- 1 This contribution arose from the collaborative effort of the authors, who have thoroughly discussed (...)
- 2 According to Verene, ‘philosophy is a kind of humanistic literature, governed by the Muses’ and ‘ph (...)
- 3 For an introduction to speculative realism and for the distinction between common-sense realism and (...)
- 4 One of the principal figures associated with the Speculative Turn is undoubtedly Quentin Meillassou (...)
1To illustrate the contemporary philosophical use of the term ‘speculative’, let us consider two exemplary texts, which advocate the revival of speculative philosophy. The first is a book published with Lexington in 2009, titled The Speculative Philosophy. Its author is Donald Philippe Verene, professor of metaphysics and moral philosophy at Emory University and a leading expert on Vico. For Verene, philosophy should be understood as an integral part of the humanistic enterprise in the classical sense of the term, as the culmination of the pursuit of self-understanding, which it shares with other humanistic disciplines, in particular with the arts2. The second text, published in 2011 with re.press and edited by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, is a collection titled The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism. It is an impressive volume, containing an interview with Alain Badiou, as well as contributions by a diverse range of authors, including Ian Hamilton Grant, Roy Brassier, Martin Hägglund, Reza Negarestani, Slavoj Žižek and Quentin Meillassoux. It was intended to summarise, perhaps even to canonise, the new philosophical sensibility that had developed in the last decades of the twentieth century around a perceived crisis of continental philosophy (that is to say, of phenomenology, structuralism, hermeneutics, deconstructionism, post-structuralism and postmodernism), which, in its attention to discursive and linguistic practices, had allegedly proved itself incapable of understanding the reality in which it found itself immersed. This is probably the reason why this new speculative philosophy eventually manifested itself, not without resistance and friction, in the form of so-called speculative realism3 and speculative materialism4.
2Verene, a figure in many ways emblematic of a certain classical humanism, is decidedly foreign to the mood that defines speculative realism or speculative materialism. Nevertheless, despite their disparate accents, styles and conclusions, there are points of convergence between the two that allow us to identify some of the basic features of what is currently referred to as speculative philosophy.
- 5 Verene 2009: x.
- 6 Ibidem.
- 7 Ivi: xiv. For Verene, the constitutive traits of speculative philosophy are: (a) reaction to a mere (...)
- 8 Ivi: xiv.
3For Verene, speculative philosophy, which he identifies historically with Greek and especially Platonic philosophy, the philosophy of Bruno and Cusanus, the philosophy of Vico, that of Hegel, of Whitehead, and also with the literary production of James Joyce, must be understood in modern times as a kind of reaction against the critical attitude that has defined philosophy since Kant and has found its defenders and emulators in the various forms of deconstructionism, present in both the continental and analytic traditions. Contrary to the common misconception, Verene argues, speculative thinking does not refer to imaginative thinking devoid of solid foundations and alien to the domain of experience. For him, to speculate means “to attempt to ponder and narrate the whole of things in a way that satisfies reason in its connection with sense, imagination, and memory”5. Verene further asserts that speculative thinking does not reject analysis; however, it is not satisfied with it either and requires what he calls “a willingness to risk imperfection”6. According to Verene, the speculative philosopher should abandon the certainties offered by critical and analytic reflection in order to embark on a task that, despite its apparent impossibility, is nevertheless inescapable: to comprehend the totality of experience from within experience itself. What the speculative philosopher should strive toward, according to Verene, is thus to attain a divine perspective. In this sense, the task of speculative philosophy is inherently unattainable. However, to abandon this task and consequently to satisfy oneself with mere practices of reflective and critical thinking would be to renounce what constitutes the essence of the human being, which is reason. Indeed, according to Verene, speculative philosophy is an exercise through which reason knows itself and thus, ultimately, represents the most radical form of human self-knowledge: “The purpose of speculative philosophy is the Socratic pursuit of the Delphic gnothi seauton, of self-knowledge”7. The self, according to Verene, can turn back upon itself only speculatively. This implies that the self “cannot attain a vision of itself through a critique of its own actions or an analysis of the empirical basis of them”. Ultimately, speculative philosophy is thus always a form of autobiography, “an art of self-writing in which the philosopher comes to see what being is and, in terms of it, what the human being is”8.
- 9 Bryant, Srnicek & Harman 2011: 1.
- 10 The most significant texts marking this turn towards realism would be, according to the authors of (...)
- 11 Bryant, Srnicek & Harman 2011: 2.
- 12 Ivi: 3.
4The Speculative Turn moves in a very different cultural atmosphere from Verene’s, yet the intent behind the operation accomplished in it also has many points of contact with Verene’s. The introduction to The Speculative Turn by Bryant, Srnicek and Harman is emblematically and programmatically entitled ‘Towards a Speculative Philosophy’. In it, the authors clarify that the term ‘Speculative Turn’ is intended to unify what they describe as “a more chaotic and in some ways more promising situation’, which includes several ‘intriguing philosophical trends” emerging globally that “have gained adherents and started to produce a critical mass of emblematic works”9. More specifically, the ‘Speculative Turn’ is conceived as an antithetical counterpoint to the so-called ‘Linguistic Turn’, which defined philosophical discussions throughout the twentieth century. Against the backdrop of an equally global and equally cross-cutting divide between analytic and continental philosophy, which characterised the linguistic turn, the speculative turn would represent a form of realism10. If in Verene speculative philosophy was defined in opposition to the conception of philosophy as a critical activity, speculative realism formulates its project in opposition to a widespread apprehension of late twentieth-century continental philosophy as a practice of thinking that focuses entirely “on discourse, text, culture, consciousness, power, or ideas as what constitutes reality”11. While it is very difficult to identify strong common traits among the diverse thinkers associated with the label ‘Speculative Turn’, they all appear to be unified by a shared rejection of the traditional focus on textual criticism and a return to reality. In one way or another, all of them “have begun speculating once more about the nature of reality independently of thought and of humanity more generally”12.
5What is meant here by the verb ‘to speculate’?
