2Recently, the trend has been reversed. On the one hand, conspiracy theories are no longer considered a form of stupidity (Loria, Iacone & Meini 2023). Secondly, the fight against these theories is increasingly being waged before they are disseminated in the public arena. Indeed, most research into conspiracy theories now seeks to understand the reasons for their “success”. Furthermore, given the relative failure of fact-checking and debunking (Bronner 2022), conspiracy theory education practices are gradually turning towards pre-bunking (Lewandowsky & van der Linden 2021; Tisseron 2022). The objective is to prevent obscurantist temptation rather than cure it once it has taken hold. From this perspective, rhetoric and its technical methodology could play their part in the tremendous challenge that awaits us (Danblon 2020, 2024).

– is opposed to common opinion and scientific knowledge at a given time T

• 5 On the distinction between these two meanings of the rhetorical and Aristotelian concept of “verisi (...)

– uses the terms “possible” and “probable” as synonyms5

– rejects contingency and chance

– postulates hidden intentions that explain events in a deterministic way

– lends malicious intent to alleged conspirators

– conveys distrust of traditional authorities

• 6 On this topic, see Nicolas 2010; 2014.

– assumes blind confidence in its own theory6,

and

– is both victim-centered and accusatory.

4This issue takes stock of the current state of conspiracy theories, which have entered a new phase in the last twenty years or so. They are unprecedented in terms of their spread, but undoubtedly also of the change in their very nature. The current success of the phenomenon sometimes reveals a spectacular empowerment on the part of conspiracy theorists concerning the classic question of truth, as well as the state of our scientific knowledge. As specialists in rhetoric, we are more interested in the reasons for the persuasive power, and hence the success, of conspiracy theories than in finding any errors of reasoning or falsifications of events that they contain. Indeed, one of the sources of astonishment for specialists is the highly persuasive nature of conspiracy explanations, even though a careful critical examination most of the time detects the factual errors or biases in the reasoning underlying them. Where does then the persuasive force of conspiracy theory come from, even though it is often manifestly false, and sometimes even implausible (Danblon 2020)?

5This situation calls into question our understanding of rationality and persuasion, and what distinguishes conspiracy theory from scientific, political and legal discourse. Is it so different? Or, on the contrary, does it share more similarities with our usual persuasive frameworks than we might like to believe?

7Indeed, it must be said that a great deal has changed since then in what has come to be known as the complosphere. A first indication of this current mutation in conspiracy discourse can be seen in the difference highlighted by Michael Barkun (2003) between, on the one hand, what he calls “conspiracy events,” which we assume were disseminated at the time, and, on the other hand, “conspiracy-systems” as they are mainly disseminated today. In other words, a conspiracy tradition that prevailed until the 20th century specialized in some conspiracy explanation of an event, whose followers became self-proclaimed experts. Today, this has given way to a general tendency to “see conspiracies everywhere,” linked together by an obscure vision of the world and events. Indeed, even if some conspiracy theories now focus on a particular aspect of society (health, politics, or justice), the discourse developed by conspiracy speakers does not fail to place this event within a more complex system: the introduction of 5G, co-occurring with the Covid-19 pandemic, is said to be the sign of the same desire to sterilize or even destroy part of the population.

8Under these conditions, as many media specialists are now bitterly observing, fact-checking, while still an essential step in dismantling and debunking conspiracy theories, is losing much of its critical effectiveness in the face of the virality of their dissemination. What might this change be symptomatic of? How can we educate people about citizenship in the face of what is happening today? And why do we feel that rhetoric is an important tool for tackling these new challenges?

9As we know, the rhetorical approach, especially in a realist conception inherited from the Aristotelian tradition (Amossy 2000, Danblon 2013, Piazza 2004), seeks to describe all the processes of persuasion to evaluate their potential effectiveness. It, therefore, considers the three means of persuasion, traditionally known as technical proofs (ethos, pathos, and logos), not only to be of equal importance, but also to be intimately linked together to form a strategy underpinned by a set of commonplaces that we will attempt to describe by a coherent imaginary or, in other terms, a vision of the world: a “topique.” More than ever, this global analysis of the success of a given kind of discourse is in our eyes fruitful – an analysis that requires us to consider human rationality in a version that is both broadened and made more flexible, one that is not limited solely to the criteria of the validity of reasoning. The rhetorical approach, with its technical and conceptual apparatus, provides a reminder of the importance of the three proofs that participate in the process of persuasion, in the face of the faltering practice of fact-checking. Rhetoric offers a disciplinary framework for thinking about the importance of trust and emotions in argumentative procedures and could complement current research on conspiracy.

