- 1 We seek to distinguish here a concept of field which explains the regular and sometimes competing i (...)
- 2 The information necessary for this research, in particular biographies, was collected during a numb (...)
- 3 If we follow Sewell (Sewell 1992) who comments on Giddens: the resources are all that can produce o (...)
1The increasing complexity of societies is reflected in the autonomy of social fields1. The closure of the field is defined notably through the existence of separate institutions: its ability to create norms and its own stakes2. However, though the make-up of fields has been described in numerous instances, the autonomy of a field – above all its fluctuations – is difficult to pinpoint from an empirical standpoint. In order to do this, here we consider the example of a political field and we centre our analysis on one of the dimensions of this autonomy: the question of resources mobilised by the actors. In the case of the political field – of interest to us here – the term resources applies to what an individual may mobilise, for instance in order to be elected: militancy, religious charisma, social capital, etc.3 One of the dimensions of the autonomy of a field stems from the mobilisation of resources outside of the field in question, through complex and costly procedures, forming a veritable process of transformation. In the same way, the capacity of actors (individuals, institutions) to produce their own resources (activism, ideological discourse, etc.) is an indicator of autonomy. The process of transforming resources therefore allows an appreciation of the varying autonomy arising from the level of transformation of resources and from the ability of political actors to create their own resources. In comparison, an approach taken from biographical traits (age, qualification, gender, profession, etc.) enabling a description of how the position of an actor leads to an expression of certain consistencies between the field or the multiple standpoints, but which leaves largely unexplored the question of what circulates (and what is transformed) from one field to another.
- 4 In the absence of any indication to the contrary, ‘Diyarbakır’ means the administrative department (...)
2In order to test these hypotheses, we examine the resources mobilised for the election of deputies in the republican period (1920-2002) for the administrative department [il] of Diyarbakır in South-Eastern Turkey4. Why favour an analysis on a departmental scale in this study? Firstly, this framework represents a consistent electoral constituency since the beginning of the Republic and therefore defines the principal field for electoral competition. Therefore, the value of resources can be appreciated much more easily in the context of a competition. The construction of resources at the national level a priori suggests a consistency of mobilised resources throughout all the administrative departments, a theory which this paper resolutely rejects.
3Secondly, research into resources does not allow for the direct use of existing sources because these only give a general indication of social position. Thus, the resources, which a posteriori give the greatest indication of the longevity of a deputy are not included in the official categories, often because they concern aspects considered to be private or illicit. Furthermore, the data collected nation-wide in year books – the biographies of the TBMM, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi [Large National Assembly of Turkey] for instance – are incomplete, if not sometimes incorrect, from where the necessity arises to fill in the gaps using other sources, including interviews or local history – a task most easily achieved in the context of an administrative department, especially over an extended period.
- 5 The administrative department of Diyarbakır has, for much of the time, consisted of a single consti (...)
- 6 A charismatic personality associated principally with a Sufi order who takes charge of the mürid [d (...)
4We now present in more detail the administrative department we have selected. In its political behaviour (vote, partisan structure), the administrative department of Diyarbakır5 is not representative of such an average, but on the other hand is unique in many other aspects. Diyarbakır belongs to a group of regional departments whose population is largely Kurdish, and who have a specific political orientation. A study of the administrative department of Diyarbakır will enable us to look beyond certain stereotypes, sometimes orientalist, concerning the workings of local politics. In particular, tribal and brotherhood associations are explicitly or implicitly the basis of many political analyses, including local actors, who advocate a strong link between these solidarities and political behaviour. If, in effect, about 20 deputies out of the 163 elected between 1920 and 2002 belonged to a family of şeyh6, we will see that, mainly after 1980, their involvement in politics evokes more complex mechanisms than the simple mobilisation of their followers. Moreover, apart from the administrative department of Hakkari for example, no deputy has built up his electoral support essentially from a clan or tribal type group.
- 7 By ‘Kurdist’ we mean a party explicitly mobilising the Kurdish identity through politics.
5The administrative department in fact is characterised by a growing politicisation – notably in the 1980s and 1990s, at a time when exactly the opposite was happening in the rest of Turkey. After 1980, the electoral results reflect the subtle differences as regards the national standard with the marginalisation of numerous national parties and the decisive grip of Kurdish parties7. The electoral volatility in Diyarbakır was less strong than in the rest of the country since the end of the 1980s, because the Kurdish movement was dominant with more than 45% of votes in 1995 and 1999, and 56% in 2002. As opposed to the rest of Turkey the elections of 2002 did not constitute a splits, la penetration of the AKP remained limited, and the extremely popular Genç Parti [Young Party], whose national level of penetration used to be a good indicator of political crisis, had a negligible result (Dorronsoro et al. 2003).
- 8 The DEHAP obtained only 22.2% of the vote in this district in 2002 as compared against an administr (...)
6Furthermore, the administrative department was not politically homogenous. The reasons for sub-departmental specificities are complex, and in part a consequence of the uprising in the 1920s and 1930s (Bruinessen 1999; Bozarslan 1997). Later on, the formation of radical Kurdish groups in the 1960s often occurred in the districts [ilçe] which were home to high school or institutions for higher education. Moreover, even if the dominant population of Kurds means that ethnic origin is not a deciding stake, the non-Kurdish population often have a specific political behaviour. The Turkish-speaking population present in the west of the administrative department (ilçe of Çermik), settling there from the 1960s as a result of dam construction, do not vote for Kurdist parties8, as is also the case for a significant number of members of the military, as well as civil servants with regional origins other than the south-east. The scenario is therefore very different to that in Urfa or Erzurum – administrative departments polarised by a religious or ethnic split. In the administrative department of Diyarbakır, the difference between speakers of zazaki and of kurmanji (two Kurdish dialects) do not constitute a framework for political mobilisation in recent times. A very large portion of the population being Chafeite Sunni, the religious split no longer plays a role.
7In choosing to consider the entire Republican period, we do not assume that there is similarity between elections from the single-party to the multiparty periods. On the other hand, the different institutional divides are of a key importance and provide the reason as to why the comparison between these four periods [1920-1946], [1950-1957], [1961-1977] and [1983-2002] is central to our examination into the autonomy of the political field. Only five deputies were elected in two different periods, demonstrating a renewal of practically the entire political personnel and likewise, the mobilised resources are noticeably different from one period to another. Whilst the name of a party such as the CHP can remain constant from one period to another, the political agenda and the organisational framework changes sufficiently for us to consider that the party is different. On the contrary, we suppose there is continuity in the Islamic (RF/FP) and Kurdish (DEP/HADEP/DEHAP) movements. We point out here that we do not consider the 1971 coup to be divisive. As opposed to the 1960 and 1980 coups, the 1971 coup did not result in as much of a visible split, possibly due to the fact that, allowing for exceptions, political parties were not prohibited.
