1Every time I am in China, I am surprised by the ubiquitous instructional posters, signs, plates and announcements in public space. They tell me how to behave, how to take the elevator, the metro, the bus, to respect the traffic lights, to be quiet in the library, to greet and say “thank you” in social interactions. Most of these rules make sense. However, sometimes I feel like a child who is constantly being reprimanded by its parents. Moreover, there is a technological update: new programmes such as the “social credit system” are being launched experimentally in several cities. A growing number of security cameras, combined with facial recognition software, are connected with smartphone apps, big data and governmental dossiers. The intent once again is to guide and to control social interactions in public. While Western scholars and political activists are sceptical and even predict an Orwellian future (Human Rights Watch 2020; Ohlberg et al. 2017), Chinese state actors emphasise that such steps will create a better —more honest— society and a “Civilised City” (Zhongyang_a 2012). However, while the technology may all be new, the rationale which specifies its eventual usage is not.
2In this paper, I want to trace the idea of wenming (文明) —of civilised behaviour and a civilised society— through (public) space and time. I will show that the concept is a recurring theme in the relationship between the state and urban public space in China. Historical research has already elucidated the influence of wenming on urban governments and their development plans in republican China (i.e., Stapleton 2000; Tsin 1999). But 1949 —the year the communists took power— still appears as a watershed and a break with the past. Existing studies on state actors’ contemporary usage of wenming either focus on the contemporary “civilised city campaign” without looking much at the historical roots (Cartier 2016), or they concentrate on discourse and rhetoric, and ignore the practical enforcement in everyday life (Anagnost 1997; Boutonnet 2011; Dynon 2008). Meanwhile, the debate on urban public space in China is still in its infancy and takes a rather apolitical stand, with the new architecture, commercialised functions, and the freedom of leisure time since the 1990s as their main topics (i.e., Miao 2001; Hassenpflug 2005; Qian 2013). This paper draws on this valuable research, but also intends to fill some of the gaps.
- 1 See for example Dalian, Xi’an, Guangzhou, Taiyuan, Fuzhou, Guiyang etc. (Flock 2021: chapter 6.2; D (...)
3Public space in a city is often seen as the core of urban belonging. Ideally, it is the common resource, means of urban communication, of social and political participation (Carr 1992; Low 2006). However, the concept was developed from Western experiences with market economies and civil societies. Does it apply to socialist states or authoritarian countries such as China? During the first decades of the People’s Republic, urban public space mainly served as the party’s stage to choreograph the support of the masses. Considering that Beijing’s Tiananmen square was copied in many Chinese cities,1 one could argue that local governments aimed for “the representation of power […] in front of the people” (Habermas 1990: 6) and not for a citizens’ forum.
4However, when the reform and opening policies of 1978 reduced the quotidian political pressure, it was possible for the individual to develop a private and public life. According to Hans-Paul Bahrdt, both realms are always connected and require each other. Only when the individual may hide personal information, and only through a certain degree of anonymity can freedom, tolerance and diversity of urban life come to the fore (Bahrdt 1998). This is the basis of the new, dynamic public spaces we witness in China today. However, this does not mean that everyday public space is now free of political power. By its very nature, space structures, guides and limits social interactions (Lefebvre 1991). Thus, I argue for public space as a means and a process of organising and ordering urban society —while it is always contested.
5For my study I concentrate on streets, squares, parks etc. —physical outdoor space where anonymity prevails (Gehl 2011; Lofland 1973)— and take Guangzhou as a case study. This traditional trade city in South China was one of the most progressive metropolises in republican times and has served as a spearhead of the reform and opening policies since the early 1980s. The paper will show: 1) The path dependency of the state’s attitude towards public space and through the political changes from the early 1920s until today; 2) the political dimension of public space and its connection to a strong modernist and nationalist discourse; 3) the practical dimension of wenming and how it was shaped by the government into an urban development campaign serving the reformist interests of a wealthy Guangzhou; 4) Last but not least, this development shows public space in China as a governmental means of both showcasing and teaching modern citizenship. Thus, public space stands at the very heart of the government’s promise to lead the Chinese nation to a better future. This is what makes it so important in contemporary strategies of governing a society.
6The paper first gives a short historical overview of the discourse of modernisation, civilising urban citizens and urban public space in republican times. It then elucidates the growing governmental interest in everyday public space since the early reforms and in the context of “Building a spiritual civilisation”. It will show what started as an ideological thought work campaign was re-interpreted to clean up the city and introduce proper market economic behaviour. In the new millennium, the campaign culminated in the “National civilised city” competition, which aims at both economic and political profits. The paper sheds light on how the civilisation discourse is entangled with the communist party’s claim to power and how it still plays a major role in the strategies and technologies used to control urban public space.
7This paper draws on my doctoral dissertation on the social production of public space in Guangzhou’s inner-city districts, where I conducted fieldwork between 2011 and 2014. In that time, I became familiar with the different kinds of urban public space, the influence of city development campaigns and the wenming-discourse. With wenming I refer to jingshen wenming (精神文明) —the spiritual civilisation (vs. material civilisation, see below)— and the related thought work. Moreover, I often use the Chinese term wenming to avoid confusion with the English connotation of the direct translation. In the following, I examine local laws, official announcements, propaganda posters, Guangzhou chronicles, journal, and newspaper articles. To follow the discourse (and its gaps) I look through Guangzhou Daily and Nanfang Daily (from 1955 to 2012), via the Chinese National Press Index and random sampling. Moreover, I analyse the main entry on “building a spiritual civilisation” in Guangzhou’s yearbooks from 1984 to 2011, the time when the first wenming campaigns began which culminated in Guangzhou finally winning the title of “National Civilised City”. However, the data from Chinese yearbooks or other publications of party and government has to be treated with caution as they mainly speak of success. Especially in times of less intellectual freedom, official publications rather point towards a wishful picture rather than the real enforcement of policies. Thus, they can elucidate the specific focus of state actors regarding each sub-campaign, in terms of content and context. Yearbooks also help us to understand the practical specifics of the wenming discourse, while their statistics visualise the relative effort of the government. In other words, these sources have been read between the lines to understand how Beijing’s central government and Guangzhou’s local government reframed the wenming idea for urban development. Moreover, I complement this analysis with data gained from participant, non-participant observation, and half-structured interviews with 67 street vendors. I especially refer to my cooperation with Mr. Huang (name changed) which began in summer 2012 and ended with the re-evaluation of the National Civilised City Campaign in fall of the same year. Mr. Huang, a man in his 50s, originally came from Shandong province and offered calligraphy as a service on the streets of Guangzhou. He took me along to the popular and strictly controlled Shangxia-Jiu-shopping street in Liwan district. He allowed me a glimpse into the spatial logic of street vendors, their relations, and tactics, as well as the enforcement of wenming in this realm of everyday life.