10It should be remembered that, given the scale of the phenomenon, no single field of research claims to be able to respond to the contemporary challenge posed by conspiracy. Keeping this in mind, each contribution in this volume illustrates in its own way the different persuasive strategies at work in today’s conspiracy imaginary.

12Being fully aware of this danger, we have sought to bring together the views of researchers who have taken up current issues in which the accusation of conspiracy is obvious. Whether such an accusation is legitimate, and by what criterion, is a question that must therefore be considered in the different perspectives of analysis proposed.

13Théophile Robineau’s contribution addresses two of the issues highlighted in this introduction: the difficulty of defining conspiracy theories; and the ad hominem argument, both on the part of those referred to as “conspiracy theorists” and in their discourse: the question of ethos is therefore central to the discussion. More specifically, to identify the linguistic facts that would make it possible to establish a diagnosis of conspiracy, Robineau conducted three surveys of speakers giving their opinions on the COVID-19 pandemic. The survey’s result was that one of his interviewees found a link between the label ad hominem argument and a diagnosis of conspiracy. This argument is supposed to denounce a contradiction in the speaker that would at the same time disqualify the content of his arguments. One of the respondents in whom Robineau was particularly interested reasoned as follows: since our leaders cannot be suspected of stupidity or error in reasoning, the contradiction detected in their position can only be due to malice, which can be explained by the organization of a plot against the population. From this perspective, the accusation of conspiracy, which always has a negative connotation, would be an ad hominem charge. The author remains cautious, however, about the possibility of an analysis in terms of argumentative sequences able to definitively qualify a discourse as conspiratorial. Above all, such a methodology emphasizes the caution and humility researchers must display when venturing into areas as delicate as the “complosphere.”

14Adriano Bertollini and Marco Mazzeo propose a rhetorical analysis that explicitly considers the three dimensions of persuasion. More specifically, they undertake a rhetorical analysis of a documentary broadcast on the Netflix platform in which the author, a journalist, hypothesizes a spectacular plot produced by the archaeological community to conceal the existence of a very ancient yet technologically advanced civilization. The two Italian researchers attempt to answer what they perceive as an enigma. How can such an improbable hypothesis be so successful in the public sphere? In more theoretical terms, how can a discourse that appears to be factually false win support? It is clear to Marco Mazzeo and Adriano Bertollini that the mythological dimension plays an important role in the journalist’s persuasion strategy. In this respect, they make an interesting dissociation between superstition and what is commonly described as magical thinking. This focus on a current taste for mythology echoes, as we shall see, the contribution, in this issue, of the philosopher and psychoanalyst Julien Cueille.

15The following contribution by Roberta Zagarella and Marco Annoni is rooted in the same question: what rhetorical elements make it possible to understand the effectiveness of a factually false discourse? Based on a campaign organized jointly by the European Commission, UNESCO, Twitter (now 'X'), and the World Jewish Congress, which aims to counter the conspiracy theories that emerged at the time of the COVID-19 pandemic (#ThinkBeforeSharing), the authors ask how to combat the spread of conspiracy theories, particularly in the field of public health and its consequences for citizenship. With this in mind, the Italian researchers focus their analysis on the strategy recommended by experts on the best way, namely the most effective way, to talk to people who might be tempted to subscribe to conspiracy theories. Among the rhetorical proofs that attracted their attention, and like in Robineau’s proposal, the notion of ethos is central. The aim is to avoid constructing an ethos whose main feature is a form of epistemic hubris, i.e. an attitude that is both arrogant and contemptuous of those tempted by conspiracy theories. In this specific case, we can see that the experts’ main concern is to assure potential debaters that they will be respected before any arguments are exchanged about the scientific content of the debate.
In our view, this contribution clearly underlines the need to distinguish between questions of real or supposed expertise in medical or scientific matters and the question of respect for individuals and their sensitivity in their desire to participate in the public debate. The experts’ recommendation is welcomed by our authors in that it recognizes the complexity of any argumentative strategy, which is a necessary condition for a quality exchange, whatever the content at stake. Such a condition may not always guarantee the desired result (combating adherence to conspiracy theories) but it has at least the merit of pointing out that without this condition, cognitive dissonance can only lead to a breakdown in dialogue and therefore distrust between participants, reducing all citizen interaction to a “them” and a “us” cut off from any epistemic exchange.

