1This article is based on a bet: the necessity of interdisciplinarity, or at least the benefit of dialogue between disciplines. However, a few precautions should be taken from the outset. In recent years, the word “interdisciplinarity” has been sometimes overused and misused: everything has become interdisciplinarity. We are however convinced that an issue such as conspiracy and the fight against its presence and spread in the public sphere can only be approached from this perspective. This is a widely shared observation - we are thinking in particular of the so-called “Des Lumières” report directed by Pascal Bronner in 2022, which brought together players from different academic and civil spheres. Indeed, no single discipline can claim to provide the solution to such a complex phenomenon, involving such diverse aspects of human nature and life in society.
- 1 We are aware that the position of “counter acting” conspiracy theories is not neutral. Nevertheless (...)
2Nevertheless, interdisciplinarity is a difficult task that requires time, patience, and, sometimes, turning back. Unfortunately, not all disciplines can work together. Moreover, this meticulous work involves a few different stages. Firstly, we have to ensure that the epistemological concerns are the same; secondly, we have to verify that the methodologies can be mutually understood and, possibly, used by the different parties present, or at least allow the results to be compared from one discipline to another. Finally, we need to make sure that all this work is useful, i.e. in the case of conspiracy theories, that it enables us to go further in our thinking about conspiracy theories, possibly by providing a better understanding of the issues (social, psychological, democratic, educational, cognitive, argumentative, etc.) that conspiracy theories generate, and thus allows us to better counter their spread in the public sphere1.
- 2 We are thinking in particular of the various exchanges between the GRAL team and the team of resear (...)
- 3 Stefano Iacone is a psychologist; Emiliano Loria is a philosopher specializing in thought and cogni (...)
3In this article, we do not claim to be practicing interdisciplinarity thoroughly, we will limit ourselves to a first stage: the assurance of a mutual interest and understanding. Rhetoric and psychology seem to share certain concerns, at least about conspiracy; the main one is an interest in reasons. On the one hand, the “reasons” for persuasion, and on the other, the social, personal, and motivational “reasons” that lead people to embrace conspiracy theories. In both disciplines, our position is a priori that of neutral observers, trying to understand what is happening and avoiding a normative stance. This intuition about the possibility of a discussion between the two approaches has been latent for several years: many rhetorical bibliographies contain works by psychologists (social and cognitive) and discussions are taking place between colleagues, particularly at the Université libre de Bruxelles2, and in the book presented here, which we will use as a guideline for our thinking. Indeed, the three authors involved claim that their work, although rooted in psychology, also draws on writings in sociology and philosophy3 (Iacone, Loria and Meini 2023: 9, 14).
4To carry out what we consider to be the first stage of an interdisciplinary project, we will proceed as follows: we will make a critical summary of the work Complottisti vulnerabili by Iacone, Loria, and Meini. We will review each of the book’s chapters and, for each of them, we will attempt to compare the results and observations proposed in psychology with the results recently obtained in rhetoric. This first, relatively scholarly stage seems to us to be essential: in our view, it is necessary to ensure mutual understanding and the interest of an interdisciplinary undertaking.
- 4 As Giry and Tika note, the term “conspiracy theorist” can refer to different realities, and they pr (...)
- 5 As Nera (2023) points out, when studying conspiracy, two pitfalls must be avoided: complacency towa (...)
5Written by Stefano Iacone, Emiliano Loria, and Cristina Meini, the book is divided into five chapters, which combine psychological and social theories with life stories to offer a very contemporary view of “conspiracy theorists4”: people who subscribe to conspiracy theories. In a book that avoids both complacency and condescension5, the three authors justify the claim that embracing conspiracy theories can be explained, in part, by the need to construct and/or strengthen the individual identity of human beings.
- 6 As the authors explain in more detail, they draw on the concept of “ontological fragility” highligh (...)