6The three authors are quick to put their finger on it: “This activity of ‘speculation’ may be cause for concern amongst some readers, for it might suggest a return to pre-critical philosophy, with its dogmatic belief in the powers of pure reason”13. The return to a pre-critical horizon would, as with Verene, arise from a recognition of the inherent limitations of critical philosophy. It would be an expression of the need to go beyond the critical dimension that has defined continental philosophy since Kant, although not so much in the direction of Hegel, whose name is mentioned only in reference to Žižek, but rather (despite the reservations and words of caution issued in the introduction) in the direction of pre-critical philosophy. As the authors explicitly write, the speculative turn “recovers the pre-critical sense of ‘speculation’ as a concern with the Absolute”14.
- 15 According to Meillassoux, far from overcoming Kantian correlationism, Hegel absolutises it. As he e (...)
- 16 Bryant, Srnicek & Harman 2011: 3.
7From this point of view, speculative philosophy would be an attempt to overcome the limitations imposed by transcendental philosophy, yet not through Hegel, who, if anything, is read by Meillassoux as a radicalisation of transcendental philosophy15, but in a sense that harks back to pre-critical philosophy and claims to be underpinned by “a renewed attention to reality itself”16.
8The anti-realist tendency of philosophy of Kantian origin, against which the speculative turn of the new realism and the new materialism was formed, is supposed to manifest itself, according to the authors of the introduction – and one cannot help but notice the extreme vagueness and superficiality of the characterizations here, which would require much more extensive argumentation and not a straw-man argument such as this – “especially through preoccupation with such issues as death and finitude, an aversion to science, a focus on language, culture, and subjectivity to the detriment of material factors, an anthropocentric stance toward nature, a relinquishing of the search for absolutes, and an acquiescence to the specific conditions of our historical thrownness”17.
- 18 Meillassoux: internet.
9In contrast to the anthropocentric view that focuses – autistically – on subjectivity, language and culture, a new speculative philosophy would instead be characterised by a focus on material elements and reality taken as an element independent of thought. To quote Meillassoux: “Speculative materialism consists […] in the thesis that the absolute non-subjective can and must be thought – because it is that in which all thought is held”18.
10The ‘speculative’ as present in speculative materialism and speculative realism would thus be determined by the effort to think not the subject but the non-subjective, that which is independent of thought, to think the absolute understood literally, as ab-solutum, as what is free from any constraints and connections with thought. It would be defined by the effort to grasp that which is other, autonomous and independent of thought, as that from which thought derives its meaning, revealing the ultimate contingency of thought, of the subject and of the human being. Speculative philosophy would be the anti-Kantian and, more generally, anti-correlationist gesture that breaks through to what is independent of thought.
- 19 It’s interesting to note the various nuances of the term ‘speculative’ across different contemporar (...)
- 20 The absence of a definitive form of the scientific use of the term ‘speculative’ in resources such (...)
- 21 The differentiation into two main meanings of the term is also proposed by Ebbersmeyer 1995. For a (...)
11The notions of ‘speculative’ and ‘speculation’ are indeed hard to pin down to an unequivocal meaning in both common19 and technical language20. As evidenced by the Grimm Wörterbuch, the term ‘speculation’ encompasses at least three fundamental meanings. Alongside its common usage in the commercial realm, where speculation entails making calculated assessments that hold promise for the success of an endeavour, two technical meanings are of particular relevance: (1) the one referring to the contemplation of God and (2) the one connoting the act of pondering, investigating and diligently considering a matter. Upon delineating the key aspects of these two primary technical meanings of the notion21, we will briefly introduce three influential perspectives that have contributed to reframing the concept in late modernity: Kant’s use (and transcendental critique) of speculative cognition, Jacobi’s critique of speculative philosophy, and Schelling’s project toward a speculative physics.
- 22 A relevant exception to this perspective can be found in Nicholas of Cusa’s philosophy. For him, ‘s (...)
12In its first meaning, (1) ‘speculation’ denotes a specific contemplation of God, which, among the various modes of contemplating God, is not the most exhaustive. In the philosophical-theological context, speculation was mainly understood as a preliminary stage of visio22. It represented the action of one who apprehends the divine in created things, like in a mirror – a form of divine contemplation mediated through the res creatae, distinct from the intuitive contemplatio of God. Etymologically linked to ‘speculum’, ‘speculation’ thus embodies a form of reflective cognition wherein the mirrored (spirit, nature) and the reflected (God) enter into a mutually illuminating relationship. Along with this Platonic-Augustinian lineage, persisting until modern times, speculation progressively became synonymous with θεωρία (θεωρητικός) from the Aristotelian tradition. This usage did not replace the earlier tradition but rather coexisted with it, as evidenced in the works of Thomas Aquinas. According to this extended tradition, speculation serves as a counter-concept to praxis and constitutes the goal and fulfilment of human life. In this sense, the term held significance in both ancient and early-modern periods for classifying the sciences into productive, practical and theoretical ones, as well as for distinguishing the faculties of the soul into nutritive, perceptual and intellectual.
- 23 This was famously the critique of Feuerbach, Kierkegaard and Marx, among others – partly anticipate (...)
13In this context, another meaning of the term gained prominence: (2) ‘speculation’ as theoretical inquiry, rational exploration and thoughtful investigation. The ascendancy of this interpretation was accompanied by a robust critique and distancing from metaphysics and scholastic theology. Specifically, on the one hand, there was a re-evaluation of the anthropological question from a humanistic perspective, aimed at valuing humans as living, autonomous agents to be understood independently of theological inquiries. On the other hand, in the sixteenth century, a compelling need for the analysis of nature emerged, which led to a critique of the metaphysical assumptions previously held. This process, extending into late modernity, witnessed the evolution of the term ‘speculative’ into a form of thought primarily reserved for reason. This transformation was an eventful journey, as speculative cognition was often criticised for being overly abstract, hovering far above the practicalities of life23 or empirical data.
14While ‘speculation’ could not be reduced to the concept of abstract knowledge criticised by its detractors, the notion of ‘speculative’ undoubtedly came to represent a distinct form of rational understanding that set itself apart from practical considerations and strictly empirical inquiry. One notable example of this is evident in the philosophy of Kant.