8At the end of the nineteenth century, the European understanding of cultural superiority —embedded within the concept “civilisation/civility”— travelled via Japan to China (Wang 1984: 2f). The Chinese translation —wenming— ties in with traditional discourses on individual education and hierarchy, as the “nobleman” distinguished himself from the common people and the “barbarians” through “wen” (文 scripture) and “ming” (明 clarity) (Wang 1984: 3; Anagnost 1997: 81). However, the neologism wenming referred to the freshly introduced Western ideas such as “nation” (minzu 民族) and “society” (shehui 社会). It carried notions of collective excellence and the right to dominate, of evolution and modernisation according to the Western model. Thus, wenming promised a way to catch up in the competition between nations which China seemed to be losing at the time (Dynon 2008: 89; Anagnost 1997: 76). The degree of civilisation was supposed to become apparent through peoples’ internal and external cultivation, morality, culture, and social practices (Anagnost 1997: 76; Boutonnet 2011: 86). Being civilised was therefore an individual obligation. Moreover, the idea was contextualised by the understanding of the anthropocentric modernity which suggested that the well-being of humans does not depend on any transcendent beings, but lies in their own hands, supported by natural and social sciences. Accordingly, when Chinese reformers were convinced that economy and society, space and behaviour can be shaped and steered in a certain direction and to a higher degree of wenming, state intervention was not only possible but necessary (Bakken 2000: 50ff).
9“Through wenming, reformers sought to strengthen China by increasing the capacity of the state to harness the energies of the populace for the sake of the nation” (Stapleton 2000: 1). Large cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing, Shanghai and —last but not least— Guangzhou reorganised their city’s administrations and street culture (i.e., Stapleton 2000; Tsin 1999; Lipkin 2005). Over time, the idea of wenming overlapped with connotations of “discipline” (jilü 纪律), “public morality” (gongde 公德), “cleanliness” (weisheng 卫生) (ibid.) and culminated in the construction of new public spaces. When the revolutionary Guomindang formed Guangzhou’s first municipal government, it not only focused on economic growth, but also on emancipating and disciplining urban citizens:
[...] to transform the conditions in which people ordered their everyday lives, by reaching into the realms of their daily practices, right down to the level of hygiene and patterns of entertainment. [The spatial regulation of a city] was meant, in short, to be instrumental in the production of disciplined members for the body politic (Tsin 2002: 24).
10A good example of how this idea translated into public space is Guangzhou’s park movement, inspired by trends in the industrialised world: Guangzhou’s city government created its “First Park” (di yi gongyuan 第一公园) in 1919 on the grounds of the former provincial Yamen, in the centre of the city and opposite to the city hall (Chen 2000: 118; Chen 2003). As historian Chen Zehong explains, “to transform an office building of the Qing government into a park for people to rest and enjoy themselves was a symbolic, democratic and revolutionary act” (Chen 2003: n.p.). By 1933, Guangzhou had become one of the greenest metropolises of the country, offering 9 parks with a total of 560 km² (Sun 2010: 54, 70; Cody 1996). These parks were supposed to support citizens’ physical and moral health, to keep them from gambling, “superstition” and prostitution —newly defined as vices. They therefore offered a wide range of “legitimate” leisure infrastructure, such as sports and games, tennis courts and playgrounds, teahouses, concerts, art, and flower exhibitions (Chen 2000: 122f; Zhan 2009: 113). Moreover, education played an important role. Parks were supposed to shape the citizens’ consciousness, their interest in public affairs and commitment to the city and the nation. Thus, the area was equipped with museums, exhibitions, newspaper walls and information stands on current government campaigns (Chen 2000: 123; Cody 1996; similarly in Beijing: Shi 1998: 246). It offered a forum for political speeches, meetings, and governmental ceremonies. In the 1920s —for example— the First Park witnessed celebrations of the women’s and student movements, the commemoration of the May Fourth Movement, of the revolution and the Northern Campaign (Chen 2000: 123f; GZSZ 1999: 168, 170, 182, 216). Workers made their strikes public in the park, while communists and nationalists mobilised against imperialism and for their own policies. The city even mourned the death of Sun Yatsen in the First Park (Chen 2000: 123f; Tsin 1999: 116; Ho 2005: 161; GZSZ 1999, vol. 1: 168, 170, 182, 216). The park administration expected this kind of usage and stated in its official regulations: “Demonstrations must follow the prescribed paths in the park, please do not step on the grass” (usage regulation, as cited in Chen 2000: 118). Thus, public space was highly political. Proper social and spatial practices —the degree of wenming— were supposed to shape the republican citizens and eventually the nation.
11With the communist party coming into power in 1949, the concept of wenming faded into the background. The seed of the modernist thought, however, thrived and changed public space through various aspects. The over-emphasis of the collective was accompanied by the reduction of personal space and the politicisation of everyday life, while village-like structures (of social control) were introduced into the urban fabric (Flock 2017). Public space was now supposed to mobilise the masses for the revolution. Thus, the communist city leaders looked at the parks with suspicion, as places of bourgeois amusement with the potential to foster political opposition (Hung 2013: 558; Zhao & Woudstra 2012: 315). The green areas of the city should be practical and agricultural —“to unite park and production” (Li 2001:10; Zhao & Woudstra 2012: 317ff). During the Cultural Revolution about 111 km² of Guangzhou’s park area was repurposed (Li 2001: 10). In this context, the park lost its importance as a political meeting place for citizens. Instead, huge central city squares embodied the new perspective on public space. Guangzhou’s pendant of Tian’anmen square in Beijing was the Haizhu Square near the Pearl River shore. Prominently located, no trees or bushes were allowed to diminish the impression of vastness, while the soldier statue in memory of the city’s communist liberation took centre stage (GZRB 1959). It was primarily meant as a space of representation and grandeur, to demonstrate the superiority of socialism (Mou et al. 2006: 63f).