6To explore this hypothesis, the authors first set the scene: what are we talking about, and why are we talking about it nowadays (Chapter I: Al cuore del cospirazionismo). Then they outline some of the most popular conspiracy theories, such as the case of the platists and QAnon, which they use to highlight the characteristics of conspiracy discourse (Chapter II: Forme di cospirazionismo). After these two more general chapters, the book moves fully into the field of psychology. First, the authors explore the link between the psychological and “rational” needs for knowledge, identity construction, and maintenance (the so-called “self-defense” need) and the need for recognition of the individual. They explain how these different needs can be met, in a non-exclusive way, by conspiracies (Chapter III: Dammi tre parole: conoscenza, autodifesa, riconoscimento). This chapter is followed by a more illustrative one: through the presentation of five so-called “conspiracists”, they observe how these different needs converge and are embodied in clinical accounts (Chapter IV: I nemici sono (tutti) gli altri. Storie cliniche e complotti). Finally, based on the psychological hypotheses and their comparison with the clinical cases described above, the authors analyse in greater depth the interactions between the personal dynamics of adhesion to the conspiracy discourse and their interweaving with certain group logics (Chapter V: Idee contagiose). Following this five-stage approach, the authors propose to nuance the criteria for delimiting the conspiracy phenomenon they exposed at the beginning of their book and conclude by returning to their original hypothesis: the idea of a fragile identity6 as a necessary element for embracing conspiracy theories.
- 7 As their bibliography shows, the state of the art proposed by the authors is both very contemporary (...)
- 8 Indeed, the Handbook of Conspiracy Theories, published in 2020 by Butter and Knight, already embrac (...)
7More precisely, this book presents itself as a study of the conspiracy mentality, from a cognitive, emotional, and motivational standpoint, always based on the individual. The researchers examine the causal role of ontological fragility and the ego’s need for coherence as key elements in adherence to conspiracy theories. Drawing on a vast body of contemporary psychological literature7, they put forward the idea that belonging to a conspiracy group is, to some people, an appropriate way of responding to a feeling of ontological insecurity. Such a hypothesis, which at first sight might seem obvious, makes it possible, on the one hand, to approach conspiracism as a complex, multifaceted phenomenon and, on the other, to build bridges between rhetoric and psychology. As we will see throughout the book, some of the propositions made in psychology confirm results obtained in rhetoric, and vice versa. Far from under evaluating either approach, we believe that this tendency is both confirmation (if it were still necessary8) of the need to consider conspiracy as a multiple phenomenon, affecting various aspects of society, and a reflection of a more realistic approach to conspiracy.
- 9 In the fifth chapter of their book, the authors warn readers against a simplified reading of conspi (...)
8Indeed, from the very first pages, this book fits in perfectly with the current scientific attitude towards conspiracy theories: it does not simply focus on criticism and devaluation9, but, on the contrary, attempts to understand why this phenomenon exists and why people subscribe to it. The aim is to understand the mechanisms that lead people to adopt such a stance.
9As announced, in this article, we will attempt to compare the reflections and hypotheses of the three Italian authors with the literature on rhetoric, and more broadly, the literature on philosophy, philosophy of language, and contemporary argumentation.
10To explore these questions, Iacone, Loria, and Meini propose to outline the context in which these discourses have developed: for them, as for Emmanuelle Danblon about conspiracism (2023a, 2023b, 2020), for Maurizio Ferraris about post-truth (2017) or for Cynthia Fleury about ressentiment (2020), this phenomenon is an (unfortunate) heir to modernity. The authors take up the work of Antony Giddens (1999), who argues that, while modernity has enabled individuals to emancipate themselves from their socio-economic origins, it has also placed the scientific model at the centre of our reasoning and ways of acquiring knowledge. This emphasis on rationality has given rise to an emphasis on experts: since we cannot know everything about the world, we must rely on the knowledge and words of others.
- 10 This proposition is supported by Herman’s and Oswald’s recent paper analysing the construction of a (...)
11Iacone, Loria, and Meini nuance these statements in two ways. Firstly, the room for manoeuvre that everyone has concerning his or her origins can be the source of a feeling of anxiety: individuals are responsible for their own future. Secondly, and in a very contemporary way, the role of experts has become such - amplified and sometimes blurred by the media - that it might be difficult to know who to trust10. According to the authors, these factors undermine the issue of trust in our societies: while it is necessary to trust each other to form a society, current societal configurations are such that placing one’s trust in someone entails the risk of relying on inappropriate people; we now have to find our way around a multitude of sources.
- 11 In our PhD thesis Complotti persuasivi? Un’indagine retorica, the role of trust and its ambiguity ( (...)