8In order to analyse the resources employed in the political field during the election of deputies, we will undertake a four-stage process. Firstly, the different resources will be explained analytically, and we will see how their mobilisation makes re-election more or less likely. Secondly, by using social transformations taken from outside the political field (mechanisation of agriculture, urbanisation etc.), we will take into account the mobilisation, varying over time, of certain resources by those elected. These causal links have a genuine though incomplete explanatory value, which is why it is necessary to then turn towards explanations from within the political field. On one hand, the political parties play a central role in the transformation of non-political resources and in producing partisan resources. On the other hand, institutional splits – coups, the introduction of a multiparty system or the evolution of electoral laws – have a major impact on the resources enabling the election of deputies.
9The resources are valuable at two decisive moments in the political career of the future deputy: at the time the candidate is chosen by the party and during the mobilisation of voters (the same resource being effective principally towards the voters or the party, a point which we shall return to). We must however distinguish non-partisan resources from partisan resources. For Diyarbakır, four non-partisan resources were employed in politics: the influence arising through land ownership, religious charisma attributed to belonging to a şeyh family, the social capital linked with certain professions and the notoriety of an ‘aristocratic-like’ family [eşraf]. The support of a political party – through activism, a special relationship with the leader, etc. – makes up the final resource which can be mobilised, mainly for the purposes of nomination of candidates. We do not claim to give a complete picture of all the resources – for instance, we could add oratorical ability or financial capital. Instead we present only a selection of the most significant resources for this particular area (see the annexe on methodology). More generally, the resources can be combined and evolve over time, especially for politicians who have long careers (Lacam 1998). After first giving an analytical presentation of these resources, we will then investigate their combination and their transformation.
- 9 The 1970 general census is indicating that 29,3% of the population of Diyarbakır is literate.
10The practice of a rare and socially valued profession gives rise to the constitution of a social capital, which in turn can constitute a political resource. In our department, lawyers and doctors account for 35% of those elected following the introduction of a multiparty system in 1950 – out of 114 deputies 23 were lawyers (22%) and 17 doctors (13%) –, nevertheless only 20% (17 lawyers and 12 doctors) possess a social capital linked to their reputation (see the annexe on methodology). Between 1950 and 1977, 24 out of 61 deputies (39 %) were doctors or lawyers, a proportion, which clearly declined thereafter. Because they place individuals in a compromising situation, certain situations favour the self-referral to an expert – a form of delegation affecting sometimes very private matters. How does this particular social capital become a political resource? A central theme, present simultaneously for those in the professions as well as the profession of deputy, at least as far as defined by most citizens, is that of service [hizmet] – which facilitates the change to political representation. Furthermore, lawyers, through their professions, are drawn into representing prominent citizens, and significant groups, particularly against the State. The last point to be underlined is the prestige given to education in a society largely illiterate until the 1960s9.
Table 1: resources mobilised by the deputies for their election in the administrative department of Diyarbakır (1920-2002
|
|
No. of deputies
|
Re-elected leavers
|
Re-elected leavers (%)
|
Re-elected concurrently
|
Re-elected concurrently (%)
|
Family notoriety
|
Family notoriety (%)
|
Charisma
|
Charisma
(%)
|
Property
|
Property (%)
|
Partisan resource
|
Partisan resource (%)
|
Professional reputation
|
Professional reputation (%)
|
No. of non-political resources
|
No. of non-political resources (%)
|
|
1920
|
8
|
|
0.00
|
|
0.00
|
4
|
0.5
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
0.25
|
|
0.00
|
|
0.00
|
6
|
0.75
|
|
1923
|
5
|
2
|
0.40
|
2
|
0.40
|
5
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
0.80
|
|
0.00
|
|
0.00
|
9
|
1.80
|
|
1927
|
4
|
1
|
0.25
|
1
|
0.25
|
1
|
0.25
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0.25
|
|
0.00
|
|
0.00
|
2
|
0.50
|
|
1931
|
4
|
3
|
0.75
|
3
|
0.75
|
2
|
0.5
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0.25
|
|
0.00
|
|
0.00
|
3
|
0.75
|
|
1935
|
8
|
4
|
0.50
|
4
|
0.50
|
4
|
0.5
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
0.38
|
|
0.00
|
|
0.00
|
7
|
0.88
|
|
1939
|
7
|
4
|
0.57
|
4
|
0.57
|
4
|
0.571
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
0.29
|
|
0.00
|
|
0.00
|
6
|
0.86
|
|
1943
|
6
|
3
|
0.50
|
4
|
0.67
|
5
|
0.833
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
0.67
|
|
0.00
|
|
0.00
|
9
|
1.50
|
|
1946
|
7
|
2
|
0.29
|
3
|
0.43
|
7
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
0.71
|
|
0.00
|
|
0.00
|
12
|
1.71
|
|
1950
|
7
|
0
|
0.00
|
0
|
0.00
|
5
|
0.714
|
1
|
0.14
|
4
|
0.57
|
1
|
0.14
|
4
|
0.57
|
14
|
2.00
|
|
1954
|
8
|
2
|
0.25
|
3
|
0.38
|
4
|
0.5
|
1
|
0.13
|
5
|
0.63
|
6
|
0.75
|
3
|
0.38
|
13
|
1.63
|
|
1957
|
8
|
4
|
0.50
|
6
|
0.75
|
2
|
0.25
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0.13
|
6
|
0.75
|
3
|
0.38
|
6
|
0.75
|
|
1961
|
9
|
0
|
0.00
|
1
|
0.11
|
5
|
0.556
|
1
|
0.11
|
5
|
0.56
|
2
|
0.22
|
4
|
0.44
|
15
|
1.67
|
|
1965
|
8
|
2
|
0.25
|
3
|
0.38
|
5
|
0.625
|
1
|
0.13
|
4
|
0.50
|
4
|
0.50
|
4
|
0.50
|
14
|
1.75
|
|
1969
|
7
|
2
|
0.29
|
2
|
0.29
|
4
|
0.571
|
2
|
0.29
|
5
|
0.71
|
4
|
0.57
|
3
|
0.43
|
14
|
1.75
|
|
1973
|
7
|
2
|
0.29
|
3
|
0.43
|
3
|
0.429
|
2
|
0.29
|
5
|
0.71
|
5
|
0.71
|
2
|
0.29
|
12
|
1.71
|
|
1977
|
7
|
3
|
0.43
|
3
|
0.43
|
3
|
0.429
|
2
|
0.29
|
3
|
0.43
|
5
|
0.71
|
1
|
0.14
|
9
|
1.29
|
|
1983
|
7
|
0
|
0.00
|
0
|
0.00
|
2
|
0.286
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0.14
|
0
|
0.00
|
0
|
0.00
|
3
|
0.43
|
|
1987
|
8
|
0
|
0.00
|
1
|
0.13
|
2
|
0.25
|
1
|
0.13
|
2
|
0.25
|
5
|
0.63
|
1
|
0.13
|
6
|
0.75
|
|
1991
|
8
|
2
|
0.25
|
4
|
0.50
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0.13
|
1
|
0.13
|
8
|
1.00
|
1
|
0.13
|
3
|
0.38
|
|
1995
|
10
|
2
|
0.20
|
4
|
0.40
|
1
|
0.1
|
4
|
0.4
|
2
|
0.20
|
6
|
0.60
|
1
|
0.10
|
8
|
0.80
|
|
1999
|
11
|
6
|
0.55
|
7
|
0.64
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
0.45
|
1
|
0.09
|
10
|
0.91
|
1
|
0.09
|
7
|
0.64
|
|
2002
|
10
|
1
|
0.10
|
2
|
0.20
|
1
|
0.1
|
1
|
0.1
|
1
|
0.10
|
10
|
1.00
|
1
|
0.10
|
4
|
0.40
|
11In certain conditions property holdings can provide the basis for political influence. Under the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish administrative regions experienced a complex regime with districts [sancak] of differing status, which left an important autonomy to the exercise of local power (Bruinessen 1991; Akçay 1988: 10). After 1826 and the disappearance of the timar system, individual proprietorship of land became widespread and – although a law of 1858 in principal prohibited the ownership of villages – the landed gentry, the nomadic tribal leaders and the şeyh appropriated a large part of the land. The republican regime, far from providing a break with this system, would legalise land occupation (1926) and rejected all redistribution. Moreover, if the concentration of land led the military to banish 55 ağa [large landowners] from the Kurdish regions following the 1960 coup, and to call for agrarian reform, these landowners were ultimately permitted to return after 1961 and retain all their property (Mac Dowall 1996: 400).