12Although the idea of educating the people was strong throughout communist China, the concept of wenming did not reappear until 1979 (according to my newspaper overview; see also Anagnost 1997). The reasons can only be speculated upon: Was it tainted as a term of the “old society”, too close to the “West”, or its civil connotations were too strong? When the central government in Beijing re-introduced the term as a guideline for the new reform policies, it was “unspent” by the Cultural Revolution and its ideological extremes. In the beginning, the term was more open to interpretation while implying a steady path to modernity (NFRB 1981a). Deng Xiaoping is considered a pragmatist who turned away from the dogmatism of his predecessors. Nevertheless, the reorientation of the economy — the core of the communist idea— required great ideological skills. Deng argued that in addition to the “material civilisation” —the economic prosperity of the country— it was necessary to build a “spiritual civilisation”: “Its foundations are the communication of communist ideals among the people, morality, culture and discipline” (Deng 1983: n.p.). Or, in the words of his opponent Hu Qiaomu:
If we only engage in building a socialist material civilisation and do not work hard to foster a socialist spiritual civilisation at the same time, people will be selfish, profit-seeking and lacking in lofty ideals. In that case, how much will our mental outlook differ from that in capitalist societies? (Hu Qiaomu 1982, as cited in Wang 1984: 1).
As Nicholas Dynon explained, the spiritual civilisation was supposed to avert the dangers of the economic reforms and to soothe the party’s left wing scepticism (Dynon 2008: 91). Thus, wenming became the defining characteristic of a country under market economic and socialist rule.
13Until today, “Building a spiritual civilisation” serves as a generic term for the overall propaganda work of government and party (Brady 2008: 25f). It contains the communist guidelines, from “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong thoughts to current campaigns about Lei Feng and the “Chinese Dream”. Meanwhile, scholars often take a more critical perspective. They convincingly argue that the spiritual civilisation is not so much a way to cling to communist practices but rather to submit to the economic impetus without compromising social stability or the party’s rule (Anagnost 1997; Boutonnet 2011; Dynon 2008). In the name of wenming, Deng Xiaoping emphasised the need to engage in the Four Modernisations and to develop the economy for the nation’s sake. The party’s patriotism demands patience from the individual, while “some get rich first”. Wenming appeals to a communist consciousness to make up for the lack of rule of law. The concept reminds us once more of the belief in cultural determinism, but at the same time it renders social problems apolitical:
This program does not blame social disruptions on the economic reforms launched decades ago nor on the capitalist economy that became particularly extreme in 1990s China, it rather locates the crux of the problem on the failure of Chinese people to integrate and apply these new rules, and therefore asks them to accompany modernisation with a better attitude and a “correct” (zhengque 正确) morality (Boutonnet 2011: 93).
14Interestingly, from the start wenming was defined by quite “down to earth” local indicators beyond the lofty ideals. Moreover, it was imprinted on public space: The first major wenming campaign (1981-1985) promoted “Five Virtues and Four Beauties”, i.e., “be cultured, be polite, be clean, respect order and morals” and emphasised “the beauty of the soul, the language, the behaviour and the environment” (GZSZ 2010b: 388). In 1983, the central government extended the campaign and its title to include the “Three Kinds of Ardent Love” —for the fatherland, socialism and for the party. In contrast to these abstract virtues, the Ministry of Propaganda specified three aspects to improve the urban environment in the context of wenming: 1) public spaces, 2) commercial services, 3) urban management and especially urban traffic (RMRB 26.02.1982). In other words: “a civilisation of socialist spirit”, communist morality and the “correct solution of interpersonal relations” —as the party’s mouthpiece Renmin Ribao stated— had their spatial expression in clean streets, friendly salespeople, and getting from A to B without much delay (RMRB 26.02.1982). The core of the civilisation campaigns was therefore devoted to the fight against “dirt, chaos and deficiencies” (zang, luan, cha 脏乱差) (GZNJ 1985: 560; GZNJ 1984: 648).
- 2 At first glance it looks as if the whole of Guangzhou was involved, with its approx. 5 million urba (...)
15This policy was decided in Beijing but fell on particularly fertile ground in Guangzhou. The political leaders saw the city as a flagship project of the reform and opening policies, and as the “Southern Gate” which linked China to the outside world, influencing the impression on the whole country (NFRB 1981b). At the same time, decades of neglecting urban infrastructure for the sake of “production” had taken its toll. While Guangzhou felt like “a tired old man” (party cadre, quoted by Vogel 1995: 196), dealing with a fast growing population and the new dynamics of market economy, the practical perspective on “dirt, chaos and deficiencies” came just at the right time: The “dirt” referred to dilapidated buildings, neglected streets, littered “dead corners”, and the careless handling of waste and excrement in public space. As an outcome of the Five Virtues Campaign, the Canton government presented 7,400 dirt pits and 130 kilometres of canal, cleaned of 36,500 tonnes of waste and sludge by 2.74 million urbanites in 1982 (GZNJ 1986: 50; GZNJ 1985: 560). Two years later, the campaign resulted in 15 cleared-up main roads, two town squares, 38 markets, 7 sewer rivers, and 574 kilometres of underground sewers, the repair of ca. 50,000 m² of decaying housing, and the investment of 2.59 million Yuan in public toilets. Officially, 284,000 rats were killed, and the “mosquito and cockroach density” was reduced by about a third (GZNJ 1985: 560). The cleaning movement took place mainly in March, during the “Month of Polite and Civil Behaviour of the Entire Population” —one of the most important annual activities of the Five Virtues Campaign. For the almost 5 million2 participants, polite and civilised behaviour meant getting rid of 180,000 tonnes of rubbish and sludge (GZNJ 1985: 560).
