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I will study the concept of solidarity by looking at patterns of practical reasoning leading to behaviour that can be taken to exemplify solidarity. By studying which kinds of premisses are necessary for taking the motivation to display solidarity, in contrast to altruistic or moral motivation, I try to find necessary conditions for solidarity. I will argue that practical reasoning leading to solidary behaviour is a form of we-reasoning in which some of the premisses are in first person plural form and attribute actions or attitudes to a collective. If this is correct, solidarity is a group concept, and intentional solidary behaviour presupposes identification with a group where others have shared goals or interests. This distinguishes solidary motivation and behaviour from altruistic or moral motivation and behaviour.

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I thank Pekka Mäkelä and anonymous referees for their useful comments. This research has been supported by NordForsk.


1Solidarity is a concept that is used in various connections, but it doesn’t seem to have one clear definition that would be widely accepted (see, e.g., Bayertz 1999; Laitinen and Pessi 2014; Scholz 2015; Sangiovanni 2015). It is typically presented in a positive sense, as something opposed to selfishness, as willingness to help others in need. There is a long tradition of research that connects the concepts of morality and solidarity, exemplified most clearly by the following statement by Emile Durkheim (1893, eng. tr. 1984: 331): “Man is only a moral being because he lives in society, since morality consists in solidarity with the group and varies according to that solidarity”. However, it is not clear whether there is such a connection and whether solidarity is a moral concept, even though there often is some sort of a normative appeal to it: We tend to think that we ought to be solidary. There may also be an element of altruism involved in solidarity, but the concept of solidarity clearly differs from that of charity and is typically associated with some sort of sharedness, reciprocity, or expectation of mutual support, which is not associated with charity. Often the concept is used in a political connection to remark some kind of a unity of a party, union or class, as in the famous polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s. The concept seems to originate from the Roman law in which an “in solidum” obligation was formed when several people jointly took a loan and were collectively responsible for paying it back: If one party ended up in financial difficulties and could not pay their share, the others would have to pay their parts of that party’s share in addition to their own shares (Głos 2018). In such contexts, the principle “all for one and one for all” is often cited. However, it seems that the concept is nowadays used in a wider sense that does not require an explicit agreement between the parties.

2Solidarity is an attribute that has been used to characterize actions, motivations, emotions, and attitudes. It does not seem possible to characterize solidarity in terms of actions alone, because one and a same token action, such as helping someone in need, can be either solidary or not, depending on what kind of motivations, emotions, and attitudes the action stems from. Hence, it is arguably useful to study these background elements that produce or rationalise actions. I may help someone for the reason that she helped me earlier, for the reason that I expect her to help me later, or for the reason that helping her might make her like me. None of these reasons seem to be examples of solidarity, so my aim here is to find what kind of reasons for action would suffice for an action to be characterized as solidary.

3My idea is to try to approach the concept of solidarity in four steps, by

  1. Thinking about types of behaviour that we take to exemplify solidarity,

  2. Consider practical reasoning patterns that would produce such behaviour,

  3. See which kind of premisses are required for valid conclusions of corresponding intentions, and

  4. Take such premisses to reveal conditions for solidarity.

4This method, I conjecture, will reveal patterns of we-thinking in which the target of solidary behaviour is considered as one of us with shared goals or interests, and perhaps also an assumption of the existence of a shared norm, agreement, or some kind of a normative demand or expectation.

1. Practical reasoning and we-thinking

5I will restrict to intentional solidary behaviour and assume that intentional action is action for reason. I will here adopt an internalist way of speaking about reasons and assume that intentional acting for a reason can be characterized as resulting from practical reasoning, in which the premisses state reasons for action (or perhaps beliefs about reasons for action). This is not to deny that there is also a meaningful externalist sense of reasons for action, which is independent of a person’s motivations. Such reasons are often called normative reasons, but my main focus here happens to be in the motivating reasons for action, because I think they are important for the study of solidarity.