16Benjamin Sevestre-Giraud goes on to analyze the relevance of rhetoric in understanding the persuasive effectiveness of conspiracy theories. His contribution is fully focused on the practical side of rhetoric. His article addresses several questions: how does the knowledge of rhetoric respond to current pedagogical concerns? Can rhetoric be used to tackle the new educational challenges raised by conspiracy theories? If so, how can the positions formulated in the analyses be articulated with those of citizens? To answer these questions, the researcher undertakes a critical analysis of the documents published by the French Ministry of Education, based on which he proposes an approach centered on rhetoric designed to train a “good orator,” i.e. an individual whose civic qualities can be judged in terms of “virtues” in the sense that the Ancients gave to this label. From both a historical and interdisciplinary perspective, the author critically and fairly examines several disciplinary positions, always bearing in mind the initial question: what civic virtues do we want to train today? In seeking to soften some of the all-too-often caricatured oppositions between descriptive and normative approaches, the author strongly calls for broadening our conception of rationality. This broadening would make it possible to give a more realistic and coherent account of citizens’ points of view.

17Finally, this volume closes with a reflection – more like an essay – by Julien Cueille. This contribution, it seems to us, brings together many of the concerns that have run through the various contributions: the question of how to define conspiracy theories, the link that can be established between these discourses and mythological thinking, and the question of the attitude to adopt when faced with conspiracy theories in the public arena. To do this, the author focuses on the thought and world of the famous Italian author Umberto Eco. As in Mazzeo and Bertollini’s contribution, such a universe takes the reader into a murky zone where reality, fiction and conspiracy are intertwined. The author focuses on two early novels by Umberto Eco, which he sees as evidence of a postmodern turning point in which our society has begun to indulge in a significant blurring of the boundaries between fiction, myth and reality. From this perspective, questions of rationality can no longer be reduced to tracking down cognitive biases, as some authors have all too often tended to do by limiting critical thinking. Here, we enter resolutely through fiction, or rather through our (new?) relationship with a universe that hesitates between fiction, myth, reality, even playful pleasure and a taste for enigma, as Eco’s novels testify. The psychological dimension of this relationship to reality is also emphasized by the author, who draws a parallel between this blurring of boundaries within reality and the clinical notion of the borderline state. But on a rhetorical level, Cueille invites us to consider a phenomenon we should pay close attention: the emancipation of tropes. In the same way that a once-saving hoax can be deliberately taken literally, a figure such as metalepsis, which consists of making one thing appear to be another, is most often taken literally. In the case of metalepsis, the disappearance of the boundary between literal and figurative meaning extends into the imaginary.

18This overview of the current state of conspiracy theories has enabled us to take a fresh look at their topicality by comparing them with the research conducted in 2010. The phenomenon has a common base, but different variations. A final question has emerged that has yet to be definitively answered: why are conspiracy theories problematic? There is certainly the risk of collective violence, from the publication of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which inspired Nazi crimes, to the Christ Church massacre in New Zealand in 2019. There is undoubtedly also the risk of obscurantism (think of the “platists”) and the dangers to our ideal of rationality. And finally, there is the worrying problem of incompetence in managing democratic disagreement (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, Habermas 1987 [1981], Breton 2006, Mouffe 2013, Serra 2017). In the face of these dark observations, we believe that civic education, and more particularly critical thinking, could provide a common foundation for remedying the political, cognitive, and relational dangers that conspiracy theories pose to our democracies.