16In addition to temporary mobilisation, the city government relied on competitions, models, and awards to realise the Five Virtues at the grassroots level (Zhongyang_b 1984: 92; see also Bakken 2000). Beijing and Guangzhou emphasised the rapid creation of presentable spatial units as a top priority. “Civilised Danwei” (单位, work unit), “Civilised Towns”, villages, streets etc. appeared like hopeful islands where the spiritual civilisation emerged in a concentrated form (Zhongyang_b 1984: 92; GZNJ 1984: 648). They were supposed to help integrate, systematise, and ultimately expand the contents of the campaign in everyday life (Zhongyang_b 1984: 92). The titles brought prestige to the respective cadres. Gold plaques decorated entrances and housing walls and the most important names appeared regularly in the yearbooks and newspapers (e.g., GZNJ 1986; NFRB 08.03.1982). The discursive framing is especially interesting. The Guangzhou yearbook of 1986, for example, offered details only on two out of 338 awarded wenming danwei. Their main focus: waste disposal in public space. The “Guangzhou Sanitary Plant” was presented as a city-wide model (GZNJ 1986: 500) and additionally confirmed via the “Decision to learn from the Guangzhou Sanitary Plant to strengthen the Socialist Spiritual Civilisation” (ibid.). The local government advertised mottoes such as “I like to get dirty in exchange for ten thousand people’s health” or “fight bugs for the city to create happiness for the people” (GZNJ 1986: 66, 500). The second highlight was the cooperation between the army and the population. Guangzhou’s yearbook stated, “the contents of the campaign expanded from the fight against dirt, chaos and deficiencies to the greening, beautification and cleaning of the city” (GZNJ 1986: 500). It proudly reported that in April, 1,800 soldiers of the navy and the military police had taken action against 30 littered corners and 1.03 tons of garbage (GZNJ 1986: 500).
17In the following years, the city management approached the “Six Types of Chaos” (liu luan 六乱) —common practices of urban culture and public space at the time: mobile street trading and illegal parking, wild advertising and billposting, unauthorised construction activity and (bulky) waste disposal. More often than not, these culminated in blocked streets and problems of urban transport. Meanwhile, “deficiencies” referred to the shortcomings of the newly introduced market economy and focused on the city’s commercial sector as well as on the administrative services offered by the local government and its affiliated Danwei. This was particularly important for Guangzhou, which once again took pride in its history and potential future as a trading city. In one of the first national publications on building a civilised city, Guangzhou presented its “Southern department store” as an outstanding example of being wenming. The authors reasoned that the employees are courteous, the store is well-stocked and profitable (Zhonggong_a 1984). A perfect economic cycle on the one hand seems like a far-fetched interpretation of the spiritual civilisation on the other hand. But it was not unique, as the example of the communist hero Lei Feng shows originally the model soldier had stood for learning “the correct class stance and how to practice the revolutionary, proletarian-communist spirit of selflessness” (Zhou Enlai, as cited in Jeffreys & Su 2016: 31). In Guangzhou’s reform era, however, Lei Feng supported goals of urban embellishment and consumer-oriented development. The motto “learn from Lei Feng and establish a new trend” now combined with “create a beautiful environment, excellent order and offer outstanding services” (GZNJ 1986: 50). The campaign therefore organised competitions to improve the service sector (GZSZ 2010b: 392). According to the yearbook, the four most popular shopping streets and the Canton railway station fought for the title of “Civilised Trade Street”, in which 8 “civilised shops”, 50 “civilised groups”, 221 “civilised vendors” received awards. At the same time, 680,000 service teams and Lei Feng teams organised 100 “city markets at your assistance” (GZNJ 1986: 50).
18The Lei Feng campaign was just one among many and the service idea shifted even further into focus with the Sixth National Games in 1987. The Guangzhou people were supposed to be attuned to their role as hosts, show a “smiling Guangzhou”, a “warm heart for customers”, “camaraderie on the train and bus”. Mottoes such as “civilised trade, outstanding service”, and “welcoming the national games with outstanding services” were again combined with awards for the best Danwei and the best service achievements (GZSZ 2010b: 393ff; GZNJ 1988: 5). Meanwhile, these campaigns did not only refer to the private sector. The “Double Criticism” campaign, for example, called on grassroots cadres and the population in the same year to evaluate institutions of the (semi)public sector, i.e., organs of the city government as well as public enterprises, from transport and health care to catering and everyday shops. The aim was “to promote the service industry, improve service attitudes and quality; to promote the development of professional ethics in all industries, to spread the idea of ‘serving the people, taking responsibility before the people’ in each profession” (Zhonggong_c 1987: n.p.). To summarise, the fight against “dirt, chaos and deficiencies” specified the idea of wenming on the local level and focused on the improvement of public space and infrastructure, urban management, and the commercial sector.
19The events on Tiananmen square in Beijing did not leave Guangzhou untouched. Here too, people took to the streets and demonstrated in the spirit of the Beijing students. After the suppression of the movement, the construction of the spiritual civilisation entered a new phase in the 1990s. The city leadership had become more cautious about mobilising people in public space and concentrated less on practical activities than on ideological propaganda. In the early 1990s, spiritual civilisation was offered almost exclusively in the form of cultural events. Guangzhou’s urban history, local and national patriotism and the Civilised Danwei were propagated in public debates and conferences, theatre, and film weeks, singing competitions, information days and exhibitions. Rather than focusing on public hygiene, the best essays on the 40th anniversary of the People’s Republic or the people’s Mandarin skills were awarded (GZNJ 1990; GZNJ 1992). In 1991, the cooperation between the army and the population, which had previously been concerned with urban garbage, included rhetoric contests and cultural performances (GZNJ 1992). In addition to the form, the content of the propaganda changed, i.e., the ideological orientation behind the Communist Party’s claim to power was more in focus. This becomes clear with the framing of the new models whereby companies were instantly praised for communist ideals, selflessness, thrift, and hard work (GZNJ 1990). Similarly, Lei Feng now demanded that the people “be of one heart with the party” (GZNJ 1990: 446). One year later, party member Hao Weijie was highlighted as a role model, especially for the cadres. The city commission emphasised his loyalty to the party headquarters, his strict adherence to its directives and his tireless commitment to the revolution (GZNJ 1991: 535). The description of these heroes was peppered with Maoist jargon functioning as a political code. The wording and fixed phrases made the message clear: after Tiananmen, the critics of the reform and opening policies had the upper hand and the future path had to be embarked on with extreme caution. Experiments and deviations from Beijing’s specifications would not be tolerated. The “Sixth National Conference on the Theory of Building the Urban Spiritual Civilisation” held in Guangzhou in March 1990 emphasised that “the building of spiritual civilisation is not replaceable by developing the economy” (GZNJ 1991: 535).