6Practical reasoning is typically something like the following

  1. I want to have ice cream

  2. I believe that I can have ice cream by going to the kiosk

  3. Therefore, I will go to the kiosk

7Here desires and beliefs together produce or justify an intention (or action), expressed by the will-clause of the conclusion. We can say that these desires and beliefs constitute my motivation to act. We can also say that they state my reasons for action, and they can be cited in explanations of my action: I went to the kiosk because I wanted to have some ice cream and I believed that I could get it by going to the kiosk. I will speak loosely about reasons and will not distinguish between attitudes and their contents when talking about reasons: For instance, I will not focus on the question whether my belief that I can have ice cream by going to the kiosk or the (putative) fact that I can have ice cream by going to the kiosk is a reason for my action.

8Also, I will understand reasoning itself rather loosely: I will not require that the form of reasoning is strictly speaking valid (whatever that might mean in the case of practical reasoning), but I will assume that it should seem as valid to the reasoner, so that the agent can consider the premisses as a sufficient reason for the action or intention expressed in the conclusion. For instance, I will not always require the presence of a belief and a desire, but allow that people can take various kinds of things as sufficient reasons for action, for instance, the existence of a social norm can be taken as a reason to act in a certain way.

9We-thinking is thinking in terms of a “we”, that is, thinking in the first-person plural form. An important species of we-thinking is we-reasoning, which is a form of reasoning that employs premisses that are in the first-person plural form. The general form of we-reasoning is as follows:

  1. We ϕ

  2. Therefore, I ϕ'

10For instance,

  1. We drive on the left

  2. Therefore, I drive on the left


  1. We believe the Earth is flat

  2. Therefore, I believe the Earth is flat


  1. We will carry the table

  2. Therefore, I will do my part of carrying the table.

13Another instance of we-reasoning is team reasoning (see Sugden 1993; Bacharach 1999; Gold and Sugden 2007), when it is conceived in the way of Hakli, Miller, and Tuomela (2010), as reasoning starting from a premiss expressing a we-intention. Here is an example:

  1. We intend to J together

  2. The best way for the group to J together is that I do X and you do Y

  3. Hence, I will do X

14The idea here is that individuals identify with the group and adopt the group’s viewpoint in making decisions. They then employ we-reasoning to conclude what they personally have to do in order for the group to reach its goal.

2. Practical reasoning behind solidary behaviour

15We-reasoning typically takes place in cases of joint action, and also solidary behaviour is often connected to joint action, so it makes sense to start from practical reasoning leading to solidary behaviour in the context of joint action. Consider the following practical syllogism:

0. We intend to J
1. She needs help to do her part of our J-ing
2. She is one of us
3. We help each other when needed
4. I believe I can help her
5. Therefore, I will help her

16Solidarity is understood to be an integral part of joint action, and this syllogism, let’s call it SOL0, illustrates this phenomenon. Indeed, this pattern seems to fit well the original in solidum case: Just replace J with “pay back our debt”. Entering the agreement creates the we-intention, and if anyone gets into trouble in paying back their share, the others can resort to this type of reasoning and conclude that they will have to pay more than their original share in order for them to pay back their debt. Sometimes joint action is indeed conceived as necessary for solidarity (Sangiovanni 2015).

17However, I believe that solidary behaviour is not restricted to joint action situations because also the following syllogism seems to exemplify solidarity, even though it does not exemplify joint action.

  1. She needs help

  2. She is one of us

  3. We help each other when needed

  4. I believe I can help her

  5. Therefore, I will help her

18Even without a we-intention grounding joint action, this seems like an example of reasoning that leads to solidary behaviour. The need may arise for example from an outside threat to one of the members, and this threat, together with the group’s social norm of helping other group members in need, grounds solidary action. Let’s call this syllogism “SOL1”. Are all the remaining premisses in SOL1 necessary?

19Consider dropping the first premisses:

2. She is one of us
3. We help each other when needed
4. I believe I can help her
5. Therefore, I will help her

20The conclusion does not follow, because there is no premiss stating that the person is in need of help. Need here should not be taken too literally: It might be that the person can survive without help, but she might not be able to finish what she is doing, or to do it as well as with help. So the “need” might be an instrumental need, that is, a need relative to a goal, perhaps a we-goal, like in the first example above. Consider then keeping the first and fourth premiss but dropping all the other ones:

1. She needs help
4. I believe I can help her
5. Therefore, I will help her

21It seems that the major premiss is missing, and there is nothing that forces one to help someone in need. However, it is certainly possible that somebody’s need for help and one’s own ability to help together constitute a good reason for helping. Indeed, this may be a valid form of moral reasoning. However, there is no connection to solidarity. Adding a background premiss like “I will help anyone in need of help” would ground altruistic behaviour, but that does not seem to be necessarily connected to solidarity either.