- 12 Paideia is a term used to describe education in ancient Greek thought. For an in-depth discussion o (...)
12The question of trust, which also seems to be at the heart of some research in rhetoric where it is, for the moment, mainly approached from the notion of ethos11 (Angenot 2013) must nevertheless be nuanced: maintaining that a need for reciprocal trust is necessary to live together does not mean that we are advocating blind trust which would become naivety. The notion of trust, concerning oneself and others, needs to be balanced by what the ancients called paideia12 (Di Piazza 2023, 2020) and by what the authors refer to as critical thinking, i.e. the ability to grant that trust appropriately.
- 13 We refer in particular to the introduction of this volume, and to Nera and Schöpfer (2023).
13Based on these contextual premises, the book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter seeks to problematize the definition of conspiracy in terms of defensive strategies, as a place of refuge from the social anxieties and frustrations that anyone can encounter. The exercise of defining conspiracy is a task faced by all researchers interested in this topic13. For the most part, the definition proposed at the beginning of the book is inspired by the work of the philosopher Quasim Casam (2019, 2007) and the psychologist Robert Brotherton (2014) and overlaps with the usual understandings of the phenomenon. However, the three authors highlight four points. Firstly, conspiracy theories offer explanations for socially significant, disruptive, or socially worrying events, or for disturbing events such as chemtrails, i.e. events that have been attested but that disrupt the common apprehension and understanding of reality, as well as public opinion. Secondly, this phenomenon implies distinguishing an enemy in an essentialized form: the enemy is the incarnation of absolute evil. Finally, the three researchers point out that, in most cases (fortunately), conspiracy theories remain a form of discourse that spreads without entailing the political action that could result from the seriousness of the thesis put forward. To this last component, the Italian researchers link one final aspect: conspiracy is shared - unlike paranoia, as they develop further; the conspiracist seeks to disseminate his/her discourse and convince as wide an audience as possible of the veracity of his/her statements.
14This delineation of conspiracy echoes as pointed out numerous observations made in rhetoric, and this is one of the interests of this book for researchers in rhetoric and argumentation. Such a book makes it possible to build bridges between disciplines and to bring together two epistemologies, each of which is interested in human reason in a way that is, in our view, nuanced and not prescriptive, but that is nevertheless framed. Each epistemology obviously has its own methodology and points of attention. We do not intend to reduce one discipline to another; we just want to indicate the points of dialogue between them.
- 14 However, the absence of any real action does not mean that conspiracy theory has no impact in the p (...)
15Let us begin by reviewing the four points highlighted by the Italian authors and the echoes they may have in rhetoric. The designation of an enemy in an essentialized form has already been studied by Loïc Nicolas (2014) and returns in our most recent work on the subject (Donckier de Donceel 2023). More specifically, we believe we can relate it to the question of the absence of action in the conspiracy framework. In a study developed with Julie Dainville, we show how the representation of an absolute and essentialized evil can, paradoxically, paralyze the passage to action (Dainville and Donckier de Donceel 2023). From a somewhat different perspective, Marco Mazzeo and Adriano Bertollini (2024) also highlight the idea of conspiracy theories as characterized by an absence of political action14. Finally, the question of persuasion is obviously central to the study of rhetoric. It is the starting point for studies in rhetoric and argumentation on the subject (Demata, Zorzi and Zottola 2022, Nicolas 2014). This characteristic of conspiracy discourse also ties in with the construction of a guru and prophet ethos observed by Emmanuelle Danblon and Loïc Nicolas (2010) more than a decade ago.
16Based on this definition, which, as indicated above, shares many lines of thought with rhetoric, the three authors set out their psychological research hypothesis: adherence to conspiracy, as defined above, would be the corollary of a feeling of ontological fragility. Taking up the work of Ronald Laing (1969) and then Giovanni Jervis (2014) on this theme, they propose to see conspiracy as a consequence of this fragility. Conspiracy would provide a sense of continuity between different significant events over a lifetime, and a renewed feeling of confidence in oneself and others. In an unpredictable environment such as today’s world, conspiracies offer an alternative, and reassuring, narrative in the face of notorious events that can have an impact on people’s belief in themselves, and in society. Without being complacent about conspiracy, rhetoric also recognizes the need to make sense of the events as a rational human need. Indeed, as Emmanuelle Danblon reminds us, some of the rhetorical functions of the epideictic genre make it possible to make sense of certain events. But the main difference is that in epideictic discourse, this need to make sense is always assumed to be fictional, which is rarely – if ever – the case in conspiracy discourse (Danblon 2020).