20However, Guangzhou’s local government disagreed and was encouraged by Deng Xiaoping’s travel to the South and his promotion of the reform program in 1992. From the following year onward, the city called again for competitions such as “Learning from Nanhua-Xi-Road, creating a civilised street” (GZNJ 1994: 65). This road was located in Haizhu district and stood for growing prosperity in the form of a rapid increase in local GDP, local investments in infrastructure and vocational training for its inhabitants (Hua 1994: 30; GZNJ 1993: 73; GZNJ 1996: 102). Of course, there was also praise for the propagation of the Four Virtues, but the vision was clearly economic (GZNJ 1996: 102). The communist journal “Friend of the Party Member” found rapturous words for this:
In the evening we followed them to the restaurant and after dinner everyone went to the adjacent karaoke bar, singing and dancing in a relaxed atmosphere. The furnishing and decoration of the establishment amazed us as if we were standing in a big luxury hotel. With all this in mind I involuntarily thought “what the Nanhua-Xi-Road can do, other places perhaps can accomplish as well” (Hua 1994: 30).
21The Nanhua-Xi-Road appeared as outstanding example year after year and the fight against “dirt, chaos and deficiencies” continued in the usual way with its focus on public space (GZNJ 1996: 101ff; GZNJ 1997: 63f; GZNJ 1998: 69ff; GZNJ 1999: 62ff). Thus, even in times of re-ideologisation Guangzhou’s city government interpreted wenming as a means to improve the urban fabric.
22Keeping the explanations above in mind, the building of a spiritual civilisation can be understood as an urban development campaign which sheds economic and political light on public space. From the start, Guangzhou’s wenming campaigns combined national and local patriotism. The main aim of the required virtues was not to improve social harmony or urban living conditions. Cleanliness not only drove away the mosquitoes and rats from one’s porch, but was framed as a patriotic act, as a contribution to the collective and its prestige (see also the “Patriotic Hygiene Movement”). When Guangzhou emphasised “cityscape and hygiene” (GZNJ 1984: 648) as the centre of its spiritual civilisation campaign, the government later defined it as the “overall impression of the city to the outside world” (Guangzhou_d 1997: 114; emphasis added by the author). During the competitions for the title of National Hygienic City (held since 1992), attention shifted from cleanliness to pride and patriotism (Zhang & Li 2011: 40; Guangzhou_d 1992). As the local leadership explained, “the hygiene situation in Guangzhou directly affects the reputation of the fatherland and the building of the two kinds of civilisations” (Guangzhou_d1992: n.p.). The city of Guangzhou stood pars pro toto for the whole of China. On the other hand, the national context elevated the importance of the local development: “Love the fatherland dearly and beautify Guangzhou” was the first requirement of the “contract of civilised behaviour” propagated since the early 1980s (see Figure 1). The chain of association became well established, leading from the bigger political entity to the smaller one —or the other way around— with the city of Guangzhou as a final destination. Mayor Zhu Senlin for example called on people to “be civilised citizens, create civilised Danwei, build a civilised Guangzhou” (Zhonggong_e 2011: Section 10). The spiritual civilisation fuelled the local development as the Five Virtues Campaign was followed in 1986 by the “Plan to beautify Guangzhou in three years” (GZSZ 2010b: 393). In the 1990s, even the big campaigns of patriotic education eventually highlighted: “The loving Guangzhou is my family”. According to the yearbook, the intention was to convey appreciation of the fatherland, hometown, home district, factory, and workplace (GZNJ 1995) and thus made a link between the “imagined community” (Anderson) of the nation to the tangible everyday environment.
Figure 1. The “Contract of Civilised Behaviour” in a Guangzhou neighbourhood
© Ryanne Flock 2013
23As it served as an urban development campaign, the city’s major steps in urban planning were accompanied by the building of a spiritual civilisation. In 1998, the city and province government announced a large-scale renewal of Guangzhou with “small changes in one year, medium-sized changes in three years and major changes by 2010” (RMRB 12.10.2001; Zhonggong_c 2002). At the same time, they launched a new wenming campaign as a suitable “image project” (Gao SR 1998; Guangzhou_f 1998). The steps, objectives and priorities of both plans were largely identical. Mayor Lin Shusen declared that “only by beautifying the urban environment we can attract more investors” (Lin Shusen, as cited in RMRB 12.10.2001), and Gao Siren —Guangdong’s then Party Secretary— explained:
To build Guangzhou into a modernised international city requires a high degree of both material and spiritual civilisation. In which condition we find urban planning, environment and social order, urban culture, the mental and moral attitude of the people —in one sentence— the degree of urban civilisation is an important sign of the city’s overall strength (Gao SR 1998: n.p.).
24While urban redevelopment plans in China usually focus on fostering certain industry sectors, this time the emphasis lay on urban infrastructure, management, the cityscape and Guangzhou’s general attractiveness. The “small changes” referred to fast and visible improvements in public space and included the typical civilising activities on the ground: dealing with waste disposal, city cleaning, parking violations and unlicensed construction sites, the regulation of “vagrants” in the streets and the “Six types of Chaos” (Qin 1999: 57; Guangzhou_e 1998). The “medium changes” concerned public infrastructure, transportation, leisure areas and urban aesthetics (Zhonggong_c 2002: 57; see also RMRB 12.10.2001; Zhonggong_c 2000: 55f). Out of the 80 projects scheduled for 2000 and 2001, 18 concentrated on road construction, 22 on parks and greenery, 7 on squares, 13 on improving the surroundings and the landscape and 7 on the construction of shopping areas (Zhonggong_c 2000: 55f).