22Let’s consider the syllogism SOL1 without premiss 2:

1. She needs help
3. We help each other when needed
4. I believe I can help her
5. Therefore, I will help her

23Without her group membership as an implicit assumption, this doesn’t seem valid as solidary form of reasoning unless we change 3 into something like “We help others when needed”. This is still we-reasoning and involves me intending to do something we usually do, but it doesn’t presuppose that she is a member of the group. I am just acting as a member of a group of altruists or otherwise helpful people, but, again, there does not seem to be a necessary connection to solidarity but the helping behaviour can be motivated by other kind of considerations like altruism or benevolence.

24Let’s consider the syllogism SOL1 without premiss 3:

1. She needs help
2. She is one of us
4. I believe I can help her
5. Therefore, I will help her

25Apart from a case of moral syllogism, this looks invalid because the major premiss is missing (as in the above syllogism with only premisses 1 & 4). Hence, it seems that all premisses 1, 2, 3, and 4 are needed in order to make the inference (a) at least roughly speaking valid and (b) an instance of solidarity.

26Let us still consider the version SOL0 grounded in a we-intention.

0. We intend to J
1. She needs help to do her part of our J’ing
2. She is one of us
3. We help each other when needed
4. I believe I can help her
5. Therefore, I will help her

27Here premisses 2 and 3 may taken to be redundant, because 2 seems to be a consequence of 1, and 3 can be understood to follow from 0: As long as we intend to do something together there is not much choice but to help if someone cannot do their part. Hence, SOL0 reduces to this:

0. We intend to J
1. She needs help to do her part of our J’ing
4. I believe I can help her
5. Therefore, I will help her.

28Perhaps even weaker collective attitude than a joint intention (or we-intention) can suffice for solidarity:

0. We share a goal or interest
1. She needs help
2. She is one of us
3. Unless I help her, she cannot contribute to furthering our goal or interest
4. I believe I can help her
5. Therefore, I will help her.

29Let’s call this SOL2. Premiss 0 is meant to be taken in a looser sense than “we intend”, for instance, in the sense suggested by Sangiovanni (2015: 343-44), or perhaps in the distributive sense in which both have the a goal or interest with the same content, such that the content can only be satisfied simultaneously. So the goal cannot be, for instance, to eat ice-cream, but instead, for instance, that all of us will get ice-cream. Here we may be able to see an element of self-interest (or group-selfishness) in solidarity: By helping someone who is furthering goals and interests that I have, I further my own interests. This raises the question whether there are cases of solidarity in which there would be no element of own interest whatsoever.

30Apparently, the concept of solidarity has sometimes been invoked in situations in which the actor and recipient of solidary action are not members of the same group and do not have shared goals or interests. For instance, Bierhoff and Küpper (1999) distinguish between solidarity formed on the basis of common interests and solidarity with the interests of others. The former is a form of cooperation for the common good, whereas they write of the latter as follows:

In more recent years, a second form of solidarity emerged which is not directly linked to own interests. Solidarity of this type is elicited by threatening problems of needy people all over the world. The solidarity with owners of small coffee plantations in Central America who are protected against exploitation by fair contracts is an example. In this case solidarity does not serve own interests.