- 10 Nevertheless, at a sub-departmental level, there are marked differences between the districts: larg (...)
12The administrative department of Diyarbakır represents the largest concentration large-scale property holdings in the Kurdish regions: 52 proprietors possess more than 500 hectares. In the 1960s, out of 663 villages in the Diyarbakır administrative department, 476 were dominated by small-holdings, 27 belonged to families and 31 to the sülâle [large families] (Akçay 1988: 13)10. The exploitation of land capital establishes economic circular flows, which are also the interplay of complex exchanges – notably bridging loans. The transformation of land capital into social influence is largely the product of a mobilisation process, which brings about a differentiation of the social role of the ağa from simple property ownership. As regards land ownership structures similar at the outset, practices can vary considerably, particularly in line with the presence or absenteeism of the proprietor. The tenant farmers and more widely, the people dependant on property holdings constitute an easily mobilised support for elections as can be seen from the numerous descriptions of the role of the ağa (Bozarslan 1966).
- 11 Descendants (in theory) of the Prophet through Hasan and Husayn, which gave rise to tax, legal and (...)
13The social capital linked to a family possessing the title of eşraf supports itself through specific practices of sociability, which we find in the sometimes romanticised descriptions in historical literature and autobiographical accounts11. Historically the eşraf are the upper middle class in the city of Diyarbakır, senior civil servants of the Ottoman Empire, generally large absentee landowners, possessing strong cultural capital (the best high schools in Istanbul, and foreign universities), diversifying of their own economic capital from the 1930s in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy (industry, banking, etc.). In certain cases, family history, for instance an opposition to the Kemalist regime, which can be seen through exile or a confiscation of land, represents trustworthiness – further capital for a populace who are for the most part distrustful of Ankara.
- 12 The leader of the 1925 Kurdish revolt (Bruinessen 1991).
14If no şeyh in the precise meaning of the term has been elected a deputy some deputies belong to a family which benefits from a hereditary charisma. The deputies connected by this hereditary charisma have an influential ability as regards those voters who are mürid [disciples] of the şeyh. For example, the Ensarioğlu family, descendants of the şeyh Said12, settled in Dicle, initially within the Zaza tribes. Ensarioğlu Kal Masa – who was the father of Abdülatif Ensarioğlu and the grandfather of Salim Ensarioğlu (both deputies) – had a reputation of holiness. This enabled his descendants to maintain an influence in the village of Yeşilsirt (Kal Musa), at Pekmezciler in the south of the Dicle district, as well as in the Kocaköy Merkez district, where şeyh Abdulrezzak (the son of Ensarioğlu Kal Masa) had lived for two years. The figures aptly show a specific electoral mobilisation. Thus, in a context nevertheless marked by the decline of the DYP (7.2% for the administrative department), the villages and the smaller market towns (as compared to the urban centres) of the Dicle district in 2002 give more than 33.3% of their votes to Abdülatif Ensarioğlu, a candidate of this party (DIE 2002: 8).
- 13 Hikmet Çetin, senior civil servant in economic planning and director of the CHP, then of the SHP. E (...)
- 14 Tarik Ziya Ekinci, doctor and a former activist of the CHP, established a TİP cell at Diyarbakır. M (...)
15The partisan resources are defined here in relation to the party, which we can pinpoint in the biographies by the length of membership to the party, the proximity to the leader, the presence of a deputy in the immediate family, the participation in associations close to politics – for example the MTTB (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği) anti-communist and very much right-wing, or the DDKD (Devrimci Demokratik Kültür Derneği) a melting pot of Kurdish nationalism, etc. Two typical cases are distinguished here. Some deputies have a strong educational capital, a place of residence outside the administrative department and support close to the directorate of the party, which fixes their local candidature, for instance Hikmet Çetin13. More rarely, others, build up a local activist base which enables them to impose their candidature on the party directorate, amongst the few examples the deputy of the TİP14.
16A given individual can of course draw upon some resources simultaneously. What exactly are the statistical links between them? If we consider the essentially hereditary resources (charisma, property, family notoriety), the most frequent link is between the mobilisation of property resources and family notoriety. Both resources overlap in part, which is logical since initially the biggest property holdings belonged to the bourgeoisie class, who were very integrated within the machinery of the State. Out of the 62 deputies mobilising property resources, 50 (80%) also mobilised family notoriety and out of the 69 possessing family notoriety 50 (74%) also owned property resources. In other respects, the mobilisation of a charismatic resource is linked to the mobilisation of property holdings (68%), but there is less connection with family notoriety (approximately a third).