25Finally, the projects were accompanied by the newly announced competition for the title of “National Civilised City” (quanguo wenming chengshi 全国文明城市). Although previous campaigns had repeatedly spoken of the “civilised” city, the first steps towards establishing an institutionalised, nationwide contest only began in 1999 (GZSZ 2010a: 138; GDJSWMJSNJ 2002: 171). Beijing’s “Central Steering Committee to build a Spiritual Civilisation” published the national contest’s first standardised evaluation indices in 2004, followed by new versions in 2008, 2011, and 2015. It compiled a far-reaching catalogue of criteria which took up, intensified, and expanded earlier aspects of the wenming campaigns. Independent inspectors were to examine a city’s “level of civilisation” incognito, to collect material, take samples, conduct surveys, and to observe the situation on site (Zhongyang_a 2012; Cartier 2016). The quantitative evaluation would award a maximum of 112 points for offering good services and playing according to the given rules, and being a clean, green and prosperous city (Zhongyang_a 2012). “The National Civilised City is defined by building a society of moderate prosperity (xiaokang 小康)” (ibid: 697). Economic growth is of great importance, and thus “hard” factors such as above-average GDP, income, urban investment in education, research, etc. are a must. Public space is above all a part of the required high quality of life, of security and sustainability and also in relation to public transport, public cleanliness, green spaces, visible law and order, polite behaviour and a conflict-free environment. A positive aesthetic —the “overall image of the city”— could help cities win additional points (ibid: 721).
26In the new millennium, the idea of wenming has been institutionalised and is reflected in a comprehensive, large-scale urban development campaign that is repeated every few years. What involved 10 people in the 1980s is now organised by 103 positions in three committees within Guangzhou’s party propaganda bureau. Their seats are mostly filled by high cadres of party and government —right up to the mayor and the party secretary (Zhonggong_d 2011). The latter’s careers depend on it. The respective title of Civilised City, District or Danwei is laid down in the evaluation criteria for leading cadres in general (Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Communist Party 2008: § 19; GZRB 20.08.2008: § 22). Understandably, the National Civilised City is not the only city competition, but it is the most influential. Thus, the city leaders increased the pressure when the Asian Games and Guangzhou’s final goal of making “major changes by 2010” was imminent (Luo et al. 2009). Party secretary Zhang Guangning emphasised: “The establishment of the National Civilised City is the most important task for the entire city this year. There can only be success, we must not fail under any circumstances” (Zhang Guanning, as cited in NFRB 29.03.2011). According to the local government, the city had previously lost the competition because of the citizens’ low satisfaction with the city administration (Luo et al. 2009). The journalists of the Nanfang Dushi Bao explained in more detail that the problem was Guangzhou’s public space or, better put, its lack of cleanliness, green areas, and public facilities, as well as the insufficient regulations for traffic, and (street) trade (You XY, NFDSB 04.08.2011). Thus, to win the title of National Civilised City the city government strengthened its control over public space.
- 3 The abbreviation derives from Guangzhou Chengshi Guanli Zonghe Zhifa Zhidui 广州市城市管理综合执法支队.
27The following will shed light on the enforcement of public order during the National Civilised City competition in 2011 and its re-evaluation in 2012. While wenming concerns a broad range of behaviour, I would like to concentrate on street vending. An indispensable part of Guangzhou’s economy, the industry integrates hundred thousands of migrants from the countryside into urban society. However, they do not correspond to the government’s idea of modern commerce and trade; instead, they stand for backwardness, “dirt” and “chaos”. The wenming campaigns targeted peddlers right from the start as well as during the final years of the national competition. The authority in charge is the “Team for the comprehensive execution of city management” —in Chinese known as Chengguan (城管).3 Founded in 1999, the team is nowadays the most visible representative of public order in everyday life. Chengguan patrols are generally allowed to order street vendors to leave the area, to confiscate their goods and issue a fee of up to 500 Yuan (Flock & Breitung 2016).
28While preparing the Asian Games, the city government already had named very specific “focus areas” and streets of increased control. In the year of the Civilised City competition the number of such streets and areas was raised to 148 and 82 respectively. Most of them were tourist spots, commercial areas or historical sites such as the compound around the Sun-Yatsen-Memorial, the Pearl River promenade or the Shangxia-Jiu-shopping street —where I did my fieldwork (Guangzhou_b 2011). Chengguan had to patrol more often in these areas, and also hired additional security personnel and was equipped with a broader range of competences (Flock 2014). However, strict governance comes at a price; for years the “cases of violent resistance” by street vendors brought negative publicity to Chengguan patrols and their managing bureau —in Guangzhou and other cities. Moreover, city governments time and again witnessed how these conflicts could develop into bigger street protests and heated discussions in the (social) media on state authority and moral legitimacy (Flock & Breitung 2016). Meanwhile, the inspectors of the National Civilised City campaign did not look lightly on any kind of scandal. Cases of public disturbances could even retroactively lead to disqualification (Cartier 2013). Thus, in 2009 and 2011 Guangzhou started to reform Chengguan’s institutional setting and redirected its approach to wenming zhifa —to “execute the law in a civilised way”(see Figure 2) .
Figure 2. Shangxia-Jiu-shopping street and its Chengguan patrols on the right
© Ryanne Flock 2014
29Chengguan patrols were asked to avoid inciting conflicts and to refrain from confrontational behaviour. They controlled the designated zones very strictly but offered leeway in the surrounding areas. Therefore, street vendors could be found around but seldom on the Shangxia-Jiu-shopping street. During my fieldwork in Guangzhou from 2011-2014, I regularly observed the interplay between Chengguan patrols and street vendors. As I explained above, I cooperated with Mr. Huang who took me along on the strictly controlled Shangxia-Jiu-shopping street. He was one of the few exceptions bold enough to take up his stand in front of the shops and in middle of the shopping crowd. He knew, Chengguan wouldn’t confiscate anything of value, his business capital was his skills. For 10 Yuan he offered to design customised signatures as calligraphy. When he began to swing the brush and interweave the characters stroke by stroke, he attracted costumers as well as a curious audience. I served as his business partner, acted as interested customer, passed on money and calligraphy utensils, and watched out for the authorities. To do so, I stood and stretched up, tried to catch a glimpse of the patrols’ police-like hats. However, our tactic was rarely successful: sooner or later (after about 30 minutes) a team of 2 to 4 patrols would come along. If I spotted them first, we quickly packed up and moved on. If they were suddenly standing in front of us, they would behave coldly, confiscate some of Mr. Huangs calligraphies and scare us away. On the one hand, it felt wise not to provoke them; on the other hand, there were no heavier consequences when we came back several times in a row. Such a “back and forth” movement was not unusual —and it seemed to me like an established intermezzo, since very few of the peddlers I interviewed were ever punished by fees or confiscation.