31This raises a question: What makes this an instance of solidarity instead of, say, charity? I believe that the answer is that in spite of not forming an actual social group with the owners of small coffee plantations, you can still view them as group members in some sense. It seems perfectly possible that one can identify with a social class, such as the working class or precariat, and see their interests as something oneself wants to advance, just like one can identify with a particular gender, race, or ethnicity. Similarly, group identification can take place in the case of professions, like farmers, enterpreneurs, or YouTubers. If there is a difference between solidarity and charity, I think it is based on the idea that solidarity requires such identification and commonality of interests, whereas there is no such requirement in the concept of charity. Charity can be based on pity, sympathy, or compassion, which can be targeted towards any person, or even non-persons, such as animals. The concept of charity, or prosocial behaviour more generally, does not carry any kind of a reference to a group, actual or imagined, unlike the concept of solidarity. Indeed, Bierhoff and Küpper (1999) themselves say: “Support which is directed toward a single individual is termed prosocial behavior. The identification with a whole group of needy persons is called solidarity”. But how is it possible to identify with a group that one is not part of and one does not have shared interests with?

32Bierhoff and Küpper (1999) employ Turner’s self-categorization theory and distinguish between three levels of self-categorization: personal self-categorization, ingroup–outgroup categorization and self as human being. Apparently, the highest level is at play in such cases. They write: “Self-categorization at the most abstract level leads to a heightened perceived similarity among all human beings. Commonalities are stressed while individual and cultural differences are ignored. The equality of all people in the world is emphasized. As a consequence, interests of people in other parts of the world are transformed into self-interest”. Hence, their interests are in my interest, and in helping them I am also furthering my own interests. In fact, this seems to collapse the whole distinction that Bierhoff and Küpper (1999) started with, and hence, some element of self-interest seems to be inherent in the concept of solidarity. This does not mean that solidarity would be fully self-interested, however, because solidary actions involve costs as well, and there are typically other actions that would maximize self-interest. Hence, solidary actions usually are not those actions that pure self-interest would recommend.

33Are there other senses of solidarity that would not fit in the pattern of being members of a group or sharing a goal or interest? Sometimes solidarity is referred to in cases in which the individuals do not share a goal or interest but instead find themselves in a similar situation, like when people unknown to each other end up stuck in a lift. Such a situation creates a goal that will be shared by others, thereby creating a group with a shared goal, like in the lift case in which everyone will want to get out of there. Even though strictly speaking they could share the goal only in a weak distributive and indexical sense (each one thinking “I want to get out of here”), in practice such an experience of a common fate probably suffices to create a stronger we-feeling and turn the collection of people into a task group that cooperates to get everyone out. If one person managed to climb out of the lift and decided to go home instead of helping the others, they would be not only blamed for doing something morally wrong but probably also accused of lack of solidarity.

34In other cases, there might not be a shared goal, but there is, for instance, a shared resource (like a public good), and everyone has their own goal to benefit from the resource. Solidary action in such a case would be not to selfishly overuse the resource but to try to leave fair shares to others too, like in a tea party where we can see that the cake is getting smaller and people are consequently taking smaller and smaller pieces in order for it to last longer. In effect, solidary action in such cases comes very close to team reasoning:

  1. We share a resource

  2. It is best for us (as a group) if we only use our own share of the resource

  3. Therefore, I will only use my share of the resource

35This reasoning is clearly a case of we-reasoning in which the people see themselves as members of a community or a society for which it would be best to preserve the resource for common use. As such, this syllogism is not even seemingly valid, however, and would require strengthening in terms of premisses that would make it plausible to assume that others are engaged in a similar process of we-reasoning. In a more general form, this looks like the following (let’s call it SOL3):

  1. We are in a similar situation (we share an interest)

  2. In this situation, it is best for us (as a group) to do J

  3. Therefore, I will do my share of J

36This pattern comes close to team reasoning that involves a perception of commonality of interest (Gold and Sugden 2007). Like the previous one, it will also require additional premisses of assurance that others are thinking similarly, because otherwise I may risk doing my share while others free-ride. I will leave it open whether these are cases of solidarity or whether they are mere cooperation for mutual advantage, but either way they seem to be instances of we-thinking where the individuals are seen to share an interest if not a goal.