Table 2 : combination of hereditary resources
|
family notoriety
|
property
|
charisma
|
combination of 3 resources
|
|
family notoriety
|
-
|
74%
|
11%
|
11%
|
|
property
|
80%
|
-
|
24%
|
12%
|
|
charisma
|
36%
|
68%
|
-
|
36%
|
Note: the first line of the table reads as follows: out of the deputies enjoying family notoriety, 21% do not have another resource, 74% also have a property resource, 11% combine family notoriety and charismatic resources. 11% combine the three resources.
17The deputies mobilising a professional reputation (lawyers and doctors) combine different resources over different time periods. Between 1950 and 1969, out of 21 deputies mobilising their professional reputation, 15 also have a hereditary resource. After 1969, only 2 out of the 8 deputies mobilising a professional reputation also mobilise a hereditary resource. We therefore have the emergence of a new generation, which does not combine as many resources. Out of 33 deputies mobilising partisan resources, between 1950 and 1977, 14 did not possess a hereditary resource. After 1980, out of 39 deputies with partisan resources, 25 did not have a hereditary resource. As before, we observe a lesser association with other resources.
18More generally, we note a decrease in the average number of non-partisan resources per deputy in the long run (see table 1). Furthermore, the partisan resources become progressively dominant and are not associated with others, whilst the principally hereditary resources accumulate almost systematically, giving rise to circular flows for the transformation of resources. We may consider there to be a movement of political autonomy over several decades, as the non-partisan resources carry less influence. Similarly, between 1983 and 2002, out of 40 elected representatives, 18 had been nominated by the party central management and were without a local presence. If we make the comparison between the different periods, we observe that there is an increasing influence from the centre on the selection of candidates. As a consequence, we may speak of a nationalisation of local politics.
19It would be incorrect to consider resources as stock – the biographical career paths being on the contrary other hand able to be interpreted as a transformation of resources. Put differently, the initial resources, mobilised at the time of the first election evolve, which evokes a strictly strategic dimension in the behaviour of the deputies. A long career enables a diversification of resources, a cultivation of partisan and even economic resources in certain cases.
20We have not noted the change of activity, which can be attributed to being a deputy, but in certain cases a personal enrichment is very likely, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, being a deputy is the opportunity to start a new career in Istanbul or in Ankara, out of the networks constituted at the time of election. A proportion of the deputies seem to move into new areas of employment, mainly in Ankara or in Istanbul, for instance by opening a law firm or in working in the town council, a vakıf etc.
21Having described the mobilisation of certain resources, it is necessary to enquire into their effectiveness. We receive an indication from the fact that very few of the candidates do not mobilise any of the described resources (see the methodological annexe). The mobilised resources are more significant in certain social contexts, which is confirmed by the results (infra §39). Furthermore, some resources facilitate not only the entry, but also the continuance of political life. If we take the period of 1961-1977, we note for instance that a deputy having a charismatic resource can expect 2.6 mandates as compared with 1.3 mandates in the absence of resources (see table 3). Furthermore, we note that these figures fluctuates over time, thus a deputy with property resources achieves an average of 2.2 mandates during the single party period, 1.4 between 1950 and 1957, then 1.8 between 1961 and 1977.
22Table 3: re-elections and resources of deputies
- 15 Out of 163 deputies since 1920, 73 had only a single mandate, 20 had two, 8 had three and 4 had fou (...)
|
1920-46
|
1950-57
|
1961-77
|
1980-2002
|
|
charisma
|
-
|
2 (only one case)
|
2.6
|
2
|
|
property
|
2.2
|
1.4
|
1.8
|
1.6
|
|
family notoriety
|
2.2
|
1.3
|
1.5
|
1.2
|
|
political resources
|
-
|
1.4
|
1.5
|
1.5
|
|
professional reputation
|
-
|
1.3
|
1.4
|
1.6
|
|
average number of mandates for the deputies of the administrative department15
|
1.8
|
1.4
|
1.4
|
1.3
|
23Socio-economic progression, notably urbanisation and the mechanisation of agriculture, have an important impact on the value of non-partisan resources.
24Doctors and lawyers were rare in the administrative department of Diyarbakır before the 1970s, and were therefore in a prominent position. Their subsequent multiplication made this automatic position of notability disappear, above all in a city like Diyarbakır with a million inhabitants at the end of the century. The deputies-doctors practically disappeared after 1980 with only a single case where there are significant effects of patronage. On the other hand, the deputies-lawyers remain strongly present. Professional reputation, from then on marginal, does not provide any greater explanation, though the specific socialisation of this medium does. In effect, legal practice was a place for politicisation from the 1960s. For example, a very large proportion of CHP candidates and cadres were lawyers in this period. In the 1970s CHP and the 1990s Kurdist parties, lawyers represented an important proportion of managers. Those entitled to practice law in Diyarbakır have a strong tradition of investing in left-wing and Kurdist parties, as do many professional associations which play a role in social mobilisation (Bora 2000; Dorronsoro 2005). According to various interviews which we carried out between 2002 and 2005 with Kurdist activist students at the beginning of the 1990s, the choice of the profession of lawyer would have been partly motivated by this political engagement.
Graph 1: percentage of deputies mobilising the resource ‘professional reputation’ (1950-2002)
25Progressive urbanisation considerably changes the political game by lessening the relative weight of the country people in the elections. Additionally, the socio-economic transformations brought about by the mechanisation of agriculture results in a growing cost of transforming a property holding into political influence. The agricultural mechanisation occurs is on an increasing scale from 1950, when numbers of tractors are imported following the Marshall plan. In 1948, in Turkey, we count 1,750 tractors, their number exceeding 10,000 in 1951 and 40,000 in 1954, which has the effect of accelerating the concentration of land. This evolution is particularly strong in the south-east, where the small farmers saw themselves compelled into renting tractors in return for a portion of the harvest, and indeed even into sell their land and become agricultural labourers. At the beginning of the 1960s, unemployment was very strong in the winter months: 80% in January as compared with 10% in July, and these seasonal variations increasingly affected a population of proletariat agricultural workers (Mac Dowall 1996: 399; Bozarslan 1966). In Diyarbakır, the tenant farmers were turned into labourers looking after the livestock and taking part in seasonal work. These workers coexisted alongside the capitalist farmers in the same villages.
26The mechanisation and the concentration of the land in the 1960s therefore made the traditional circular flows disappear (Anderson 1978). That said, certain ağa maintained employment for the tenant farmers accepting the additional economic cost, in order to avoid direct confrontation with them or to preserve political influence. In a study, Akçay shows how, in the village of Sinan (between Bismil and Batman), the landowner adopted a strictly capitalist approach which alienated him from the local populace (and prohibited him from all politically significant roles) (Akçay 1998). Conversely, at Silvan, a large landowner introduced paternalist vote-catching which represented a considerable financial investment.