17While conspiracy is a possible reaction to the ontological need for continuity and coherence, the fact remains that it is a response to “normal” necessities, which has a (negative) impact on the human capacity to acquire information, reason, trust - in a nutshell, to think critically. Conspiracy theories’ impact on critical thinking has never escaped the attention of specialists in the field. The first to highlight this element was Karl Popper when he pointed to an impression of a transfiguration of the scientific model in conspiracy theories. And indeed, it is the first type of conspiracy discourse that the three Italian authors propose to highlight in the second chapter (Forme di cospirazionismo) of their book. After so-called “scientific” conspiracies, they describe what can be described as “emotional” conspiracies, in which the victim’s imaginary is very present, and “totalizing” conspiracies, in which the conspiracy explanation covers all aspects of society.
- 15 The authors refer to the documentary « Behind the curve » produced in 2018.
18So-called “scientific” conspiracies are illustrated by the case of the platists15. The authors develop the following proposition: a priori, scientists are the designated interlocutors for providing answers or attempts at answers to the many ‘whys’ that run through society. It is a long, slow, tedious job and one in which disagreement is still prevalent. In contrast to scientific work, conspiracy theories offer an obvious, clear, and immediate answer to these questions. They are a form of refuge from human vulnerabilities. However, conspiracy theorists respond to the “whys” using an argumentative style that emphasizes the scientific model: doubt is cast (Nicolas 2014), signs and clues are interpreted (Danblon 2023a) and reference is made to the field of expertise (Mazzeo and Bertollini 2024, Donckier de Donceel 2022, Herman and Oswald 2022). Conspiracy theories thus seem to propose argumentative reasoning based on empirical and practical models, with the scientific approach remaining the reference benchmark; but, as the Italian authors point out, conspiracy theories merely “mimics” scientific practice. As mentioned before, the answers they propose are generally simplified, rapid, unambiguous, and above all do not respect the principle of falsifiability. This is the exact opposite of what we expect from a scientific approach, which is neither simple, quick nor unambiguous.
19These fundamental differences lead the authors to assert that conspiracy theories are also a pitfall of relativism and not just positivism, as some tend to think today. In a trend similar to that highlighted by Marc Angenot on the subject of trust (2013), contemporary Western society, by placing so high a value on positivism, has sometimes led to excesses: either strong trust in and appreciation of the role of experts, or extreme doubt that paradoxically leads to absolute certainty, based on our direct experiences. Absolute, and we would say almost unique, confidence in our direct experiences can also be linked to a certain pitfall of relativism. As the psychologist Jervis, on whom the three Italian authors base their discussion, points out, in the 1960s and 1970s there was a crisis of objectivity, and direct access to things was valued to the extreme; there was a tendency to consider that every discourse and interpretation of reality had a voice (Jervis 2021, 121 cit. in Loria, Iacone and Meini, 33-34). It is in this tension – which we consider symptomatic of our times, and which can be found in conspiracy-related phenomena such as post-truth (Di Piazza, Piazza and Serra 2018, Lorusso 2018) – that the right appreciation of the conspiracy phenomenon lies (Iacone, Loria and Meini, 34):
- 16 Our translation: “We reach out one of the central aspects of conspiracy: its argumentative process (...)
E qui a nostro avviso si tocca un nervo scoperto del complottismo: il paradossale incedere argomentativo della mentalità cospirazionista, tutta protesa a servire immaginari e desideri personali e condivisi tra gruppi elitari. Il paradosso risiede proprio nel maldestro uso della ragione che, escogitando giustificazioni parodianti rigorose inferenze tipiche della scienza, arriva a negare la correttezza dei ragionamenti stessi16.