30Chengguan patrols instead disturbed the business by their presence, increasing the frequency with which they would shoo hawkers away, or the patrols surrounded the sellers and cut them off from their customers. With increasing pressure due to the Civilised City campaign the patrols became more assertive —expelling vendors from a wider radius around the shopping area than usual. Ironically, the patrols also became friendlier. During my cooperation with Mr. Huang, a Chengguan patrol politely asked us to stay away for the next few days, i.e. from 1 to 7 September 2012, because of the re-evaluation of the Civilised City competition. Meanwhile, his colleagues distributed an official notice to the surrounding Muslim hawkers from the Liwan district’s Chengguan branch in Chinese and Arabic:
Dear compatriots, […] do not peddle at major roads, traffic intersections, station terminals, schools and markets. […] Good urban environment and orderliness requires the general public to participate and all nationalities to support urban management. Let’s work together to accomplish the important task of Guangzhou’s “Civilised City” to meet the national inspection.
31Muslim hawkers (especially from Xinjiang) had a prominent position among the street vendors. The political tension between the central government in Beijing and the Uyghur minority trickled down to the approach of everyday governance at the local level in Guangzhou. Moreover, these Muslim hawkers had a reputation of being stubborn and violent (Flock & Breitung 2016), so the patrols were especially cautious. Their increased effort did not come as a surprise. Even though the national regulations speak of secret inspections, the dates of the visits are relatively fixed and known to the city government. The re-evaluation was announced on ubiquitous posters on Guangzhou’s walls, in the newspapers and by word of mouth among the vendors. Moreover, the patrols implied that we could come back after 7 September and could peddle in areas less popular and less visible to the visitors’ eyes. Thus, the vendors’ resistance was low and most of them temporarily followed the patrols’ request.
32The Civilised City competition resulted in short-term islands of public space displaying the government’s take on modernity. As Boutonnet argues:
[T]o be wenming, cities, when required, also need to be rid of their “bad habits” like poverty, migrants and homeless people, to show the bright side of society only (Boutonnet 2011: 102).
33In the end, the spiritual civilisation is about prestige, about the “impression of the city to the outside world” (Guangzhou_d 1997: 114; emphasis added by the author).
34At the same time, shaping public space through the wenming campaigns is supposed to have an influence towards the inside, towards the users in everyday life. From the start, wenming propagated rule-obedient behaviour: “Everyone should get into the habit of maintaining discipline and respecting the laws on their own initiative. This is the minimum requirement of civilised behaviour, in this point we must be absolutely strict” (Zhongyang_b 1984: 94).
35Moreover, the campaigns were supported by new local regulations on public space —on public hygiene, noise, sidewalks, pedestrians, bicycles, motorcycles, street vending, construction sites etc.— and by more or less formal “house rules”. One of the best-known codes of urban virtues to date is the above mentioned “Contract of Civil Behaviour” (wenming gongyue 文明公). Published in the context of the Five Virtues Campaigns (GZRB 29.06.1982a; GZRB 29.06.1982b), its form and title recall the Ten Commandments or Rousseau’s social contract (shehui gongyue 社会公约) —supposedly to gain authority. In the 1980s, the contract of civilised behaviour was literally “set in stone” in urban neighbourhoods, written on walls or embedded as tiles, because “we have to mobilise the masses, to learn and discuss [the contract], we have to spread it to all families and households, to be taken to heart and consciously accepted” (GZRB 29.06.1982b). Figure 1 shows the contract in one of the old neighbourhoods in the central Yuexiu district. It requested from the citizens:
Love our country and beautify Guangzhou ;
Be polite to people and do not speak vulgarly
Show solidarity to your neighbours and keep your family harmonious ;
Refrain from old habits and follow the family planning program ;
Be helpful, respect the elderly teacher and love the children ;
Abide by the law, and refrain from superstitious gambling ;
Pay attention to hygiene, do not spit and do not dispose of your rubbish on the street ;
Green the environment, plant trees, flowers and protect birds ;
Respect public property and public order ;
Respect yourself and protect the integrity of the state.
36This code covered the current topics of the time, including the one-child policy and the re-establishment of social harmony and hierarchy, scientific secularisation to serve the Four Modernisations, and of course the wenming campaign. It urged people to change “customary law” and not to treat the commons as a residual space.
37Although it seems propaganda posters have been losing importance in recent decades (Landsberger 2009), “advertising in the public interest” —as it is now called in marketing jargon— is omnipresent in Guangzhou: on public buildings, shops, kiosks, bus and subway stations, construction site walls, advertising stands and pillars, on housing walls and information boards of the neighbourhoods or as banners stretched across the street, in buses, subways, taxis, in hotels, restaurants and snack bars, on posters, flyers, LED-screens, or furniture (Guangzhou Shi Wenmingban 2014). There is hardly anywhere in Guangzhou where the appropriate behaviour is not pointed out: Don’t run in the subway, let the elderly take a seat, don’t step on the grass, order only as much as you can eat, separate the garbage etc. Similar to the contract of Civilised Behaviour, Figures 3 and 4 suggest not to spit on the floor, not to throw garbage around, not to make noise or to smear the walls, but to be polite in social interactions, to say “hello” and “thank you”, “sorry” and “excuse me”. According to Guangzhou’s Committee for building a Spiritual Civilisation, in 2013, 1,320 boards of the propaganda series “Be Civilised and Establish the New Trend” were set up in 10 city squares, on 10,707 m² of construction site walls, made 24.4% of all fixed billboards, 37% of LED walls and 30-40% of advertising space in public transportation and respective stations (Guangzhou Shi Wenmingban 2014).