27Although eşraf and ağa often go hand in hand, we note a different evolution for each of them. If some eşraf no longer had large property holdings, their disappearance allowed for the intervention of mechanisms other than the loss of rural supporters. In actual fact, we observe the abandonment of the eşraf from the 1960s and these have almost completely disappeared today. The diversification of capital is a general phenomenon which is found from the instant when capital invested in land has a less substantial return and as the opportunity to invest in industry and services increases. In the south-east, savings do not finance local investment, but benefit the most developed regions of the west (Diken 2000), moreover there had not been a State policy of significant redistribution in favour of the region. Thus, the bourgeoisie profit from governmental non-interest bearing loans in order to invest in industry or services, outside of their region of origin. The displacement of the economical interests of these families leads to the displacement of their places of residence into the big cities such as Ankara and Istanbul, and this accelerated after 1980 when security deteriorated.
Graph 2 : percentage of deputies mobilising the resources ‘property’ and ‘family notoriety’ (1920-2002)
- 16 Grandson of the şeyh Said, elected without having campaigned at Hınıs in the 1950s from a list of D (...)
28The weakening of the Sufi networks is particularly clear in urban areas, where however there is a proliferation of practices orientated towards healing. The active şeyh in the administrative department have less and less of the mürid and, in the towns, the zikr [mystic reunions] concerning, above all the newcomers to the village. Furthermore, the medrese ([Islamic schools] illegal after their closure in the 1920s) as opposed to the imam-hatip schools no longer have any pupils. Against this backdrop, hereditary and family religious charisma is a declining source of mobilisation as is in fact shown, for example, when certain villages which traditionally voted a deputy from a şeyh family, vote for Kurdish candidates from the mid-1990s. Let us take the example of an independent application to stand of Abdülmelik Fırat16, in 2002 at Diyarbakır. He was elected in the 1950s from a list of DP candidates at Hınıs without having to campaign. In 2002, he put himself forward employing the sole means of his charisma, since his party is an organisation lacking in financial means. He suffers a serious setback, confirming the difficulty to mobilise on the basis of his only charismatic resources. Despite the presence of şeyh, at the administrative department’s level, the votes for the DYP are lower than the national average. These residual supporters cannot win an election at the departmental level.
- 17 İzzetin Yıldırım, the founder of the movement, born in 1946 at Ağrı, had established the Med Zehra (...)
29On the contrary, the Nurcu movements, moreover ideologically variably orientated, were very much developed. That of the Fettulahcı brought together several thousand people in the administrative department, above all in the central district (Merkez). The Yeni Asya followers, mainly established in the town of Diyarbakır, similarly united several thousand people. Lastly, the Med Zehra movement emerges in the 1980s. As opposed to the two former movements, it is linked to the medrese – the traditional place for the dissemination of Kurdish culture – and ideologically close to the Kurdish parties17.
- 18 A deputy can for example intervene in order to obtain a favourable price for a cemaat which buys la (...)
30The şeyh themselves seldom have an open political position, whilst the religious societies [cemaat] have coherent political position-taking at a national level and their instructions are reputed to have real influence on results. In general, Med Zehra supports the Kurdish parties, Yeni Asya the DYP and the Fettulahcı the RF/FP/AKP. The mobilisation occurs mainly during their meetings (with a large audience), where the leader of the cemaat announces his vote. The negotiations between cemaat and political parties takes places largely at a national level18. The graph bears testament to the absence of a relationship between the transformation of religious practices mentioned above and the growing presence of this resource amongst the deputies in the 1980s and 1990s.
Graph 3 : percentage of deputies mobilising a charismatic resource
31These socio-economic changes account for certain evolutions such as the presence of resources associated with professional notoriety and family reputation or with property resources. However in some cases, there exists a significant temporal discrepancy: property resources are heavily represented in the 1960s and 1970s, while they are already in decline. Nevertheless, this presence can be justified by the establishment of a partisan capital for those who have been elected. Landowners do not return to the political field until after 1980 possibly because of insufficient resources or because the parties have changed.
32However, why does the decline in brotherhood practices not result in a decrease in the presence of this resource, virtually non-existent before 1980 and much more represented thereon? More generally, why does this decline occur intermittently in relation to the socio-economic evolutions? This leads us now to consider the internal processes in the political spectrum.
33We will firstly discuss whether candidates are able to join and leave parties easily. Secondly, we will consider the links between the parties and their resources.
- 19 Note that in 1977, out of the 11 independent elected representatives of Parliament, 8 are Kurdish. (...)
34To demonstrate the central role of parties, we will successively tackle the questions of independent elected representatives and of the change in parties. Votes for independent candidates are difficult to decipher for each candidate, as only global figures are generally available for analysis. There have only been two independent elected representatives: one in 1969 and another in 1977. These two deputies concurrently hold all hereditary resources, allowing them to mobilise enough voters. However, more than a chosen strategy, their independence is the result of the failure in negotiations with a party. Once elected, they rejoin a party19.
35Concerning the changes of parties, we are excluding from our analysis forced changes resulting from dissolution or prohibition of a party - for example, when a deputy passes from the DP to the YTP, or from the YTP to the CHP. In all other cases, we have only been able to locate six changes of parties, small in comparison with the number of deputies and national tendencies (Turan in this special issue). Moreover it seems that deputies do not change party during the course of their mandate. Segregation is almost total between the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ (including Islamic parties). The change of parties takes place in an ideological compatible setting, for example between the ANAP and the RP/FP. The global image is that of an ideological, structured world, where parties hold a key role.
36Parties are not neutral operators, they change their resources to suit their preferences. Several considerations intervene here, varying according to the party concerned: the choice of candidates, relations with the leader, involvement in militant networks, ideological similarities, reputation of the candidate, financial contribution for the campaign etc. A party is not a machine with a view to maximise the number of voters, but an organisation with several aims and practicalities. For example in 1969, İnönü, leader of the CHP party, puts forward a list of candidates all foreign to the administrative department, in an ideological perspective of exchange, even if this results in a total (and probably expected) failure in the elections. We will now analyse, for each time period, the distribution of resources between the parties.
37In the period of one party (1920-1946), the appointment is made by Ankara, without consideration of electoral competition, but not necessarily without consideration of the capacity of the deputies to be the interface of government action. Two types of ideal can be distinguished from this period: on the one hand the eşraf and, on the other hand, those without local ties, chosen for their integration into the State. The variety of resources during this period can be explained by evolutions in government policy. In the first two terms of office, the centre chooses prominent citizens very well set up. These citizens vanish after the revolt of şeyh Said, when the government chooses representatives to support the policy of the administration. Therefore, in 1927 and in 1931, all deputies are senior civil servants who are not based in Diyarbakır. Progressively, these senior citizens return in force, this tendency is accelerated by the return to a multiparty system. In 1946, the seven deputies are eşraf or close to them. We are in a triangular system consisting of property resources, the upper echelons of the administration and the CHP (Arslan 1992: 56 sq.).