- 24 Cf. Kant 1781: 841-842; Kant 1787: 869-870: “Metaphysics is divided into the metaphysics of the spe (...)
- 25 Kant 1987: 19; Eng. trans. 1992: 533. According to Kant, ‘[c]ognition of the universal in abstracto(...)
- 26 As one reads in the Vienna Logic, “[w]e have a logic of common reason and a logic of speculative re (...)
15In Kant’s uses, the term tends at first to be synonymous with theoretical knowledge, in contrast to the practical domain24. In this case, when used as an adjective alongside terms such as ‘cognition’, ‘reason’, ‘use’ and ‘interest’, ‘speculative’ denotes a theoretical understanding whose focus lies in comprehending the object up to its highest a priori principles. In addition, it carries technical nuances, which can be elucidated through two distinct conceptual oppositions: (i) speculative cognition versus common cognition and (ii) speculative cognition versus cognition of nature. In the first opposition, (i) speculative cognition is closely associated with abstraction. While common cognition relies on examples drawn from experience, termed ‘concrete’ for this reason, speculative cognition can abstract from such contexts and, in certain cases, possess knowledge of concepts alone. In this sense, Kant distinguishes between speculative understanding, the faculty enabling insights into the rules of cognition in abstracto, and common understanding, the faculty allowing insights into the rules of cognition in concreto25. Examples of speculative (i.e. abstract) cognition include not only metaphysics but also logic. Since in concreto is defined as the use of concepts applied to determinate objects of possible experience, whereas in abstracto pertains to an investigation of concepts regardless of their applicability to objects, considered in their pure relations, logic is for Kant a form of theoretical, speculative knowledge functioning in abstracto. It is the science of the rules of thought in abstracto26.
- 27 Kant 1781 634; Kant 1787: 662; Eng. trans. 1998: 585.
16In addition to this use, Kant also delineates a second technical meaning of speculative cognition, wherein cognition is deemed (ii) speculative “if it pertains to an object or concepts of an object to which one cannot attain in any experience”27. This notion encompasses various theoretical inquiries that are not abstract in the first use but surpass the bounds of possible experience. One such inquiry, explored in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of the Critique of Pure Reason, elucidates the need for reason to transcend its legitimate use in the understanding of nature, searching for the unconditioned beyond the limit of all possible experience. When reason infers from the existence of determinate things in the world a transcendent cause, Kant claims it engages in mere speculation, relying on the principle of causality beyond the legitimate conditions of its application (those of possible experience). This speculative endeavour not only fails to yield objective knowledge but also leads reason into errors.
- 28 Kant 1781: 637; Kant 1787: 665; Eng. trans. 1998: 587.
- 29 Kant 1781:640; Kant 1787: 668; Eng. trans. 1998: 588.
- 30 Kant 1781:639-640; Kant 1787: 667-668; Eng. trans. 1998: 588.
- 31 Ibidem.
17Kant illustrates this with theology as an example of a discipline founded on such speculative cognition. In Part II of the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’, Book II, Chapter III, Section VII (‘Critique of all theology from speculative principles of reason’), Kant contrasts speculative cognition with cognition of nature, which confines itself to objects or predicates within the realm of possible experience. While transcendental questions admit only transcendental answers derived from a priori concepts, speculative theology ventures into synthetic inquiries that extend beyond the limits of human knowledge, positing the existence of a being beyond empirical verification: i.e. “the existence of a being that is supposed to correspond to our mere idea, to which no experience can ever be equal”28. Nevertheless, Kant does not consider the result to be a total debacle. Despite its shortcomings, Kant acknowledges a negative use of transcendental theology and speculative cognition, highlighting their critical role as “a constant censor of our reason”29, particularly in dealing with pure ideas. Although reason “in its merely speculative use”30 is not adequate in attaining the existence of a supreme being, it can correct the cognition of this being, ensuring it aligns “with itself and with every intelligible aim”31, thereby purifying it of any inconsistencies with its concept.
- 32 Kant 1781: 636; Kant 1787: 664; Eng. trans. 1998: 586.
- 33 In Faith and Knowledge, Hegel explores the speculative nature of the idea, offering at the same tim (...)
18However, does this imply that speculative cognition is something encouraged by the Critique? Kant’s response appears negative in this regard. For Kant, the principles governing reason’s natural use do not inherently lead to theology32. The task of the Critique, therefore, is to establish the immanent, regulative and non-transcendent use of ideas33.
- 34 For a survey of some of these, see the contributions of Walter Jaeschke (1994; 2013) on the controv (...)
- 35 Jacobi 2004: 194; Eng. trans. 1994: 501.
19Kant’s transcendental philosophy sparked various controversies surrounding speculation34, with one of the most notable ones fuelled by Jacobi’s Letter to Fichte. In this Letter, penned between March 3 and 21, 1799, Jacobi depicts speculative philosophy as characterised by its relentless efforts to disrupt the equal certainty of the natural human being that “I am” and “there are things outside me”35: to make such equal certainty un-equal, Jacobi contends that speculative philosophy, by seeking to undermine the equality between subject consciousness and object consciousness, aims to subordinate one to the other. In doing so, it strives to derive the first proposition entirely from the second (or vice versa), thereby positing the existence of only one being and one truth. This endeavour ultimately leads to the destruction of natural equal certainty and the creation of an artificial equality of the I and non-I.
- 36 Ibidem. The relationship between speculative materialism and speculative realism is further explore (...)
- 37 See Marco Ivaldo’s discussion of ‘Egoism’ in the Jacobi-Wörterbuch Online.
- 38 Jacobi 2004: 194; Eng. trans. 1994: 501.
- 39 Jacobi 1998: 29; Eng. trans. 1994: 194: “[…] the greatest service of the scientist is to unveil exi (...)
