• 1 In Arabic, the event is called yum al-shahid, literally meaning the Martyr’s Day in a si (...)
• 2 Before the 2011 Revolution, aside from the security forces martyrdom, martyrdom narratives in Egyp (...)

1Egypt has commemorated Martyrs’ Day1 on March 9th every year since 1969. Instituted by Nasser, this commemoration had been neglected for a while until competing actors mobilized around it after 2011. After the January 25th Revolution, new actors attempted to invest in the celebration and integrate new martyrs to the former military pantheon.2 Shortly after, the al-Sisi regime embraced the commemoration, and its shape has constantly evolved since, taking more space in the media year after year. Why and how was this commemoration resurrected? What does this revival tell us about the symbolic and narrative issues at stake in post-revolutionary Egypt?

• 3 For the purpose of this research note, I choose to focus on the evolution of Martyrs’ Day commemor (...)

2The figure of the martyr is generally ambivalent: a dead person can be considered a martyr by some and a traitor or a terrorist by others (Sei 2017, 137). Disagreements over who qualifies as a martyr create political and identity fault lines: the definition of martyrdom varies according to the group that claims its martyrs (Middleton 2014, 130). In this research note, I address the struggles over the definition of “good” or “real” martyrs through the commemoration of Martyrs’ Day in Egypt after January 25th, 2011. The act of commemoration is never void of meaning. It stems from political decisions that frame events or people as national symbols. Studying public commemoration allows us to understand how collective memory is shaped, institutionalized and eventually preserved (Gershoni and Jankowski 2004; Volk 2010). This note thus aims to analyze more specifically how the 2011 Revolution impacted the former symbolic order over the years, either through the temporary integration of revolutionary martyrs to the military pantheon or through the state’s reinvention of the commemoration, from a counter-revolutionary perspective.3

• 4 Sadat ordered the building of this tomb in 1974 to celebrate the 1973 “victory” against Israel; he (...)
• 5 Numerous wars opposed Egypt to Israel in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict: in 1948 in reac (...)

5In 1969, Gamal Abdel Nasser decided to establish Martyrs’ Day in homage to General Abdel Moneim Riad, who died on March 9, 1969 in Sinai during the “war of attrition” that opposed Egypt to Israel. Riad was praised as a martyr and regarded as a hero of the Egyptian army. A square in central Cairo was named after him, and a statue of him was erected there in 2002 (Armbrust 2019, 68). The commemoration of this day has long been carried out with formalism and sobriety. In the presence of high-ranking army officers and veterans, the minister of Defense would lay a wreath on the tomb of the unknown soldier,4 in the Cairene suburb of Medinat Nasr. He would then recite the opening sura of the Coran, al-fatiha, in honor of the martyrs of the Egyptian wars.5 For a long time, this ceremony did not seem to catch a strong attention outside of military circles, unlike such celebrations as the 1952 Revolution and the 1973 October War celebrations, which triggered strong popular mobilization (Podeh 2014). It was a kind of formal celebration in memory of the heroes of the army where former combatants were rewarded.

• 6 Mohamed Morsi, member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected President in June 2012 bef (...)

6Until 2011, the State was the main producer of the martyrdom narrative and of commemorations. The revolutionary period that began in 2011 witnessed a resurgence of the martyr’s figure with the “martyrs of the revolution” (shuhada’ al-thawra). Competing political entities celebrated those martyrs to challenge the authority of the regimes of Hosni Mubarak, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and Mohamed Morsi.6 Martyrological narratives appeared to be a citizens’ production (Buckner and Khatib 2014, 380), and protests on behalf of revolutionary martyrs were “one of the most productive strategies for expressing grievances and demands” (Armbrust 2019, 99).

• 7 Al-Masry al-Youm, February 28th 2011, “The mourning of the martyrs of the January 25th r (...)
• 8 The 40th day after death is considered in Islam as the day marking the end of the mourning rituals (...)
• 9 Al-Ahram, March 7th 2012, “General Abdel Moneim Riad… Story of a martyr entitled ‘the wi (...)
• 10 Al-Ahram is a state-owned newspaper. It belongs to the Al-Ahram Establishment, managed b (...)

8An article published by Al-Masry al-Youm7 at the end of February highlighted that Martyrs’ Day would coincide with the 40th day of the mourning of the January 25th martyrs,8 thus creating a link between military martyrs and martyrs of the Revolution. An article9 published by Al-Ahram10 on Martyrs’ Day presented Abdel Moneim Riad as a strong symbol of the January 25th Revolution. The proximity between the eponymous square and Tahrir Square (the symbolic heart of the revolution) also linked Abdel Moneim Riad’s name to the revolutionary events.

• 11 These movements are: the Free Egyptian Movement (not to be confused with the Free Egyptians Party) (...)
• 12 This “liberal” party has adopted a very strong anti-Muslim Brotherhood position, and boycotted the (...)
• 13 Al-Shorouk, March 12th 2012, “(Free Egyptians Party) organizes a march for Abdel Moneim (...)