38In the period of a multiparty system, certain parties favour political resources (DP, AKP, Kurdist parties, TİP in 1965). In particular, we witness the transformation of the DP, the dominant party between 1950 and 1957. This party begins by recruiting the eşraf, originating from families in exile in the 1930s, who were generally opposed to the republican government. Progressively, the DP puts forward those candidates with partisan resources (activism, exteriority in relation to the province), while the number of landowners decreases (see table 1).
- 20 In this way, in the elections of 1969, the CHP gains 43% of votes in the cities, compared with 13% (...)
39Between 1961 and 1977, the political field being more complex, we will consider only the more important parties (AP, YTP, CHP) and three resources: property resources, professional reputation and political resources. Property resources are split between the AP and the YTP. Professional reputation is vital to the CHP and the YTP. The YTP has both of these resources, while the AP and the CHP seems to clearly oppose it. This seems to be consistent with the electoral results of the parties, the CHP doing the best in the cities, the AP in villages and market towns, the YTP being in a median position20. Partisan resources become more common during the course of time because of re-elections and the appearance of parties with a strong activist structure like the TİP (communist) or the MSP (Islamic).
Table 4: resources by term of office and by party (1961-77)
|
1961
|
Number of deputies
|
Property resources
|
Political resources
|
Professional reputation
|
|
AP
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
|
CHP
|
3
|
2
|
0
|
1
|
|
YTP
|
3
|
3
|
1
|
3
|
|
1965
|
Number of deputies
|
Property resources
|
Political resources
|
Professional reputation
|
|
AP
|
2
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
|
CHP
|
2
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
|
YTP
|
2
|
2
|
2
|
3
|
|
1968-69
|
Number of deputies
|
Property resources
|
Political resources
|
Professional reputation
|
|
AP
|
5
|
3
|
2
|
1
|
|
CHP
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
|
YTP
|
2
|
1
|
2
|
2
|
|
1973
|
Number of deputies
|
Property resources
|
Political resources
|
Professional reputation
|
|
AP
|
2
|
2
|
1
|
0
|
|
CHP
|
3
|
1
|
3
|
2
|
|
1977
|
Number of deputies
|
Property resources
|
Political resources
|
Professional reputation
|
|
AP
|
2
|
2
|
2
|
0
|
|
CHP
|
3
|
0
|
2
|
1
|
Table 5: resources by party and by legislature (1961-77)
|
AP
|
No. deputies
|
Property
|
Property (%)
|
Pol. resources
|
Pol. resources (%)
|
Prof. reputation
|
Prof.reputation (%)
|
|
1961
|
1
|
0
|
0%
|
1
|
100%
|
0
|
0%
|
|
1965
|
2
|
1
|
50%
|
0
|
0%
|
1
|
50%
|
|
1969
|
5
|
3
|
60%
|
2
|
40%
|
1
|
20%
|
|
1973
|
2
|
2
|
100%
|
1
|
50%
|
0
|
0%
|
|
1977
|
2
|
2
|
100%
|
2
|
100%
|
0
|
0%
|
|
CHP
|
No. deputies
|
Property
|
Property (%)
|
Pol. resources
|
Pol. resources (%)
|
Prof. reputation
|
Prof.reputation (%)
|
|
1961
|
3
|
2
|
67%
|
0
|
0%
|
1
|
33%
|
|
1965
|
2
|
1
|
50%
|
1
|
50%
|
2
|
100%
|
|
1969
|
2
|
0
|
0%
|
0
|
0%
|
2
|
100%
|
|
1973
|
3
|
1
|
33%
|
3
|
100%
|
2
|
67%
|
|
1977
|
3
|
0
|
0%
|
2
|
67%
|
1
|
33%
|
|
YTP
|
No. deputies
|
Property
|
Property (%)
|
Pol. resources
|
Pol. resources (%)
|
Prof. reputation
|
Prof.reputation (%)
|
|
1961
|
3
|
3
|
100%
|
1
|
33%
|
3
|
100%
|
|
1965
|
2
|
2
|
100%
|
2
|
100%
|
3
|
0%
|
|
1969
|
2
|
1
|
50%
|
2
|
100%
|
2
|
0%
|
Note: the percentages turn on very reduced figures, variations of which are therefore only slightly significant.
40Post 1980, the main resources are partisan, charisma and property. The parties concerned here are the ANAP, the CHP, the RP/FP, the SHP and the AKP. Property resources, much in decline, are present essentially within the ANAP and the DYP. Political resources are very present in the RP/FP, the SHP and in the AKP, which nominates activists unknown to the public. Political resources in other parties are linked with re-elections.
41Charismatic resources are more interesting. The candidates split themselves between the ANAP, the DYP and the RP/FP. In the 1980s and 1990s, we note a veritable competition between the parties of the centre-right and the Islamic parties for resources linked to religion (for example the qualities of belonging to a charismatic family, being müftü, or an imam-hatip schooling background). However, the principally rural bases of these means that their selection is not very favourable for the party in the medium term given the context of very rapid urbanisation. In other words, the changing in the partisan offer at a national level explains the growing presence of this resource, more than would an analysis based on the continuance of religious supporters. This is confirmed in the case of the ANAP and the DYP, by the fact that these parties do not achieve results above their national average in the administrative department and, more importantly, there is no striking stability of the electorate.
Table 6 : resources by terms of office and by party (1987-2002)
|
1987
|
Number of Deputies
|
Property resources
|
Political resources
|
Charismatic resources
|
|
ANAP
|
3
|
1
|
3
|
0
|
|
DYP
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
|
SHP
|
4
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
|
1991
|
|
Property resources
|
Political resources
|
Charismatic resources
|
|
ANAP
|
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|
DYP
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
|
SHP
|
7
|
0
|
7
|
0
|
|
1995
|
|
Property resources
|
Political resources
|
Charismatic resources
|
|
ANAP
|
3
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
|
DYP
|
2
|
0
|
2
|
1
|
|
RP/FP
|
5
|
0
|
3
|
2
|
|
1999
|
|
Property resources
|
Political resources
|
Charismatic resources
|
|
ANAP
|
2
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
|
DYP
|
4
|
0
|
3
|
1
|
|
RP/FP
|
4
|
0
|
4
|
2
|
|
2002
|
|
Property resources
|
Political resources
|
Charismatic resources
|
|
AKP
|
8
|
0
|
8
|
1
|
|
CHP
|
2
|
1
|
2
|
0
|
Table 7: resources by party and by legislature (1987-2002)
|
ANAP
|
No. Deputies
|
Property resources
|
Property resources %
|
Political
|
Political %
|
Charismatic
|
Charismatic %
|
|
1987
|
3
|
1
|
33%
|
3
|
100%
|
0
|
0%
|
|
1991
|
0
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
|
1995
|
3
|
0
|
0%
|
1
|
33%
|
1
|
33%
|
|
1999
|
2
|
0
|
0%
|
2
|
100%
|
2
|
100%
|
|
2002
|
0
|
0
|
!