20According to Jacobi, two primary paths emerge in speculative thought, depending on the principle to which it tries to reduce the whole of reality: materialism and idealism. Speculative materialism seeks to explain everything through self-determining matter, while speculative idealism seeks to explain everything through self-determining intelligence. Despite their apparent divergence, both systems are rooted in the concept of self-determination and ultimately share the same objective. Jacobi argues that they transition into one another: by reversing the principle meant to explain everything, both epistemologically and ontologically, speculative materialism gradually transforms into speculative idealism36, eventually leading to what Jacobi terms ‘egoism’37. In Jacobi’s conception, ‘egoism’ involves the one-sided, absolute prioritisation of the I, which is perceived as the sole entity with an independent existence. Everything else, including the realm of beings, is considered to exist only in relation to and through the I. This mirrors the perspective of speculative materialism, where everything is considered an attribute or mode of the universal substance, existing only in relation to and through it. Jacobi identifies Fichte as the champion of the all-encompassing egoistic speculative logic, portraying him as the “true Messiah of speculative reason, the genuine son of the promise of a philosophy pure through and through, existing in and through itself”38. The only antidote to this egoism, Jacobi argues, is a dualistic attitude that defends the right of existence (Dasein)39, a position he elaborates upon in his non-philosophy.
- 40 On Hölderlin’s engagement with the concept of speculation, in relation to transcendental philosophy (...)
21Beyond the ‘egoism’ of speculative philosophy, as well as Jacobi’s dualism, further developments on the speculative led to a composite constellation. Thinkers such as Hamann, Schlegel and Hölderlin40 contributed to this landscape by exploring topics such as the search for an absolute unifying subject and object.
- 41 See Moffat 2019.
- 42 Schelling 2001: 271; Eng. trans. 2004: 193.
- 43 Ivi: 272; Eng. trans.: 194. This claim is linked to Schelling’s attempt at rehabilitating nature, c (...)
- 44 Ibidem.
- 45 Ivi: 78; Eng. trans.: 14.
22In this context it’s worth mentioning Schelling’s theoretical proposal of a speculative physics, devised to reframe the notion of the speculative beyond the confines of transcendental philosophy, offering a broader framework that would avoid falling prey to Jacobi’s criticism. Schelling’s project, which he also referenced in the journal he founded in Jena in 1802, the Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik, is outlined in his works First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature and the separately published Introduction to the Outline, both of which appeared in 1799. Central to his method of speculative physics is a systematic articulation of the productive capacity of nature41 while reconciling the ideal (consciousness) and the real (matter) without reducing one term to the other. In the Introduction, Schelling asserts that human intelligence perceives “the most complete fusion of the ideal and the real” in products of nature42. Natural phenomena exhibit levels of organisation and complexity that resemble the conscious, displaying self-actualising regularities that, Schelling argues, cannot be explained solely by material mechanisms. However, Schelling also rejects the notion that such regularities are merely imposed by the human intellect, as if the real would exist only for and through the ideal. Rather, he suggests that nature exists independently of and beyond the ideal. This perspective challenges Kant’s notions of reason and reflective judgement, which Schelling criticises as too subjective and insufficient for explaining nature. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, as a speculative physics, posits that nature should be understood as “independent and real”43. According to Schelling, the emergence of our ideas must be grounded in the productive capacity of nature itself: “the ideal must arise out of the real and admit of explanation from it”44. Crucially, Schelling rejects any reduction of consciousness to matter or vice versa, for matter is no more fundamental to nature than consciousness is. Instead, he posits that both consciousness and matter are “a determinate form or limitation” of an underlying activity45: the unconditioned productivity of nature. Nature is therefore neither merely a reflection of self-consciousness nor merely a medium in which self-consciousness can occur. It is an active force that transcends and encompasses both consciousness and matter.
- 46 Ivi: 77; Eng. trans.: 13.
23Schelling’s definition of the unconditioned, which transcends reduction to either the real or the ideal, objective or subjective, underscores the necessity for a novel methodological approach capable of adequately addressing it. As elucidated in the First Outline, the unconditioned cannot be sought in any individual ‘thing’, in something of which one can say that it ‘is’. According to Schelling, since “what ‘I’ only partakes of being, and is only an individual form or kind of being”46, one can never state that the unconditioned ‘is’. Instead, the unconditioned does not exhibit itself entirely in any finite product. It never solidifies into a product, a thing.
24Given this understanding, how are we to comprehend individuals, those entities that ‘are’? Speculative physics aims precisely to reconcile these two aspects of nature that cannot be separated: the nature that appears as distinct and established natural products, and the unconditioned nature that is productive of the whole, including our knowledge of it. In Schelling’s view, speculation serves as a bridge between empirical inquiry and scientific inquiry. Ordinarily, these two approaches seem irreconcilable. Empirical inquiry regards its object as something already prepared and accomplished, while science views its object as something that is in the process of becoming, yet to be accomplished. However, speculative science, like any science, cannot begin from a product, i.e. a thing. It must instead begin from the unconditioned while simultaneously demonstrating that the nature appearing to knowledge as established natural products is nothing but particular expressions of the active productivity of nature as unconditioned.
- 47 Alfred North Whitehead’s Process and Reality, provides a significant example thereof. In his work, (...)
- 48 The project of a New Mythology – shared by figures such as Novalis, Herder, Hölderlin and Hegel – i (...)
- 49 The project of speculative theology, as pursued by Immanuel Hermann Fichte in his founding of the Z (...)
25The recognition of the need for a methodological revolution motivated the emergence of questions concerning the exhibition and the system, which became pivotal in debates of the time surrounding speculative philosophy and subsequent philosophies47. In the domain of Naturphilosophie, although not confined to it but extending to other branches of philosophy, such as aesthetics48 and theology49, a pathway emerged for further theoretical proposals.
26The term ‘speculative philosophy’ is often used as a designation for Hegel’s philosophy. In the Preface to the first edition of the Science of Logic, Hegel formulates his task as restoring speculative philosophy, not by a nostalgic return to pre-critical philosophy, but rather in continuity with the Kantian turn. In presenting the necessity that makes his logic necessary, Hegel, on the one hand, positions himself in contrast to what he terms the exoteric interpretation of Kantian philosophy. This version, according to Hegel, fails to delve into the profound depths of Kant’s critique, content as it is with mere injunctions against surpassing experience to avoid falling into the trap of fantasies and unwarranted philosophising. On the other hand, Hegel aligns himself with Kant, particularly in emphasizing his continuity with Kant’s doctrine of antinomies as outlined in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’.