9On Martyrs’ Day 2012, several civil society movements,11 among them revolutionary groups, organized various events in Downtown Cairo to commemorate the martyrs of the revolution who died in such bloody events as the Maspero massacre, the Mohamed Mahmoud protests and the Cabinet clashes. Concomitantly, the Free Egyptians Party, founded by the billionaire Naguib Sawiris in 2011,12 announced a march to the statue of Abdel Moneim Riad, aiming to lay a wreath of flowers to commemorate the “martyrs of Egypt throughout the ages and the martyrs of January 25th”.13

• 14 Al-Ahram, March 8th 2012, “the Admin of the Military (page) presents a bouquet of flower (...)
• 15 On February 11th 2011, on the occasion of Mubarak ousting, SCAF spokesman General al-Fangari paid (...)

12In parallel, the SCAF published a tribute to martyrs on social media. The declaration first honored the martyrs of the Egyptian army, as usual, and then paid tribute to “all the martyrs of the Egyptian people and the Armed Forces”, addressing a “perfumed salutation and a wreath of roses to the martyrs of our dear January 25th Revolution and until now”.14 Although it was not the first time that the SCAF symbolically greeted the martyrs of the 2011 Revolution,15 this tribute happened on Martyrs’ Day, which until then was dedicated to the martyrs of the army.

• 16 Al-Watan, March 9th 2013, “The Armed Forces send a message of gratitude and gratitude to (...)
• 17 For example, during the celebration organised on January 23rd 2014 to commemorate the Police Day a (...)

13The year 2013 witnessed a clear shift in the narrative about the January 25th martyrs. On March 9th of that year the SCAF saluted the martyrs to the homeland without mentioning the 2011 revolution martyrs.16Al-Ahram published the names and events that led to the death of “military martyrs” since January 25th, praising their roles as protectors of citizens in a time of chaos. This rhetoric involved martyrs from the armed forces and the police in narratives about January 25th and was used again on several occasions.17

• 18 While these seminars (nadawât tathqifiyya) have long been organized by the armed forces on the occ (...)

14In 2013, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, then Mohamed Morsi’s minister of Defense, attended the commemoration and laid a wreath on the tomb of the unknown soldier, which was the role usually assigned to his office. He also participated in an “educational seminar”18 organized by the Department of Moral Affairs of the Armed Forces of the Defense Ministry, paying tribute to famous heroic figures of the army.

• 19 Al-Dustour, March 9th 2014, “The military spokesman salutes the martyrs of the homeland (...)

15I could not find sources mentioning the martyrs of the revolution on Martyrs’ Day, 2014. On March 9th, the military spokesman paid tribute to the homeland’s martyrs on social media.19 From 2014 onwards, when references were made to January 25th, it was only to mention military or police martyrs.

• 20 See for example: Sputnik, March 13th 2018, “On the occasion of Martyrs’ Day... the Egyp (...)
• 21 In particular on the tomb of the martyrs of the Second Field Army in Ismailia, and the Third Field (...)
• 22 Sometimes exemplary fathers are also rewarded, but more rarely.

16The following years witnessed an increase in official commemorations, with parallel activities hosted by the Veterans’ Organization in addition to formal tributes and seminars. It is difficult to date precisely when this organization, created in 1951 and affiliated to the Defense Ministry since 1971, started to handle various activities for Martyrs’ Day. It usually organizes events for veterans and their families, such as art exhibitions or sports games encounters20 as well as visits to the tombs of fallen soldiers in various governorates.21 It also seems to support martyrs’ families and soldiers wounded during military operations, providing them with stipends and medical assistance. During the seminar, numerous martyrs’ mothers received medals and rewards by the Organization, and were honored as “exemplary mothers”.22 The fact that Martyrs’ Day is sometimes named “the Martyrs and Veterans’ Day” in the media also highlights the Organization.

• 23 This has been the object of several studies (Armbrust 2019; Buckner and Khatib 2014; Mittermaier 2 (...)

18Instead of describing the common features of revolutionary martyrs,23 I look here at how actors used Martyrs’ Day to express other claims. As we saw before, the commemoration was mainly an intra-military event before 2011; it was celebrated within army circles. It allowed to praise the role of veterans during various military events and to honor living and fallen army heroes. A solemn act, it found its legitimacy in repetition over the years, rather than being an opportunity to express specific political discourses or to convey a distinctive political imaginary. More importantly, and surprisingly enough when considering the “exemplarity” of the martyr’s sacrifice and its potential to mobilize and foster a sense of collective belonging (Albert 2001), Martyrs’ Day did not aim at being celebrated in a wider popular sphere (Van de Bildt 2015, 262).