|
0
|
|
0
|
!
|
|
DYP
|
No. Deputies
|
Land
|
Land %
|
Political
|
Political %
|
Charismatic
|
Charismatic %
|
|
1987
|
1
|
1
|
100%
|
1
|
100%
|
1
|
100%
|
|
1991
|
1
|
1
|
100%
|
1
|
100%
|
1
|
100%
|
|
1995
|
2
|
0
|
0%
|
2
|
100%
|
1
|
50%
|
|
1999
|
4
|
0
|
0%
|
3
|
75%
|
1
|
25%
|
|
2002
|
0
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
0
|
|
|
SHP
|
No. Deputies
|
Land
|
Land %
|
Political
|
Political %
|
Charismatic
|
Charismatic %
|
|
1987
|
4
|
0
|
0%
|
1
|
25%
|
0
|
0%
|
|
1991
|
7
|
0
|
0%
|
7
|
100%
|
0
|
0%
|
|
RP/FP
|
No. Deputies
|
Land
|
Land %
|
Political
|
Political %
|
Charismatic
|
Charismatic %
|
|
1995
|
5
|
0
|
0%
|
3
|
60%
|
2
|
40%
|
|
1999
|
4
|
0
|
0%
|
4
|
100%
|
2
|
50%
|
|
AKP
|
No. Deputies
|
Land
|
Land %
|
Political
|
Political %
|
Charismatic
|
Charismatic %
|
|
2002
|
8
|
0
|
0%
|
8
|
100%
|
1
|
13%
|
- 21 A party which does not obtain 10% at national level is not represented in Parliament.
42The institutional regulations are not neutral; they have structural effects, often complex and unexpected. In this way, the threshold of 10%21 does not discourage voters to vote for parties whom they know, however, will not be represented in Parliament. If we attempt to extend the institutional rules to include certain informal practices, the impact on resources can be seen.
- 22 Those concerned put their demands [dilekçe] to the government and finally the cards were reinstated (...)
43The attitude of institution is one specificity of this administrative department, though this engenders a discussion of the whole of South-Eastern Turkey. The administration at Diyarbakır has always been political, perhaps more than elsewhere. For a number of years, the administrative department has been subject to ‘states of exception’ (a state of emergency or military rule) until the 1940s and also from 1980 until 2002. During these periods, judicial regulations were suspended, the organising of meetings prohibited etc. After 1980, the conditions of political activity differ from the rest of the country, notably due to political violence. The assassination of certain candidates at the elections, and the pressure exerted on voters by the government took place principally between 1983 and 1999. The police force and the deputy prefects [kaymakam] are put to the voters – principally in the rural areas – to forbid them to vote for Kurdist candidates, but without giving instructions to vote for one party in particular. The removal of the social security card [yeşil kart], the end of agricultural subsidies, the absence of works on infrastructure, and electrification were the key threats made by the official representatives. In the district of Çinar for example, the deputy prefect confiscated many hundreds of social security cards after the elections of 1995 in the area of Eski Mahalle, as inhabitants there voted almost unanimously for the HADEP22.
44Two resources are particularly prone to illegitimacy: political resources linked to a Kurdish militant agreement or those linked to religious charisma. Political parties belonging to the Kurdist and Islamic fronts were wound up even if the group reformed under another name. In the case of the Islamic movement, the prohibition of Fazilet party provoked a split in the Islamic front and finally the marginalisation of its most radical wing.
45Following the coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980, many deputies were isolated from political life. Before 1960, six deputies were imprisoned and the deputy of the TİP elected in 1965 was subject to constant pressure. The deputies of the SHP were imprisoned after the elections of 1991 accused of separatism for having spoken Kurdish during the pledging of oaths. Moreover, three applications to stand for election were rejected after 1980 by a decision of the High-Electoral Commission [Yüksek Seçim Kurulu]. The ANAP application of a former judge was refused in 1983, accused also of Kurdish separatism. The application of a civil servant, accused of being a reactionary [irtica], was invalidated in 1983. Finally, a Kurdist activist was prohibited from the 2002 election for having participated in the HADEP before its closure.
46Moreover, the disappearance of religious charisma after the coups of 1960 and 1980 shows the illegitimacy of these resources for certain State institutions, which apply pressure directly or indirectly on the parties. This also explains the absence of all candidates belonging to a charismatic family before the introduction of a multiparty system. We see again the effects of the revolts of 1920 and 1930, where the şeyh played a central role, notably in the revolt of şeyh Said in 1925.
47The effect of splits in the partisan system – the introduction of a multiparty system and coups – is observable notably in the renewal of personal policy (elected representatives and candidates) and the resources at their disposal. The capacity of the institutions to regularly reformat the political system is unrivalled in other competing systems. In this way, in the history of republican Turkey, 1950 saw the introduction of the multiparty system, 1960 saw the prohibition of the DP and 1980 the prohibition of all parties. 1971 did not lead to a significant modification of the partisan offer, but the effects were important in the long-term, notably with the prohibition of the TİP allowing the formation of Kurdist nationalist movements.
Graphic 4 : sitting re-elected representatives and cumulative re-elective representatives (1920-2002)
48A clear relationship between re-election rates and the stabilisation of the partisan system can be established. In general, the rate of renewal is around 50% past the effect of reorganisation. The rate of re-election casts doubt on this approach, but the curve remains sensitively identical. The elections of 1983 fall outside the norm because the offer is extremely controlled by the military, meaning it is difficult to analyse from the point of view of resources.
49The other important point concerns the variety of resources. A significant negative correlation between the eşraf resource and the rate of re-election can be seen (-1, -0.49, - 0.93 according to the periods) and also between the number of ağa and the rate of re-election (-0.81, -0.85, -0.95). In more simpler terms, at the point of a split, as the rate of re-election drastically falls, we can note a significant increase in certain non-partisan resources. On the contrary however, hereditary resources decrease in line with re-elections. Furthermore, there exists a positive correlation between political capital and re-election (0.87, 0.93, 0.68) which is not solely explained by the fact that the re-elected representatives by definition possess political capital at the second election. Even if the coup of 1971 was not considered a split, we note a slow decrease in the number of re-elected representatives after the coup of 1971 (Graphic 4) and a high percentage of property-holdings resources (Graphic 6), corresponding to the general view.