- 50 See Hegel 1985: 4-5; Eng. trans. 2010: 7-8.
- 51 See ivi: 7; Eng. trans.: 9.
27The exoteric version of Kant’s philosophy, Hegel further notes, forged an alliance with the scientific camp, which likewise raised its voice against speculative thought, including metaphysics, the endeavour to grasp what really is. It found additional supporters in ‘modern pedagogy’, according to which – in Hegel’s words, which continue to resonate today – “the pressing situation of the time called for attention to immediate needs”, for the cultivation of those skills, one would say today, that are immediately useful in production. Echoing his mantra, Hegel asserts that “just as in the ways of knowledge experience is first, so for skill in public and private life, exercise and practical education are the essential”, they alone are what is required, “while theoretical insight” would be “even harmful”. Since only practical training is seen as essential, Hegel continues, even theology, once the guardian of ‘speculative mysteries’, now relies mostly on sentiments, on a purely practical-popular dimension or at best on considerations of mere historical erudition50. In these few lines, Hegel sketches out what one could call a historical-conceptual landscape determined by two seemingly opposing perspectives, which, though, upon closer examination, reveal themselves to be the products and outcomes of each other: the insistence on reason’s inherent limitations in grasping reality beyond empirical bounds justifies the belief that what is profound and essential can only be apprehended through ‘feeling’ – intuition provided by non-rational means. The Hegelian aim, however, is not only to show that these two tendencies go hand in hand, but above all to articulate an idea of reason that is capable of going beyond its mere intellectualistic version. It is against this background that the Science of Logic presents itself as “metaphysics proper or pure speculative philosophy”51.
- 52 See ivi: 40; Eng. trans.: 35 (translation modified).
- 53 See ivi: 40-41; Eng. trans.: 35.
28Thus, it is already in defining his project of speculative philosophy that Hegel’s link to Kant clearly emerges. Indeed, the concept of the speculative is explicitly related by Hegel to that of the dialectic, which in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant has already emphasised as “a necessary doing of reason”52. In the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’, and in particular in the Antinomies of Pure Reason, Kant demonstrated, Hegel argues, that “the necessity of contradiction […] belongs to the nature of thought determinations”. Provided that one reads the Kantian dialectic not only negatively, as is mostly the case, but according to what Hegel calls “its positive aspect”, one glimpses the speculative: “It is in this dialectic as understood here, and hence in grasping opposites in their unity, or the positive in the negative, that the speculative consists”53. For Hegel, the speculative is thus the capacity not to remain stuck in abstractions, that is, in determinations of thought in their isolation and separateness, but to grasp the nexus that connects them to one another. Dialectic is what Hegel calls the “self-moving soul” of the determinations of reason, which is itself “the principle of all natural and spiritual life”.
- 54 Ivi: 41; Eng. trans.: 36.
29But for the understanding, which Hegel also calls ratiocination, to think dialectically is one of the most difficult things to do, because it fundamentally implies its self-negation, its ceasing to be ratiocination. According to Hegel, the reflective activity of understanding is a necessary and fundamental moment in the constitution of speculative thinking: overcoming the immediacy inherent in understanding serves as the initial step toward self-determination. However, it is equally important not to stop at the level of understanding. For in this case, we would find ourselves in an apparently coherent whole, in which, however, the parts exist in absolute separation, deprived of those connections that constitute the “soul of the edifice” of knowledge – deprived of “the method dwelling in the dialectic”54, which alone can establish the relation that connects the parts into a whole. Indeed, in its quest to liberate itself from the confines of the sensible realm, which hinder the free and autonomous development of thought, the understanding resorts to abstraction. Consequently, it fixates concepts in their determinate forms, thereby distancing itself from concrete reality and creating a world of its own – a sort of duplicate of the actual world. However, this constructed world, characterised by its internal coherence, inevitably appears artificial when juxtaposed with reality, rendering it incapable of grasping what is. It should be emphasised that speculative philosophy is not simply a thought that is opposed to reflection of the understanding; it is not the other in relation to it. Rather, speculative thought develops out of the understanding itself, insofar as it is the articulation of the contradictions into which abstractions inevitably lead – contradictions which pure understanding nevertheless shuns, as if in the face of horror.
- 55 Ivi: 42; Eng. trans.: 36.
- 56 Hegel 1992: 6; Eng. trans. 2010b: 9.
- 57 Ibidem.
30This is where the difference between what Hegel calls “abstract logic” (which would be precisely the logic of understanding) and “speculative logic” comes into play. If one takes the logical in its formal and intellectual aspect, “its content passes only for an isolated occupation with thought determinations, next to which the other scientific endeavours constitute a material and content of their own”55. Considered from its formal side, logic is only one discipline among many. If, on the other hand, we take the logical as an element that emerges concretely in the very exercise of the sciences, that is, in the various practices through which thought seeks to explain reality, then the logical reveals itself as the very essence of reality: that is, as metaphysics. This is an important point. It shows that, for Hegel, the speculative is not positioned against the empirical as its opposite, but emerges out of considerations inherent in empirical inquiry. In the Preface to the second edition of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Hegel insists: “It is a pernicious prejudice that philosophy finds itself in opposition to knowledge gained from sensory experience, to the rational actuality of what is right as well as to an innocent religion and piety”56. For Hegel, nothing could be further from the intention of truly speculative philosophy. Truly speculative philosophy harbours no such opposition. If anything, speculative philosophy recognises and justifies these figures: “Far from opposing them, the thoughtful mind enters deeply into their content, and learns and strengthens itself in their midst as in the midst of the great discernments of nature, history, and art”57.