20Secondly, although the so-called “scientific” conspiracy is prevalent in the public sphere, it is not the only existing form of conspiracy. The three authors also highlight the presence of what they call “emotional” or “pathetic” conspiracies. By this term, they mean conspiracy theories in which the emotional cursor is more pronounced, and in which there is a very clear victim-versus-abuser dynamic. In this category, they classify, for example, the speeches produced during the Covid-19 pandemic in which the conspiracists claimed to be victims of an attack on their physical and moral integrity in the same way as the victims of the Shoah. This is an unfair persuasive effect encountered on numerous occasions on social networks, and that has escaped nobody’s notice (Donckier de Donceel 2023). More generally, claiming to be a “victim”, i.e. constructing an ethos based on this qualifier, is now a recognized persuasion technique: in our contemporary societies, the “victim” is considered a valid and legitimate interlocutor on the public scene (Azouvi 2024, Grinshpun 2019, Giglioli 2014).
- 17 In a nutshell and in a simplified form, according to Mercier (also in Sperber et al. 2010, Sperber (...)
21In the present study, the authors decide to go one step further in their analysis of the Covid-19 conspiracy discourse by highlighting the credulity component. For them, this conspiracy wave was the perfect embodiment of the tension between distrust and fear of the traditional epistemic, political, and media authorities and blind trust in ‘ready-made’ proposals, as they describe them. Based on this observation, the three researchers propose to discuss one of Hugo Mercier’s final hypotheses. According to the French researcher, human beings are not naturally inclined to be credulous17, and, regarding conspiracy theories, this leads him to maintain that, a priori, adherence to conspiracy theories stems mainly from an intuitively appealing narrative, ignoring questions of the charisma of the conspiracy theories’ author (Mercier 2020). Without discussing Hugo Mercier’s thesis on credulity from a rhetorical perspective, we observe that this position does not consider the persuasive effects of the discourse produced by the components of ethos and pathos and is generally rather at odds with general trends in conspiracy studies. The caution we express regarding Mercier’s approach seems to be shared by the book’s authors. They point out the risk, based on such a reading of conspiracy theories, of labelling conspiracists as mad or simple-minded. We’ll come back to this later.
22Having explored these two types of conspiracy, the authors make a third suggestion: conspiracy as a response to a need for total control. To illustrate and explore this tendency, they refer to the case of QAnon – a so-called systemic conspiracy theory according to Michael Barkun’s categorization (2003). Based on this conspiracy theory, the researchers embark on a more strictly psychological reflection: conspiracy theorizing reflects a sense of unease and insecurity about personal identity. Taking their lead from the work of Dolores Albarracìn (2020), they develop their argument: the need to build a stable and coherent personal identity is linked to and operates in a reciprocal logic with three other psychological needs: knowledge, self-defense, and social recognition.
23The third chapter is the most psychological in the book, exploring each of the psychological needs and explaining their relationship to the other two, as well as to conspiracy. This is the most technical part of the book, and to clarify our discussion and avoid appropriating knowledge that is not our own, we have preferred to proceed in two stages: first, a summary of the propositions of the Italian authors, and then a point of comparison with the observations currently suggested in rhetoric.
24The first of the psychological needs studied by the three authors is that of knowledge, the importance of which was already emphasized by Aristotle: human beings need to know the world around them, but not only that: they also find a certain pleasure in the search for meaning and understanding of their environment. This heuristic pleasure component is precisely what can, paradoxically, lead to certain excesses, such as the excessive desire to trace a coherence between different events.
- 18 The illusion of knowledge recalls the idea that individuals think they know something about a speci (...)
- 19 The authors remind that, on the one hand, this model includes two forms of strategies (situational (...)
25In addition, there are two main cognitive biases: the illusion of knowledge and the illusion of informed knowledge18 (Sloman and Fernbach 2018, cit. in Loria, Iacone and Meini). In their relationship with conspiracy, these potential drifts of heuristic pleasure are grouped under the term ‘fundamental attribution error’ (Clarke 2002 cit. in Loria, Iacone and Meini), which emphasizes the role of intentionality in the conspiracist interpretation of events19. However, the authors insist that the presence of certain cognitive biases in conspiracy reasoning is not enough to explain everything: while these mechanisms may encourage our tendency to adhere to certain false discourses or conspiracy theories, understanding them must be coupled with the question of identity if we are to understand the attraction of conspiracies.