Figure 3. “Promote social morality and bid farewell to uncivilised behaviour”
© Ryanne Flock 2013
Figure 4. “Carry civil language in all streets and alleys”
© Ryanne Flock 2011
38For decades there has been a controversy regarding the extent to which state propaganda in general, and propaganda posters in particular, still affect the population (Landsberger 1996; Brady 2012; Sun 2017). However, propaganda in public space refers to the power behind it, staging party and government as the dominant speakers. These posters are not isolated voices, but they repeat familiar messages and are perceived in combination with other media: “The intended meanings never exist in the unity of one single poster, but in the unremitting intertextuality and intervisuality within it” (Sun 2017: 10). When the posters talk about the civilised city, it is the given information plus the association and ideological knowledge which influence the reader. Figure 3 for example combines the logos of the Asian Games with the civilised city: “Welcome the Asian Games, behave in civilised way and establish a new trend”. The colours and comic-strip characters also add to the association, as they follow the Games’ campaign aesthetics. Figure 5 shows a poster which combines the wenming context with the “Core Values of Socialism” – Xi Jinping’s new ideological focus:
Cultivating and disseminating the core values and effectively integrating the people’s mindset is an important means of ensuring that the social system operates in a normal manner and that the social order is effectively maintained (Xi 2014).
Figure 5. “Core Values of Socialism” on a construction site wall
© Ryanne Flock 2013
Accordingly, he stands for the paternalistic tradition of public space. The poster’s red colours and craftwork style remind the reader of the new role that Chinese tradition is supposed to play under Xi Jinping, while content and design lead to his ideas on the “Chinese Dream” (Gow 2017). Wenming and other thought work campaigns overlap, interact, and are attuned to one another. Thus, the public advertisement is part of the party’s overall education of urban citizens.
39Disciplining the people and encouraging them to accept certain behaviours always intertwines with a rather political connotation. In preparation for the Asian Games, for example, several government institutions in Guangzhou published a “courtesy of manners” for citizens and public servants (Guangzhou_a 2010; Guangzhou_c 2008; Zhonggong_b 2010). These guidelines are very detailed, covering posture, handshake and speech, clothing, and jewellery in different social situations.
Moreover, they clarify the aim of this behaviour and begin with the words:
Civilised courtesy is not only an expression of the quality of someone’s personality, but also shows the individual as well as public morality of a society. Moreover, it is a window into the national culture and spirit of a country. Civilised courtesy is the traditional virtue of the Chinese nation. To strengthen the people’s courtesy and to build a spiritual civilisation is an important task when we want to raise the education level of the entire people (Guangzhou_a 2010: 99).
[i]n all these years, the power of China’s traditional courtesy has been comprehensive and strong. It offered great cohesion for China’s social progress and development. The undiminished splendour of this courtesy still shines until today and its role is irreplaceable in the modern civilisation (Zhonggong_b 2010: 2);
[t]he Asian Games [...] will be a spiritual baptism for all Guangzhou people. Facing the “critical and blaming” gaze of the international society, urban citizens’ polite appearance, cultural knowledge and mental horizons have to greatly improve (Guangzhou_c 2008: 2).
40Thus, educational measures of politeness and “civilised” behaviour have a basic nationalist motive again. In public space the dimensions of outward representation and inward education are combined.
41Wenming has been one of the defining concepts of Chinese modernisation since the beginning of the twentieth century. In the republican era, the concept is driving the redesign of public space through architecture, new regulations, and governance. The new constructions such as Guangzhou’s First Park stood as proof of the city’s change. At the same time, the urban space was supposed to form inhabitants into citizens and ultimately to strengthen the nation. The People’s Republic —which differs from its predecessor and competitor in many respects— is nevertheless a child of the modernist discourse and carries its heritage. Since 1978, the Communist Party has relied on the idea of wenming and ties its propaganda as well as its political legitimacy to leading the Chinese nation into the future. Thus, the associations with wenming influence the governance of public space to a great extent. They refer to standardisation of space and behaviour, law and order, a domesticated clean environment, technology, and prosperity. This paper has shown how the lofty ideals of civilised behaviour were translated into the everyday fight against “dirt, chaos and deficiencies”. Not only peoples’ behaviour was to be adapted to the necessities of the market economy, but also their public spaces, their streets and squares, parks and open plots were affected. Even in times of national re-ideologisation, the city of Guangzhou kept its practical focus and interprets wenming in terms of urban prosperity. Finally, after 20 years of reform and opening policies, the idea of building a spiritual civilisation culminated in a comprehensive urban development campaign determining the rhythm of city politics. Because of the high importance of wenming, activities in public space are never profane, but morally highlighted —whether you stop smoking or queue in line, you are contributing to the community. The calls for civility appeal to individuals’ duties as citizens, in service to local development and the nation’s well-being. This continued state-building process accounts for the political dimension of public space in urban China. While urban public space is integrated into the overall propaganda machinery of the Communist Party, its political function is twofold: it is a space of education and of representation to steer China on the path to modernity.
42While the city of Guangzhou —with its history of urban modernisation and as the spearhead of the reform policies— stood at the forefront of this practical take on the spiritual civilisation, its acts were embedded in the possibilities given by the central government in Beijing. Thus, it is a city where Chinese urbanisation trends come to the surface earlier and more extensively. The enforcement of a civilised space eventually led to a fragmented urban realm, where public behaviour is dependent on times and zones set by the local government (see also Flock & Breitung 2016). Through Guangzhou, this paper showed the path-dependent elements of urban public space in contemporary China and its contextualisation not only in a socialist but a modernist discourse. It explained the ubiquitous reprimands mentioned in the introduction and the general idea of public space in the eyes of Guangzhou’s government. One could argue that the new technologies in China’s urban public space follow an established logic and simply expand the toolbox of control. Nevertheless, they might have a new effect, because urban public space thrives on a certain degree of freedom and anonymity. They form a city’s urbanity —the dynamic differentiation and innovation of economy, culture, and lifestyles. Privacy and “publicness” are two poles of a continuum, and neither can exist without the other (Bahrdt 1998). Without protection of the person, there is no public sphere. Without freedom from surveillance, public space loses its character as a forum for individuals to meet and to create something new. This happened once before —under Mao Zedong— when China’s cities appeared like villages and lacked the air to breathe (Flock 2021). However, the question of how the contemporary technical intensification of public control will affect urban society remains to be examined.
This paper’s fieldwork and data collection were part of the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) [German Research Foundation] Priority Programme (SPP 1233) “Megacities – Megachallenges: Informal Dynamics of Global Change” and supported by the DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst [German Academic Exchange Service] and the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation. The author would like to thank these institutions and all supporting colleagues.
Flux RSS