31In Hegel’s view, speculative thought is therefore not a way of thinking that, dissatisfied with mere experience and unwilling to stop at it, would simply reach beyond empirical reality, in an attempt to grasp a transcendence separate from it. Rather, speculative thought seeks precisely to think this reality, understanding its complexity and dynamic interrelations. Speculative thought aims to grasp those logical-ontological connections that would account for this complexity, accepting the challenge of explaining the real in its entirety, thus overcoming the abstraction, separation and fragmentation that the understanding produces instead.
32Precisely because it thinks the real in its concrete unfolding, and thus also in its historical constitution, speculative thought necessarily has a processual, transformative and dynamic character. Whereas understanding tends to block reality, to freeze it like a snapshot, speculative thought is that way of thinking which, being itself dynamic or dialectical, can take into account the dynamism of the real.
- 58 Hegel 1992: 72; Eng. trans. 2010b: 71, §31R.
- 59 The idea of judgement (‘Urteil’) as an original or primordial division (‘Ur-Teilung’) was first for (...)
33This implies a recognition of the limits inherent in the propositional structure. According to Hegel, the dialectical and process-oriented exposition that is required for a concrete and therefore dynamic consideration of the real cannot find its proper articulation in the usual, ordinary proposition. “The form of the sentence, or more precisely, of the judgment”, Hegel observes, “is in any case unsuitable to express that which is concrete and speculative – and the true is concrete”58. Judgement can only be realised in a structure that is split and divided between the subject and the predicate59. While every proposition must be composed of distinct terms to be informative, Hegel shows that each of these terms cannot be independent and isolated, since it is holistically connected to others that determine its meaning. For instance, while in the copula the judgement establishes a relation of identity between subject and predicate, the subject, which encompasses other predicates as well, is not exhausted by the predicate that the proposition makes explicit. And if the content that the proposition wants to manifest is of a speculative nature, that is, if the content relates to the totality, then the non-identity between subject and predicate is also an essential moment. Their relation is the passing or vanishing of the one into the other.
34This is the topic of the speculative proposition that Hegel famously addresses in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, a text that is not so much a gateway to the work in question as an introduction to Hegel’s entire system.
- 60 Kant discusses the division in the ‘Architectonics of Pure Reason’; see supra, n. 24.
- 61 Hegel 1980: 31; Eng. trans. 2018: 25.
- 62 Ivi: 32; Eng. trans.: 25.
- 63 Ivi: 32-33; Eng. trans.: 26.
35In the Preface, Hegel anticipates the issue by discussing the difference between philosophical truth and the sphere of historical and mathematical knowledge60. Historical truths, which have to do with “individual existence, with a contingent and arbitrary content, and with the non-necessary determinations of that individual existence”61, e.g. that Caesar was born on a certain day and not on another, that he was killed on a certain day and not on another, are indeed facts; as such they contain no necessity in themselves and precisely for this reason cannot be rationally derived. However, this does not imply that such facts are completely independent of the cognitive dimension of subjectivity. Certainly, the fact itself is independent of the subject that knows it, but its knowledge, and especially its being exhibited as something true, is the consequence of a process of explication, inspection and externalisation of the reasons behind that fact. This is all the more evident in the case of mathematical truths, which, not surprisingly, Hegel remarks, we only really regard as truths if the subject who possesses them also knows their demonstrations. And yet, even in the case of mathematical knowledge, the result is still separable from the demonstrative process that supports it: “the proof in the case of mathematical cognition does not yet have the significance and the nature of being a moment in the result itself; rather, in the result, the proof is over and done with and has vanished”62. Historical knowledge and mathematical knowledge therefore have in common that they can be thought of (and used) independently of the process sustaining them. In contrast, in the case of philosophical knowledge, such a separation proves to be impossible. Philosophical cognition is that kind of knowledge in which the process is one with the result – “the whole act of producing the result is a process and a means of cognition”63 – thus uniting the being of the thing and its knowing.
36This is, essentially, for Hegel, the speculative.
37Speculative thinking, as Hegel defines it, is that knowing which grasps the concept within being, which thinks the essence in the concept, and which therefore dialectically articulates being in its own movement. It shows in what sense and according to what logic the real is the very movement of the concept.
- 64 Ivi: 42; Eng. trans.: 38.
38This notion of the speculative encounters resistance within the framework of the language of representation and its propositional structure. In the speculative, Hegel argues, the self is no longer “a motionless subject tranquilly supporting the accidents”64. Rather, in the agitation of the speculative, this quiet and inert subject sinks; the content no longer functions as the predicate of the subject but instead becomes the substance itself: the concept embodies the object’s own self.
39The processual dimension of speculative thinking thus rearticulates the very relationship between the true and the false. In the famous example of the bud disappearing into the flower and then the flower disappearing into the fruit, Hegel criticises the intellectualistic, i.e. non-speculative, conception of truth, a conception that conceives of the true as sharply opposed to the false and fails to grasp the intimate dynamics of the relationship between truth and falsehood. True and false are not, as the classical epistemological perspective would have it, simply properties of an assertion; rather, in speculative thinking they manifest themselves as those moments of the process in which the real is constituted. In speculative philosophy, then, the true and the false are not antithetical concepts: however incompatible they may be, they are necessary moments of each other in that dynamic unity which is the life of the whole. This led to Hegel’s famous formula, which is in many ways the programmatic manifesto of the entire speculative philosophy:
- 65 Ivi: 18; Eng. trans.: 12.
In my view, which must be justified by the exposition of the system itself, everything hangs on grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much as subject65.
40This formula also implies a critique of what Hegel regards as the fundamental standpoints of modern thought, namely Spinozism, Criticism and immediate access to the absolute. The danger of Spinozism is that it completely absorbs the subject and self-consciousness into a single substance, leading to a position in which subjectivity deflates into substance. Criticism, on the other hand, tends to absorb substance into subjectivity, or rather, it tends to consider the logical dynamic enabling the universal validity of our knowledge as something that belongs exclusively to subjectivity, presenting substance as something utterly undifferentiated, unaffected by logical structures of any kind, which instead, if we may say so, rests entirely on the shoulders of subjectivity. In relation to this, the standpoint of immediate access to the absolute emerges as both a consequence and a radicalisation of Criticism. It tries to reconcile thinking and being, and to do so it resorts to the form of intuition, which, however, precisely because intuition is immediate, cannot articulate substance, which in turn remains undifferentiated and inert.