- 20 The personal identity of someone is related to his/her social identity, the role he/she plays in th (...)
26The element of knowledge is thus linked to the question of identity, which the authors explore through the prism of the need for self-defense. When faced with available information, individuals adopt two main types of reasoning: reasoning based on the information itself and reasoning based on identity. The first refers to a more technical and systematic analysis of the information available. The second refers to the idea of reasoning based on stereotypes that reinforce personally and socially each person’s individual identity20. This second line of reasoning favors the tendency to adhere to and positively consider information that is congruent with the thinking of the group to which each individual belongs.
- 21 On that matter, we refer to our PhD thesis.
27Although this tendency is natural to human beings, in certain cases, when it becomes too automatic and when it is confronted with an unclear information space, it risks being transformed into identity-based thinking. As the authors repeatedly point out, these tendencies are natural, even necessary, for human beings. Once again, they emphasize that it is difficult to draw a line between a strictly conspiratorial attitude and one that is not. The workings and mechanisms of conspiracy are mostly shared and common with other types of reasoning and/or human phenomena. It is worth remembering that this is an element that emerges in a salient way in rhetorical analyses of conspiracy: the conspiracy discourse owes its effectiveness, in large part, to an argumentative arsenal shared with the three main genres of rhetoric21. Reasoning according to a schema that reinforces individual identity is thus a necessary, but not sufficient, element in the psychological explanation of conspiracy.
28Based on these initial observations, the authors suggest a further correlation: while individuals tend to adhere to information/explanations that are sometimes false and that reinforce their individual identity, these same individuals sometimes go so far as to consider that people who contradict them are not opposing what they are saying, but their person, their identity. This is how the need for knowledge and the need for self-defense come together: human beings are keen to protect themselves from unpleasant emotions (which may come from information that contradicts their thinking patterns), in general, but even more so when they have a fragile individual identity. This fear of contradiction can lead to a withdrawal into oneself and/or the group, reinforcing the individual’s initial position. Once again, according to the authors, this is a necessary, but not sufficient, step to explain the support for conspiracy. This is why they propose a further development: conspiracy is a particular manifestation of the need for knowledge and self-defense of personal identity, which finds in devotion to a leader a form of compensation for ontological insecurity.
29In so doing, the authors lead the reader to consider the social recognition component in the psychological process of embracing conspiracy theories. The leader recognized as the authority in every respect, both epistemic and moral, becomes the recipient of the conspiracist’s absolute trust. Ontological fragility often goes hand in hand with a lack of confidence in oneself and others. Confidence in one’s relationship with oneself and others is one of the central elements of human behavior, forming the basis of social cooperation, learning, the reinforcement of knowledge, social norms, a feeling of security regarding oneself and others, and eventually, self-esteem. In conspiracy theories, trust is undermined: it is transformed into (almost always) widespread distrust of traditional authorities and blind trust, or even submission, to an alternative authority figure and the entourage created around him or her; belonging to a group provides a new sense of identity. These mechanisms for constructing and reinforcing identity are even more effective when the group to which the individual belongs identifies, on the one hand, with a public figure whom he or she evaluates positively and, on the other, with a group whose political identity is very strong. In this way, group membership provides an “imaginary identity supplement”: this means that the group becomes a strong, stable, and coherent identity structure that compensates for the individual’s ontological fragility.
30The authors explain in more detail how the quality of identity defence (and therefore, vice versa, the ontological fragility to which all human beings are potentially exposed) is greatly conditioned by the quality of the relationships and care from which each of us benefits in childhood. They deal with this question based on attachment theories and will show, in the next chapter, that this is undoubtedly one of the only constants in the attempt to answer the question of who the conspiracists are. Before doing so, the three researchers explain two further elements to the reader: they show the different types of attachment that an individual may experience and what are the existing links between feelings of ontological security and narcissism.
- 22 On parrhesia and the concept of disruptive ethos, see the recent work edited by Guérin (2022). On c (...)
- 23 On truth, its different meanings, and social impacts, from a linguistic perspective, see: Di Piazza (...)