Table 8 : relationship between resources and re-election
|
Correlation coefficients between those re-elected and resources (Pearson)
|
Family notoriety
|
Charisma
|
Property
|
Political resources
|
Professional reputation
|
Mean number of resources
|
|
Total period
|
0,00
|
-0.03
|
-0.10
|
0.70
|
-0.09
|
-0.08
|
|
1920-1946
|
0.03
|
|
-0.1
|
|
|
-0.42
|
|
1950-1957
|
-1.00
|
-0.92
|
-0.81
|
0.87
|
-0.87
|
-0.97
|
|
1961-1977
|
-0.49
|
0.60
|
-0.85
|
0.93
|
-0.57
|
-0.32
|
|
1983-2002
|
-0.93
|
0.79
|
-0.95
|
0.68
|
0.50
|
0.15
|
|
Correlation coefficient between eşraf and political resource from 1950 to 1977
|
|
|
|
-0.76
|
|
|
Note: the correlations of Table 8 are calculated from the series stated in Table 1.
50How can we justify these correlations? A split seems to disorganise parties and devalue their political resources, which in doing so, enables at least the selection of one candidate from a party. New parties do not have candidates from within the party machinery at their disposal, and are therefore more open to local recruitment strategies with candidates benefiting from resources mobilising the voters directly. In periods of stability, parties tend to create partisan resources. The transformation of non-partisan resources becomes more difficult. The political field becomes more autonomous from the point of view of resources when the political system is institutionally stable. Re-elections therefore increase, personal policy becomes professionalized and certain parties put activists forward as candidates. Furthermore, hereditary resources tend to decrease.
Graphic 5: percentage of elected representatives elected several times and mobilising a political resource.
Graphic 6: Cumulative elected representatives and property resources
51The balloting method is the second institutional aspect modifying the resources of the deputies. The rules have frequently changed since 1950 (Massicard 2002), but there is difficulty in measuring their effect. The distribution of the remains at a national level has perhaps favoured a penetration of central State machinery in the nomination of candidates, but the changing system in the 1980s has not led to an opposing movement of re-localisation. Furthermore, the changing relations between deputies and voters cannot be discussed in simple terms using the material at our disposal, (see Yasushi in this number). Moreover, in 1987 and 1991, the administrative department was split into two constituencies with two lists of candidates. It has been difficult for us to isolate the particular influence of this change because of its short length (two terms of office) in a period of radical restructuring of politics after the great split of 1980.
52More precisely, the threshold of 10% in place since 1987 has an extremely strong effect in this administrative department. The block renders it necessary to make a radical distinction between the capacity of candidates to mobilise the voters and the election. In effect, since the emergence of a Kurdish party, fifty per cent of voters are essentially eliminated without the voters appearing to be aware of the matter of a useful vote. The consequences of the block were particularly remarkable in the elections of 2002. The AKP wins 8 seats out of 10 with 16% of the vote and 2 deputies go to the CHP (with 5.6% of the vote). In total, the only parties represented make up 21.6% of the vote. A progressive decrease in the number of voters represented in Parliament can therefore be established. Furthermore, this fact does not bode well with a political vision, which principally would be an exchange of services at an individual level where the deputy has a privileged status (Massicard in this volume).
Table 9: useful votes (1983-2002)
|
Population in billions
|
Voters and % of the population
|
Valid votes and rate of participation
|
Useful votes (parties and % of the vote)
|
|
1983
|
860
|
239 802 (27.9%)
|
198 232 (82.7%)
|
ANAP HP MDP
32.7+42+25.3=100
|
|
1987
|
986
|
342 646 (34.8%)
|
311 979 (91%)
|
ANAP, DYP, SHP
22.9+13.3+25.5= 61.7
|
|
1991
|
1 113
|
406 477 (36.5%)
|
315 964 (77.7%)
|
DYP, SHP,
20+49.9= 69.9
|
|
1995
|
1219
|
449 962 (36.9%)
|
342 820 (76.2%)
|
ANAP, DYP, RP
13.8+10.6 + 18.8= 43.2
|
|
1999
|
1327
|
546 772 (41.2%)
|
434 201 (79.4%)
|
ANAP, DYP, FP, DSP
11.1+11.3+14.6+5= 42
|
|
2002
|
1 407
|
615 103 (43.7%)
|
437 595 (71.1%)
|
AKP CHP
16+5.9 = 21.9 %
|
53Without the block, would the deputies who would have been elected have had the same resources? To provide an answer to this question, we will consider the elections of 1999 and 2002 using the profiles of the candidates. In Table 10, we have indicated in brackets the figures without taking into account the block of 10% (with a voting method necessitating a majority in a voting round for example). We put forward the hypothesis that the result of the Kurdist parties would not be lower had there been a conception of a useful vote.
- 23 We have indicated in brackets the results without taking the block into account with the same resul (...)
Table 10: variety of resources according to the block of 10%23
|
Year
|
Number of Deputies
|
Family notoriety
|
Charisma
|
Property
|
Political resources
|
Professional notoriety
|
|
1995
|
10
|
1 (0)
|
4 (0)
|
2 (0)
|
6 (10)
|
1 (0)
|
|
1999
|
11
|
0 (0)
|
5 (0)
|
1 (0)
|
10 (10)
|
1 (0)
|
|
2002
|
10
|
0 (0)
|
1 (0)
|
1 (0)
|
10 (10)
|
2 (0)
|
Note: the figures in brackets indicate the resources without the block.
54Without the block, the deputies elected would be deprived of all resources apart from those relating to the party. Moreover, in the elections of 2002, the resources of the deputies would have been largely the same, because of the domination of the AKP, which essentially recruits candidates outside the administrative department on the basis of a former relationship with the Islamist movement.
55Several conclusions can be drawn from these analyses. Firstly, resources have a local value. In this sense, ethnicity is here redundant though a key resource in the administrative department of Mardin or Erzurum. From this, how can we articulate the question of resources at a national level? A comparative strategy between several administrative departments can be considered in order to analyse typical profiles of the administrative department according to the resources mobilised for the elections.
56Secondly, the evolution of resources can be explained by mechanisms partly outside the political field (mechanization, urbanisation), and in part inside (institutional regulations, partisan capital). Splits have the effect of decreasing the boundaries of the field and the value of non-partisan resources in the period immediately after the splits. Periods of political tension are those where the autonomy of the political spectrum is the strongest when considering political resources (end of the 1950s and 1970s), while those periods after the splits exist where the political field is the least autonomous.
57Thirdly, partisan resources are progressively to the detriment of others. In this administrative department at least, the mobilisation of voters is a matter of partisan State machinery and no longer of local notoriety. The growing importance of re-elections in cases of stabilisation of the partisan system indicates a logic of specialisation leading to the autonomisation of the political field.
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