- 66 See ivi: 19; Eng. trans.: 13.
41To grasp substance equally as subject requires us, according to Hegel, to go beyond these positions, that is, to think the relation between subject and object in radically new terms. Only by thinking this radicality can we conceive the concept of speculative truth – the idea that the true is “the becoming-of-itself”. Or that “the true is the whole”. Or, again, that “the absolute is to be comprehended essentially as a result”66.
- 67 See ivi: 40; Eng. trans.: 35.
42To say that substance must be equally conceived as subject, according to Hegel, is to say that the real must be thought in its dynamic structure, in its negativity. In this understanding, all determinacy contains within itself its own other, the negation of itself, in a movement by which it tends toward the realisation of its own rational structure. Thus, as Hegel puts it, “the intelligibility of the understanding is a coming-to-be, and as this coming-to-be, it is rationality”67.
43When Hegel states that the “nature of what it is to be its concept in its being”, and further claims that in this consists the “logical necessity”, he is not idealistically annihilating the real in a thought that would be alien to it. Instead, he is presenting the rational as the dynamic structure of that very real, “the rhythm of the organic whole”68, the constitution of reality in its entirety, the becoming of the concrete.
- 69 See ivi: 40; Eng. trans.: 35.
44For Hegel, speculative philosophy is philosophy that grasps the true as a subject. This is far from affirming that the true is something subjectivist. Rather, it signifies that the true “is only the dialectical movement, this course of self-engendering, advancing, and then returning into itself”69. It asserts that the true, the real, is the ongoing movement of its own constitution, the dynamic of its own realisation. And that reason is nothing other than this very movement, this very dynamic of self-realisation.
45There was a time when Hegel was convinced that, after the epochal change marked by the French Revolution, speculative philosophy was destined to acquire a central role in the structure of the modern world, firmly embedded in the educational and scientific system of a rational state. The world spirit, however, did not want to proceed along Hegelian lines, to put it mildly. Against Hegel’s affirmation that the actual is rational and reason actual, the young Hegelians, most notably Marx and Kierkegaard, already set out to prove that there is something actual that cannot be grasped by reason. Further philosophical and political development could be understood as an accelerated process of decay of the absolute spirit. It ended in a situation where the very idea of reason had become suspect, if not guilty, of criminal aspirations. In the postmodern condition, Lyotard poignantly declared, there is no longer any place for a grand narrative, we are confronted only with various language games, which may indeed form local coalitions but are unable to integrate such partial stories into a coherent unified whole. Philosophy, too, was thus forced to diminish its expectations and either limit its enquiry to well-defined objects on the model of the positive sciences, as was the case with so-called analytic philosophy, or else invent a different, more subtle type of discourse that could still want to be committed but could no longer pretend to be universal. As for speculative philosophy, including Hegel’s, it was still a highly interesting object for the history of ideas, yet as a serious programme it was generally considered a thing of the past.
46While the recent re-emergence of the speculative has not changed the situation, since in the Speculative Turn the use of the term is quite at odds with Hegel’s conception, we strongly believe that there are at least three good reasons to insist on a speculative philosophy along broadly Hegelian lines. First, we must remember that Hegel developed his philosophical project in an intellectual constellation that was remarkably similar to our own. After Kant’s critique had established the inherent limits of rational cognition, and Jacobi had declared that the way of demonstration necessarily led to Spinozism, the absolute was generally considered inaccessible to reason. In addition, the Romantics denounced the bias inherent in any universal claim, especially when presented under the guise of pure reason, and instead proposed alternative, non-rational cognitive ways to reach the absolute. In this situation, faced with having to choose between the radical self-limitation of reason and its self-renunciation, Hegel essentially retained the highest aims of philosophy. This is not to say that he did not accept the soundness of the charges levelled against traditional reflective thinking, far from it. However, while he conceded that reason could have oppressive consequences, it was very much clear to him that reason was also the only place that made emancipation possible. In this sense, speculation is the general name for the – always actual – determination to think to the end, to remain faithful to the task of philosophy against all odds.
- 70 Hegel 1987: 79.
- 71 See Böhm: forthcoming.
47Secondly, according to Hegel, philosophy can be said to transform representations into thoughts, and these further into concepts. Since the formal difference between the two is far from obvious, the main danger lies in carrying out the philosophical work only halfway, that is, in stopping at the level of reflection and understanding and not taking it further to speculation and reason. In Hegel’s view, this was the case with the philosophy of his time, for example with the “sich so nennende Philosophie” associated with Fries, and with the philosophy of enlightened reflection in general. As a consequence, they were bound to end up in unsolvable contradictions, both internally, against themselves, and externally, against other shapes of absolute spirit. So, when Hegel asserted that, after the end of art and the end of religion, it was up to philosophy to take the central place in the architecture of the absolute spirit, he was perfectly clear “that only the wholly speculative philosophy can do this”70. Historical development has shown that Hegel, as far as his person is concerned, failed to break the hegemony of the philosophy of reflection. Even Marx and Kierkegaard developed their critique from the unchanged standpoint of reflection71, and while many valuable details may have been added to the argument, it must be acknowledged that, historically, we still inhabit the same philosophical period as Hegel. Simply put, speculative philosophy cannot be a thing of the past since it has not yet had its present. Perhaps there is a reason for this, too. But the continued hegemony of the regime of reflection does not only not disqualify the call for speculative philosophy, it actually confirms its relevance.
- 72 To use an appropriate analogy, we can say that the structure of Hegel’s conceptual regime closely r (...)