3. Characterisation of solidarity

37If the syllogisms SOL0–SOL2 and perhaps also SOL3 are accepted as exemplifying solidarity, we might suggest, as a general characterization, that solidarity means something like supporting someone with whom I share a goal or interest, hence basically someone I can take to be at least a potential group member in joint action. However, it might not be an actual group member in the sense of us having a joint intention, but perhaps just someone with shared goals or interests, like people in the same social class or profession, or people of the same age group, race, or gender, or people sharing the same hobby. This characterization is less restrictive than that of Sangiovanni (2015) that restricts solidarity to cases of joint action. I have employed a rather loose sense of solidarity common to current parlance, but stricter senses might be better suited for particular purposes like the analysis of the concept of solidarity in discussions concerning political movements or institutions. Even in this looser sense, there is a relation to social groups and joint action. In order to have others as a target of solidary action, I have to see them at least as potentially included in a “we”, as group members with an aim I want to promote too. By helping them, I also promote our shared goal, hence my own goal.

38In addition to such element of self-interest in solidarity, we can see that there is no necessary connection to morality. Solidarity and morality may be in tension with each other because morality is universal whereas solidarity is relative to a particular group (Heyd 2007; Laitinen and Pessi 2014). Even in the cases in which the group happened to be the whole of human kind, it would still exclude something (such as animals, robots, or aliens). Solidarity and morality can even contradict each other: Your shared goal can be an immoral one, so you can have a solidary motivation to help someone to do immoral things.

39For example, if you and I go and steal some apples, and I get caught but you manage to escape, I may decide not to reveal your identity, and this can be considered a solidary action on my part because I don’t want you to suffer and I may think that it is better for our group that only one of us gets punished, even though the moral thing to do could be taken to be to admit that we were in this together because that is the truth and we both deserve equally well to be punished. From the perspective of you, however, it might be solidary to give in and admit that you were participating in this theft as well and not let me suffer alone. Here, then, it seems that solidary action can also be different from selecting the best group action as in team reasoning, however, this may depend on the group and its values. Hence, solidary action can be distinct from both moral action and prudential or instrumental group action.

40Would it be a counterexample to understanding solidarity as a group concept based on we-thinking, that solidarity can work against one’s own group? There might perhaps be a solidary motivation to support another group than one’s own social groups, as we have seen in the case of identification with the whole human kind, but can it also be targeted against one’s own social group? Perhaps it can, as in a case where one is part of an oppressive group and still identifies with the oppressed group. Some candidates for such cases could be, for instance, white people standing against apartheid in South Africa in the 1980s or Russian citizens petitioning and demonstrating against the Russian attack to Ukraine in the beginning of the war in 2022 before the protests subsided (partly due to repression from authorities but partly also because of increasing general demands of solidarity towards Russian government as a response to the sanctions imposed by the Western countries). Of course, instead of solidarity, such acts could perhaps be understood also as acts stemming from moral outrage or perhaps feelings of sympathy, which seem somewhat related to solidarity but do not require shared goals or interests or even being in the same group or species. For instance, one can easily feel sympathy towards suffering animals, but it is somewhat unusual or non-standard to speak of solidarity towards animals, even though this is something that e.g. animal rights activists do sometimes, and perhaps it is possible if one identifies with the group of all the living beings capable of suffering.

41If actions targeted against one’s own social group can be classified as solidary, I don’t think that they constitute a counterexample against identifying with the ones who are outside of one’s closest group, it would only show that the strength of solidarity is not necessarily directly related to the social distance, even though typically it may be. Perhaps it shows that solidarity depends also, and perhaps more than on mere social distance, on one’s values and ideals, like principles of justice, fairness, or legitimacy that one subscribes to: The group with which one identifies in cases of solidarity seems to depend on whether one sees the aims of that group as more worthy or justified than those of one’s closest group. If one’s own family or country behaves badly towards another group or individual, one’s compassion may easily be on the side of the one who has suffered injustice, and solidarity can draw from universalist ideals or from the experience that one shares the viewpoint of the oppressed and feels that their aims and interests are more legitimate than the wrongdoers.

42Even here I take there to be some sort of a sense of a connection or feeling of togetherness indicating we-thinking if the motivation is to stem from solidarity instead of universal morality or feelings of sympathy. One is not acting from moral motivation, namely just for the reason that someone’s rights have been violated, but because one feels some type of a connection with the person, in terms of shared values or a similar situation that one could find oneself as well, and would perhaps expect that other person would also try to help.