31Without going any further into the details of these psychological arguments, we will only point out that if conspiracy is the result of an emotional dysfunction in childhood, then in adulthood it translates into a lack of self-esteem and the ability to trust, which manifests itself in an attitude of devotion to a person/thought on the margins, which fosters both a feeling of exclusion and powerlessness, but also a strong narcissistic feeling. It seems to us that these propositions are echoed in the rhetorical analysis of conspiracy discourse: the conspiracy speaker is generally someone who presents him or herself as someone whose words must be listened to and widely disseminated, someone who holds the truth but also someone who, because he or she holds this truth, is on the margins. This is reflected in rhetorical terms, notably in the use of the word “truth”, but also in the construction of an ethos that might be likened to that of the parrhesiast22. It seems to us that the feeling of powerlessness is one of the specific pathetic features of conspiracy discourse and we propose to relate this effect to the strong presence of resentment in such discourse, but also to an essentialized and absolute representation of the enemy: the enemy takes the form of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent group, an adversary that is impossible to beat. In a reverse mirror image, the conspiracist sees him or herself as the victim, the person who has done nothing, the innocent par excellence. Finally, the narcissistic component can be found in the rhetorical results of analyses of conspiracy discourse insofar as the conspiracy speaker is both a person close to his/her audience, “like us”, but also above us, the conspiracy speaker knows his/her subject, his/her words are expert and deserve to be listened to absolutely. This narcissistic inclination and the demand for absolute devotion, as the authors studied here also emphasize, play a major part in the polarizing component of conspiracy theories: either you are with us or against us, things are true or false, there is no room for disagreement or nuances of truth23.
32This exploration of the psychological reasons for embracing conspiracy is a perfect preparation for the fourth chapter (I nemici sono (tutti) gli altri). In this section, the authors present five clinical cases to show the diversity of profiles of people who adhere to conspiracy theories. These stories are approached and read from a systemic perspective and were selected to enable the authors to develop their explanatory and interpretative propositions presented earlier in the book. Indeed, at the end of this chapter, three propositions seem to be confirmed. Firstly, there is great diversity in the profiles of those who adhere to conspiracy theories. Secondly, the group component is essential: belonging to a group with a strong, uncompromising identity allows a certain form of narcissism to express itself and enables some people to reinforce an individual identity still under construction. Finally, and related to this second element, these clinical accounts illustrate and confirm the hypothesis that the component of ontological fragility is a common and significant feature for adherence to conspiracy discourse. Indeed, for the three authors, becoming and being oneself is always a complicated process which, for some, finds a way out in joining and belonging to the conspiracy group.
- 24 Recognizing pastafarism as a religion is still a discussed matter, mostly because at first, it was (...)
33Going a step further, in the final chapter (Idee contagiose) of the book they propose a more in-depth analysis of the dynamics of individual identity construction within the group, focusing on the binary, even polarizing, dynamics between “us” and “them”. They ask the question: allora, che cosa sono i complottisti? (‘who are the conspiracists?’). In answering this query, the authors clearly emphasize their refusal to describe the conspiracists as mere representatives of irrationality, which would, in their view, lead to two errors. Firstly, to regard them as the manifestation of a far-fetched form of irrationality would bring conspiracy theories closer to new and eccentric forms of religion such as pastafarism24. Secondly, if these discourses are the embodiment of human irrationality, it would be easy to dismiss them as paranoid or even pathological delusions.
- 25 The tendency to understand conspiracy as a form of paranoia is rooted in the works of Hofdstadter ( (...)
34According to the Italian researchers – and we agree with them – these comparisons should be avoided because they do not reflect the specific features of conspiracy theories. On the one hand, the new religions and the sense of belonging to a group are not built around an enemy. In conspiracy theories, the enemy acts as a repellent and contrasting pole, helping to reinforce the group’s identity, in a dynamic of polarisation and a very strong distinction between “them” and “us”. On the other hand, the pathological component25 is confusing on two levels: firstly, a mental pathology generally affects a small and specific number of people, whereas conspiracy theories affect everyone. Secondly, the victim-abuser dynamic present in both paranoia and conspiracy reveals a fundamental difference between these two groups. A paranoid person considers that he or she alone is the victim of society. A conspiracist considers that he or she and his or her group are the victims of abuse by a very specific group of people, an essentialized enemy. The paranoid person is therefore alone, whereas the conspiracist is looking for allies, seeking to spread his/her word, what he/she considers to be “the” truth. As we pointed out earlier, this is one of the linguistic markers of conspiracism that we see particularly pronounced in rhetorical studies on the subject. As we said, in conspiracy speeches, the speaker often adopts the ethos of a guru, or even a parrhesiast: he/she is the one who holds the truth and has a duty to spread it. These discourses are therefore filled with terms such as “the duty of truth”, “opposing light to darkness”, etc. In this logic, the persecutor, the person who prevents the dissemination of conspiracy theories and harms the speaker’s integrity, is an enemy and a target.