48Thirdly, Hegel can be considered a post-critical and post-Romantic philosopher in that he fully accepted the pertinence of the critique directed at reason in its traditional, reflective form. It is precisely for this reason that he sought to develop a speculative conceptual regime which would make thinkable what, from the standpoint of reflection, proved unthinkable. It must be stressed, however, that this profound change in the form of the concepts also led to an equally profound ontological transformation in the whole domain of the entities to which they used to refer. In insisting on the absolute and the universal, Hegel was far from simply re-establishing the former absolute. Instead, he put in its place something that was inherently precarious, fractured, opaque, deficient, even sloppy, and in general afflicted with the weaknesses usually associated with the finite. Similarly, his concept was designed in a way to accommodate that which lacked its concept, for the inherently defective, ephemeral, abstract, merely positive, insignificant. And while Hegel admits that there is no such thing as a pure and neutral universal, untainted by the particular, it is crucial for him that the place of the universal nonetheless remains open and continues to represent the ultimate goal of rational activity72. In this, too, his speculative philosophy seems to be well adapted to our present condition.
- 73 Hegel 1994: 304.
- 74 See, however, Wieland 2022, who seems to suggest that Hegel’s absolute spirit should be invested wi (...)
- 75 Just as in phrenology, it would be entirely up to us what the outcome of this immediate junction of (...)
49It is, of course, possible that there are good reasons, both theoretical and political, why Hegel’s initial proposal of speculative philosophy has not managed to take up a dominant place in modern societies. Empirical observation would strongly suggest that philosophy has all but abandoned attempts to construct an all-encompassing system of thought, and that even the positive sciences have lost a significant part of their public authority. To that extent, one might as well declare the end of philosophy! But the empirical data never speak for themselves. Those of us who want to maintain the persistence of the absolute would thus basically have two strategies at our disposal. One, the milder of the two, would be to accept the irreversible decomposition of the absolute spirit in its unified form, but instead of abandoning it altogether, to try to devise for it a different, pluralistic configuration, in which philosophy would renounce its exclusive pretensions. The question as to the extent to which the unity of reason could still be preserved within such a plurality of the absolute – for, as Hegel observes, reason is a jealous god who “wants to have no other gods beside himself”73 – must remain open here74. The other, stronger strategy would be to interpret the current situation along the lines sketched out above, that is, as a symptom of the fact that we still find ourselves assuming the standpoint of reflection, and to present speculative philosophy as a project for the future. Indeed, this kind of methodological optimism was often practised by Hegel, who tended to read the extremely bad as a sign of imminent reversal – as in the case of the infinite judgement in his discussion of phrenology75. The task would no doubt remain enormous, but compared to its gravity, the perceived enormity of the work required could hardly relieve us of it.
50This Issue of Rivista di Estetica on speculative thinking comprises papers from invited contributors (Gunnar Hindrichs, Quentin Meillassoux, Angelica Nuzzo, Alenka Zupančič) and contributions selected through a call for papers (Silvia Pieroni, Giovanni Temporin, Goran Vranešević). The contributions collected in the Issue explore the concept of the speculative from both a systematic and historical perspective, primarily focusing on Hegel’s philosophy and some contemporary redefinitions of the concept. The Issue is organised into three sections: In the first section (“I. Speculative, Speculative Thinking, and Dialectics”), three contributions delve into the issue of the speculative, offering diverse perspectives in dialogue with the philosophical tradition and Hegel’s dialectical thinking. The second section (“II. Speculative and Language”) features two contributions that examine the unique relationship between the speculative and its articulation, particularly concerning ordinary language, rhetoric and translation. The third and final section (“III. Speculative, Speculative Materialism, and Psychoanalysis”) includes two contributions that reflect on the speculative in the context of contemporary developments within speculative materialism and psychoanalysis.
51The contribution of Gunnar Hindrichs (Basel) traces the trajectory of speculative thought through the philosophical tradition, spanning from Plato to Kant and Hegel, while also engaging with contemporary proposals by Dieter Henrich and Hans Heinz Holz. Hindrichs argues for the necessity of reformulating the speculative programme under post-speculative conditions, going beyond the insights of Henrich and Holz to address fully the issues of totality and the precariousness of thought. This involves revisiting the speculative tradition while acknowledging the increasing scepticism surrounding the concept of speculation.
52Angelica Nuzzo’s contribution (New York) argues for the adoption of a dialectic-speculative rationality modelled on Hegel’s conception of speculation. Nuzzo demonstrates how such rationality is best suited to meet the demands of understanding the complexities of the contemporary world.
53Quentin Meillassoux (Paris) also addresses Hegel’s dialectic, concluding the first section of the Issue. Meillassoux contends that at the heart of Hegel’s philosophy lies a form of non-dialectical negation, which he interprets as genuinely speculative. By analysing the conceptual sublation of Christianity, Meillassoux identifies a form of contingency that cannot be reduced to dialectical treatment. This leads him to reconceptualise the absolute not as the Idea, but as a form of contingency that transcends it – an aspect that, according to him, is mostly kept tacit in Hegel’s system.
54In the second section, two contributions explore the significance of exposition and language in speculative thinking within Hegel’s philosophy. Goran Vranešević (Ljubljana) delves into the speculative essence of language, including ordinary language. Vranešević argues that Hegel’s treatment of language sheds light on its role in speculative thinking and elucidates the internal workings of thought formation and explication.
55Silvia Pieroni’s contribution (Bologna) focuses on the philosophical translation of experience. Pieroni examines the challenges inherent in the ‘speculative proposition’ and the integration of form and content, highlighting the role of aesthetic, linguistic elements in articulating speculative thought.
56In the third section, the inquiry broadens. Giovanni Temporin (Padova) examines the tension between systematicity and exposition within speculative materialism. By analysing the key aspects of Meillassoux’s speculation – non-metaphysicality and factiality – alongside the differentiation between two concepts of the absolute, Temporin explores the distinction between philosophical speculation and its residual trace in the natural sciences.
57Alenka Zupančič’s contribution (Ljubljana) delves into the intersection of Lacanian theory with philosophy. Zupančič explores the extent to which the concept of the unconscious can be considered genuinely speculative. Through an analysis of Lacan’s two interpretations of the Cartesian cogito, Zupančič highlights Lacan’s revolutionary impact on questions of objectivity, objective knowledge and the subject’s role in it. Zupančič argues that for Lacan the formations of the unconscious not only enable but also underpin objective, scientific knowledge. This is where the speculative emerges.