43Hence, the characterisation should be amended to take this consideration into account: solidarity means support toward others with whom one takes to share a goal or interest that one finds legitimate and important (to the extent that it may override goals or interests that one shares with more proximate groups). Moreover, solidarity is often connected to a feeling of demand or obligation, a normative pressure to do one’s part, which I haven’t said much about. In the Roman law case, there was an explicit agreement, whereas this seems to be lacking in the modern-day conception of solidarity. However, there might be a sense of obligation arising from the idea of we-reasoning, at least if we follow ideas suggested by, e.g., Christopher Woodard (2003) or Anne Schwenkenbecher (2019): patterns of team reasoning can give rise to group-based reasons or collective obligations. In cases of joint action we can feel normative pressure to help other group members in case they need help to accomplish their part of our joint action. This need not be a moral demand, nor even something required by a social norm, but mere prudential consideration, because completing our intention demands it. However, in other cases, it may be a more strongly normative pull toward helping. For instance, our motivation to help the Central American coffee farmers can stem from the realization that if we all started buying fairtrade coffee, it would not only support local farmers and communities, but also be better for social stability, biodiversity, and environmental sustainability, which are in everyone’s interest. Hence, team reasoning in such a situation would recommend everyone to do their and buying fair trade instead of regular coffee would contribute to making the world a better place for us all. Solidary action here entails doing one’s part, or more, even when not all others might be doing theirs.


44By studying patterns of reasoning behind solidary action, we have come to the conclusion that solidary action results from we-reasoning and solidarity is a group concept. If the origins of the concept of solidarity come from the Roman time formal agreements among debtors, who clearly formed a group and also shared the same fate of having to pay the debt, the current usage seems to apply more widely. Still, solidarity seems to presuppose identification with a group, although group here should be understood loosely, not necessarily a social group or an organization, but a class or some kind of a loose collection where the participants share similar goals or interests, or are in a similar situation. This shows that solidarity is separate from morality which is universal and not tied to a group, class, or sharedness of situation. Sometimes solidarity and morality may even be in conflict with each other. These conclusions may not be very surprising, because many other studies have ended up with similar results, but I believe that the method of studying the practical reasoning patterns behind solidary action is novel, and in general results are stronger if they are obtained by using several different methods.

45Seeing solidarity as a result of we-reasoning explains the normative force often associated with solidarity (and which is perhaps sometimes identified with morality) by the power of we-reasoning to provide pro tanto reasons for action, namely group-based reasons. It also explains the connection to ideas of reciprocity that are sometimes linked to solidarity, because the reference to a “we” entails that all are in the situation together and suggests that the normative pressure for me to help others would be similar to them if I happened to be the one in need of help.

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Bayertz, K. 1999, Four Uses Of “Solidarity”, in K. Bayertz (ed.), Solidarity, Dordrecht, Springer: 3-28.

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Hakli, R., Miller, K. and Tuomela, R. 2010, Two Kinds of We-Reasoning, “Economics and Philosophy”, 26: 291-320.

Heyd, D. 2007, Justice and Solidarity: The Contractarian Case against Global Justice, “Journal of Social Philosophy”, 38: 112-130.

Laitinen, A. and Pessi, B. 2014, Solidarity: Theory and Practice. An Introduction, in A. Laitinen and B. Pessi (eds), Solidarity: Theory and Practice, Lanham, Lexington Books: 1-29.

Sangiovanni, A. 2015, Solidarity as Joint Action, “Journal of Applied Philosophy”, 32: 340-359.

Scholz, S.J. 2015, Seeking Solidarity, “Philosophy Compass”, 10: 725-735.

Schwenkenbecher, A. 2019, Collective Moral Obligations, “The Monist”, 102: 151-171.

Sugden, R. 1993, Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior, “Social Philosophy and Policy”, 10: 69-89.

Woodard, C. 2003, Group-Based Reasons for Action, “Ethical Theory and Moral Practice”, 6: 215-229.

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Raul Hakli, «Solidarity and We-reasoning»Rivista di estetica, 82 | 2023, 93-104.

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Raul Hakli, «Solidarity and We-reasoning»Rivista di estetica [Online], 82 | 2023, online dal 01 février 2024, consultato il 23 juin 2024. URL:; DOI:

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