• 24 Al-Shorouk, March 8th 2012, “The martyrs of the revolution... the absents present in the (...)
• 25 Graffities as a way to express revolutionary claims and commemorate revolutionary martyrs have bee (...)

20Thus, the announcement of the event was also used by various civil society movements to express their grievances. While state officially claimed to celebrate the martyrs of the revolution on Martyrs’ Day, these movements organized actions to denounce the rule of the SCAF and its abuses:24 a march protesting military trials and a march calling for judiciary independence. Other actions such as a graffiti session in Nubar and Mansour Streets25 (around Tahrir Square), and prayers for the souls of the martyrs were also planned.

• 26 As the “90 minutes” TV show (Mehwar TV Channel) presenter insisted in a special episode of Martyrs (...)
• 27 Video published on the website of the presidency, March 15th 2018 (https://sis.gov.eg/Story/160581 (...)
• 28 Video published on the Ministry of Defense YouTube channel, March 10th 2019, “Promo Martyrs’ Day n (...)

23Such discourses depict martyrs as “kind” men who voluntarily sacrificed themselves for the nation and for the citizens to live in peace.26 Families play an active role in creating this idealized figure. They contribute to portray them simultaneously as extraordinary heroes and regular folks through anecdotes and personal storytelling. Like the martyrs of the 2011 Revolution (Buckner and Khatib 2014: 384), they are individualized. The narratives mention their names and describe their personal lives. The martyrs are depicted as fathers, brothers, and sons. According to their families’ testimonies, they also share specific religious traits: in particular, knowing about their future martyrdom before it happens. One difference should be noted between the two types of martyrs. While religious conceptions helped frame revolutionary martyrdom, it was mostly celebrated in a claim-making process. On the contrary, the state chose to emphasize the religious aspect of shuhada’ al-wagib’s martyrdom. For example, shaykhs of Al-Azhar or such famous Islamic scholars as al-Habib ‘Ali al-Jifri delivered speeches during the seminar27 and religious representatives (Copts and Muslims) explained in videos and the importance of their sacrifice to secure Egypt from a religious perspective: “this (martyrdom) is something that God and the Church greatly value”.28

• 29 Video published on the Al Hayat TV network YouTube channel, March 15th 2018, “Martyrs’ Day, touchin (...)
• 30 See Lisa Weeden’s analysis of Hafez al-Asad’s presentation as a substitute father who would replac (...)
• 31 Video published on the DMC YouTube channel, March 10th 2019, “The kid Adam Sharaf recites the poem (...)

24The celebration also emphasized the martyrs’ children. In 2018, during the educational seminar, president al-Sisi spent a long time with two children dressed in small army uniforms. He asked them what they wanted to be when they grew up: the young Omar answered a “hero”.29 The little girl then reportedly confessed that she had mistaken president al-Sisi for her father during the ceremony.30 During the 2019 Martyrs’ Day, Adam, a young boy, son of an army martyr who died in Sinai, delivered a poem during the seminar, dressed in a military uniform and making the military salute to the audience: “I’m the son of the martyr, tomorrow I’ll be a perfect hero just like he was”.31 The seminar therefore acts as a “family party” (Ozouf 1983, 163) binding participants as if they were relatives. The family trope creates a narrative that connects heroes across generations, implying that heroism is transmitted by blood. As commemorations rest on the obsessive assertion of sameness (ibid.), this narrative affirms a familiar “us” against a threatening “them”, participating to define the community that identifies with the martyr.

• 32 Ministry of Defense YouTube channel, March 9th 2019, “Promo Martyrs’ Day”, (https://urlz.fr/hgPb).

25On the same topic, the Defense ministry released a promotion video32 in 2019, featuring a child holding hands with a military officer who seems to be his father. The officer suddenly disappears, representing the absence of the martyr. The orphan is left alone until another military officer appears on his left and takes his hand. Then, a policeman appears on his right and takes his other hand, as well as various characters who embody the nation in its diversity: an Azhari shaykh, a Coptic priest, a doctor, workers, employees, and a peasant. As they all join hands and cross the street together, the clip ends on the following comment: “You are not alone; we are all next to you; with our hands we will build; and our unity is our strength; and we will build our hopes. You will always be our guide and our path to realize the martyr’s dream”. The caption read: “Together we will continue the path of the martyr” (ma‘ ba‘d hankammel meshwar el-shahid). The expression hankammel el-meshwar, “we will continue the path”, was also used as a slogan to support the 2018 candidacy of president al-Sisi. Many families of “Martyrs of Duty” had also mobilized in the media during the electoral campaign to urge their fellow citizens to vote as a way to fight terrorism. The idea that people from all social categories should continue the mission or the dream of the martyr by joining efforts to develop the country is a recurring thread. The connection between what the martyr did – protecting the nation – and developing the country through the building of new infrastructure is shown in promotion videos, featuring roads, bridges, the new Suez Canal, etc.