expense'.94 In this addendum, Montesquieu also confirms that in the period when Rome suspended taxes on its citizens due to the enormous wealth acquired through the Macedonian Wars (171–167 BC) and other conquests, Roman citizens had sufficient wealth not to seek to increase salaries. The same addendum describes Marius’ period in which the Roman army became dependent on salaries as follows: 'After Marius had enrolled men without a patrimony, and because his example was followed, Ceasar was forced to increase the pay'.95 Thus, at the end of the Roman Republic, the salaries given to soldiers were more intended to guarantee their loyalty to the military commander than to their homeland, the city of Rome.

• 98 SL I-3.
• 99 SL I-1.
• 100 For a historical study of how criminal justice became a means of eliminating political opponents in (...)

49Sulla led his troops from the battlefield into the city of Rome as conquerors, plundering the property of his compatriots. The logic of this conquest is also explained by the analysis of 'positive laws' in Book I, Chapter 3 of The Spirit of Laws. Here, Montesquieu argues that, concerning the establishment of political societies, 'individual strength cannot be united unless all wills are united'.98 In other words, after the laws are established as the 'union of the will' of the constituent members of society, executive or judicial powers are formed as a result of the union of individual strengths to enforce and protect these laws. Therefore, in The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu sees the essence of 'despotism' in this overturning of the order derived from 'the nature of the things'99: Sulla subjugated the 'union of the wills' of Roman citizens by the 'union of strength' of an army brought in from the battlefield outside the city and more loyal to him than to their homeland. In this overthrow of laws by military force, Montesquieu sees the prototype of military government in the later imperial period. When the abuse of judicial power backed by military force nullified the law, that is, the 'union of wills' of the citizens, what remained was Sulla’s will as a military commander, and the citizens—regardless of rank—were uniformly subordinated to the will of this most powerful man.100

• 102 SL III-3.
• 103 At the Club de l’Entresol, in the intellectual exchange meeting of the open-minded aristocracy led (...)

52Indeed, Sulla appears to have attempted to rebuild the Roman Republic by limiting the excessive power of the tribunes and restoring political power to the Senate. However, even if he intended to restore the government of law in the Roman Republic, Sulla was ultimately forced to resort to military force, which in turn led to a deepening inclination toward military despotism: 'When Sulla wanted to return liberty to Rome, it could no longer be accepted'.102 Thus, Montesquieu understands the period of civil war after Sulla and Caesar as an irreversible process whereby it was no longer possible to restore the Roman Republic through legislative intervention without resorting to violence.103

• 104 Montesquieu, Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu, vol. 3, p. 1245.

56With this recognition in mind, Montesquieu dismisses Domville’s concerns about the future corruption of the English government and praises this country: 'I believe, however, that in Europe, the last breath of liberty will emanate from an Englishman; I even believe that you [the English] will delay the promptitude with which the other nations are moving toward entire downfall'.104 Whether Montesquieu meant to be polite or diplomatic is irrelevant. Through this letter, Montesquieu shows concern for the downfall of European nations and, at the same time, suggests the relative hope that England embodies. This letter presents his assessment and concerns regarding the current state of European commercial activities.