- 26 As presented by the authors, Pierre considers that epistemic mistrust, as Fleury assumes it towards (...)
35The group, constructed in radical opposition to the other as the source of unhappiness but also as the source of a certain form of censorship, or at least invalidation of what the group says, is said to be the source of what the American researcher Joseph Pierre (2020) describes as “epistemic mistrust26”. This form of mistrust, which he sees as characteristic of conspiracy theories, is expressed through a categorical rejection of information from traditional authorities. Once again, the authors come around to the question of self-esteem, which goes hand in hand with the human capacity to trust. Conspiracy would be a group where individual identity is constructed, in opposition to traditional authorities, only to be subjected to another authority, that of the margins and the alternative. The group’s thinking becomes contagious and necessary, and group reasoning is necessary for the construction of individual identity, but it can, in certain respects, diminish the individual’s critical capacity. This “us” then enters a logic of polarization and dysfunction; it is a group made up of individuals who nevertheless remain isolated.
36Based on these various proposals – and this is the final point in our critical analysis – the authors propose to redefine the limits of conspiracy theories. They add the following propositions to those presented at the beginning of the work:
– Conspiracy is a form of extreme simplification of reality in which “us” is opposed to “them” in the form of essentialized evil. The “us” is, conversely and undoubtedly, the “good guy” in the story. This extreme simplification of reality acquires a quality of self-evidence.
– From a psychological and social point of view, the “us” takes on such a scope that it becomes totalizing ; leaving the group would imply a profound rupture and would strongly impact the individual identity of the departing member.
– The simplification of reality and the prominence of “us” come together in periods of crisis, when thinking is more in need of meaning and coherence.
– These different elements push the conspiracist individual to take social responsibility away from him or herself, to distrust and distance him or herself from society.
37These clarifications of the characteristics of conspiracy and the book as a whole highlight the idea of a strange, even disturbing, similarity between conspiracists and non-conspiracists. It is an observation we share. As we said, many of the questions and observations are like those that have marked the field of rhetoric, including our own PhD thesis. Conspiracy theories reflect a discontent specific to our societies, an ambivalent relationship with trust and authorities, and a threat to our democracies, but it is not a pathological phenomenon.
38The questions raised by this phenomenon are legitimate and understandable. It is normal to wonder about our identity; uncertainties are part of human nature. But while it is legitimate to ask these questions, conspiracy theories offer what the authors describe as a ready-made response, a simple and easy answer, polarizing and radical, to questions rather difficult and complex. Rather than condemning conspiracy theories, the authors invite the reader to explore the depths of human nature, abandon a binary reading of rationality, and rediscover a certain form of lucidity in our social relationships. The lucidity they call for should help us to rebuild a wisdom that is both collective and individual.
39It is a call that the entire rhetorical tradition can only welcome. It confirms our initial premise: when it comes to studying a phenomenon such as conspiracy, the disciplines of rhetoric and psychology share certain concerns and put forward comparable hypotheses. However, as we pointed out at the opening of our discussion, for interdisciplinary work to be truly effective, it must not be limited to a simple reciprocal confirmation of observations. It is important to bear in mind that a discussion such as the one proposed here is only a first step. From now on, if the desire to work together to understand the conspiracy phenomenon is shared, we need to be able to sit down together around the table and truly initiate the interdisciplinary work: we must understand how the two disciplines can dialogue, mutually enrich each other and concretely how to proceed. Such work will certainly involve facing up to challenges, and even dead ends; but we remain convinced that it is only in this way that we will gain a more insightful look at one of the key issues facing our democracies today, and thus be able, one day, to hope to counter effectively the presence and spread of conspiracy theories in the public sphere.
Flux RSS
